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Abstract 
Small, tight-knit communities, are complex to manage from outside during a disaster. The 
township of Lyttelton, New Zealand, and the communities of Corsair Bay, Cass Bay, and 
Rapaki to the east, are especially more so difficult due to the terrain that encloses them, 
which caused them to be cut-off from Christchurch, the largest city in the South Island, 
barely 10 km away, after the Mw 7.1 Darfield Earthquake and subsequent Canterbury 
Earthquake Sequence.  
Lyttelton has a very strong and deep-rooted community spirit that draws people to want to 
be a part of Lyttelton life. It is predominantly residential on the slopes, with retail space, 
service and light industry nestled near the harbour. It has heritage buildings stretching back 
to the very foundation of Canterbury yet hosts the largest, modern deep-water port for the 
region.  
This study contains two surveys: one circulated shortly before the Darfield Earthquake and 
one circulated in July 2011, after the Christchurch and Sumner Earthquakes. An analytical 
comparison of the participants’ household preparedness for disaster before the Darfield 
Earthquake and after the Christchurch and Sumner Earthquakes was performed. A 
population spatiotemporal distribution map was produced that shows the population in 
three-hourly increments over a week to inform exposure to vulnerability to natural hazards.  
The study went on to analyse the responses of the participants in the immediate period 
following the Chrsitchurch and Sumner Earthquakes, including their homeward and 
subsequent journeys, and the decision to evacuate or stay in their homes. Possible 
predictors to a decision to evacuate some or all members of the household were tested.  
The study also asked participants’ views on the events since September 2010 for analysis. 
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Definitions and/or Abbreviations 
Some of the major earthquakes mentioned in this thesis that have struck the Canterbury 
region since 4th September 2010 have been given names in the literature, but others have 
not. On occasion, it is more appropriate to refer to the date the earthquake occurred, e.g. 
the February earthquake. The following names have been used in this thesis: 
Table 0-1-1 : Names of major earthquakes used in this thesis 
Name1 
[Fault] 
Mw Depth 
(km) 
Date and time – NZ Local time 
YYYYMMDD HH:MM 
GNS Science 
reference number 
Canterbury Earthquake Sequence   20100904 onwards  
Darfield Earthquake 
 [Greendale Fault] 
7.1 10 20100904 04:35 3366146 
Boxing Day Earthquake 
[Christchurch Fault] 
4.9 5 20101226 10:30 3437105 
Christchurch Earthquakes 
 [Port Hills Fault] 
   
20110222 
 
I 6.3 6 20110222 12:51 3468575 
II 5.8 6 20110222 13:04 3468581 
III 5.9 7 20110222 14:50 3468635 
Sumner Earthquakes 
 [Sumner Fault] 
   
20110613 
 
I 5.9 9 20110613 13:01 3528810 
II 6.4 7 20110613 14:20 3528839 
Pre-Christmas (2011) Cluster 
[Pegasus Bay Seismicity Zone] 
   
20111223 
 
I 5.9 10 20111223 13:58 3631359 
II 5.3 10 20111223 14:06 3631363 
III 6.0 7 20111223 15:18 3631380 
IV 5.1 11 20111223 16:50 3631432 
                                                        
1  Earthquakes are usually named according to the closest named important locality or geographical location to 
the epicentre. Even though the earthquakes that occurred on 22nd February 2011 happened away from Central 
Christchurch, it was the effect they had on the complete city that is reflected in the name. Some of these 
earthquakes are not named officially, or are referred to as part of a cluster or swarm, or the date they 
occurred.  Likewise, the names of faults take time to become established in literature. 
xxii 
 
Table 0-1-2  : Acronyms 
Acronym Long form 
CCC Christchurch City Council 
CDEM Civil Defence Emergency Management 
CERA Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority 
CPSZ Canterbury Plains Seismicity Zone 
DBH Department of Building and Housing 
DoC Department of Conservation 
ECan Environment Canterbury 
ESRI Environmental Sciences Research Institute. A vendor of GIS software. 
EQC EarthQuake Commission 
GIS Geographic Information System. A system for storing and manipulating 
geographical information on a computer. 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GNS Te Pū Ao. The Institute of Geological and Nuclear Science Limited, 
established in 1865 and one of New Zealand’s Crown Resource Institutes. 
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System 
GST Goods and Services Tax 
HFA Hyogo Framework for Action 
ICSU International Council for Science 
IESE Institute of Earth Science and Engineering 
IRDR Integrated Research on Disaster Risk 
ISDR International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
KML Keyhole Markup Language. KML is a file format used to display geographic 
data in an Earth browser, such as Google Earth. 
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Acronym Long form 
LINZ Land Information New Zealand 
MCDEM Ministry of Civil Defence Emergency Management 
MMI Modified Mercalli Intensity scale 
Mw Moment Magnitude Scale (MMS). Used to measure the size of earthquakes 
in terms of energy released. 
NHRC Natural Hazards Research Centre 
NZD New Zealand Dollar 
NZTA New Zealand Transport Agency 
PBSZ Pegasus Bay Seismicity Zone 
PHGG Port Hills Geotechnical Group 
PSHA Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Assessment 
TCLEE Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering 
UoC University of Canterbury 
USD United States Dollar 
WSPA World Society for the Protection of Animals 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Lyttelton (pop. 3’075) (Statistics New Zealand 2006c) is a small satellite township to the 
South of Christchurch, New Zealand. It is of high strategic importance to Christchurch City 
(pop. 348’435) (Statistics New Zealand 2006b) and the surrounding region due to its 
deepwater port.  
 
Figure 1-1 : Study area in context of New Zealand 
 
Figure 1-2 : Map of Study Area 
There have been various studies commissioned to analyse the continuation of port 
operations after the occurrence of natural hazard events. Most are unpublished, 
embargoed, or confidential due to commercial sensitivity. However, no known previous 
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analysis of population vulnerability has been undertaken for Lyttelton. It is this gap which 
this thesis addresses; a study of the resident population, their preparation for and needs 
during a period of calamity. Due to the timing of the research and unfolding events, this 
study takes advantage of a unique opportunity to compare the pre-disaster planning and 
preparedness of one community with post-disaster actions within one year over three major 
disasters. 
Over the course of this study, the 2010-onwards Canterbury Earthquake Sequence has been 
affecting the region: 4th September 2010 Darfield Earthquake; 26th December 2010 Boxing 
Day Earthquake; 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake; 13th June 2011 Sumner 
Earthquake; and, 23rd December 2011 Pre-Christmas Earthquake. All were felt in Lyttelton 
and most caused damage or fear. 
Lyttelton lies within the extinct Lyttelton Volcano, between steep hill slopes to the North 
and the harbour to the South (New Zealand Geological Survey 1988). Prior to the recent 
2010/2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence, the steep slopes above residential areas had 
the potential to generate rock falls during an earthquake (Elder et al. 1991); to the East and 
West, the access roads pass under high and crumbling basaltic cliffs (Crampton 1985): the 
earthquakes demonstrated the accuracy of these findings. Above the township, tunnel 
gullies in the loess/loess colluvium affect down-slope properties (Yetton 1986). Liquefaction 
of the reclaimed areas of the harbour, especially in and around the dangerous goods wharf, 
could have devastating consequences to many residents, especially given the proximity to 
the Lyttelton Road Tunnel portal, should a chemical spill or explosion eventuate. Another 
recent event raised the concern of the hazard of a tsunami generated in the Pacific Ocean 
entering the harbour. In 1868, the Mw 8.5 Arica, Chile Earthquake (National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 2012) on the west coast of South America produced 6 
m waves in Lyttelton Harbour, in 1960 the Mw 9.5 Puerto Montt, Valdivia Earthquake in 
Chile (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 2012) generated 5.5 m 
waves in the harbour (Elder et al. 1991), and more recently, on 27th February 2010, a Mw 8.8 
earthquake in Concepcion, Chile (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
2012) produced a surge in Lyttelton harbour that, at tidal extremes, emptied Cass Bay and 
overtopped the jetty at Governor’s Bay (stuff.co.nz 2010b). 
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This study has identified 1’400 households in the study area: Lyttelton township is home to 
876 households, more than half of which have children (Statistics New Zealand 2006c). 
 
Figure 1-3 : Occupation - Lyttelton vs. Canterbury (Statistics New Zealand 2006c) 
It contains a population from mixed socio-economic backgrounds: professionals, 
tradespeople, retirees, and artisans. It has a combination of service, manufacturing, and 
entertainment industries. It is a community in its own right but also a satellite town for 
Christchurch. Lyttelton is also a favourite entertainment, recreation and relaxation 
destination at evenings and weekends for residents of Christchurch and beyond. It is a 
transit town for those passing through the port. This makes the momentary population 
neither static nor homogenous. 
The community has a high degree of social connectedness and cohesiveness, with a strong 
culture of volunteering. The Lyttelton Fire Brigade, Order of St John Ambulance service, Civil 
Defence, the Timebank and Project Lyttelton are among some of the local groups. There is a 
high degree of community pride and identity (CCC 2011b).  
Although topographically constrained, Lyttelton is topologically well connected to 
neighbouring communities over three main vehicular access routes: Evans Pass (closed since 
the Christchurch Earthquake), Governor’s Bay Road, and the Lyttelton Road Tunnel. There 
are numerous foot tracks, the Bridal Path Track being the best-known and best maintained. 
The Lyttelton Railway Tunnel caters exclusively for freight and coal trains. Finally, the ferry 
to Diamond Harbour offers pedestrian and bicycle access. With a growing and dynamic 
population, there is little redundancy in the capacity of existing transport infrastructure in 
case evacuation or emergency-services ingress is required. 
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This rich mix of population and environment in such a small area has made this study both 
possible and convenient. 
Since the Darfield Earthquake, Lyttelton has continued to suffer from a collapsing 
infrastructure. Many heritage buildings (Burgess 2009a) (some dating from the founding of 
Port Cooper, as Lyttelton was originally known, but mostly those rebuilt after the 
devastating fire of 1870) that survived with minor damage from the Darfield Earthquake 
were badly damaged in the Christchurch Earthquake, and the following Sumner Earthquake 
caused many to collapse or be deemed unable to be salvaged, and have been or will be 
demolished (CCC 2011b)(see Figure 1-4). The Lyttelton Timeball Station, and all of the 
town’s oldest churches (including Canterbury’s oldest stone church, the Holy Trinity) have 
collapsed.  
 
Figure 1-4 : Map of demolished buildings in Lyttelton town centre (as of November 2011) (CCC 2011b) 
Lyttelton was isolated from Christchurch immediately after the main Darfield Earthquake 
and the Christchurch Earthquake, as the Lyttelton road tunnel was closed and Evan’s Pass 
road was blocked through rock fall. The town suffered power, telecommunication, and 
water supply failures. Road infrastructure was badly damaged and some roads impassable. 
It was difficult for households to know what was happening and to decide whether or not to 
stay or evacuate, even if they could.  
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Due to the social capital built up in Lyttelton, the community came together and displayed a 
high degree of resilience. The Lyttelton festival of Lights was due to be held on the weekend 
of 26th February 2011, at the same time as the inaugural visit to Lyttelton of the Queen 
Mary 2 cruise ship.  
1.2 Objectives of this research 
This study is an analysis of the preparedness for and response to impactful natural and 
manmade hazards by the resident population of Lyttelton and surrounding areas. Due to the 
timing of 2010 – present Canterbury Earthquake Sequence it has been possible to compare 
the community’s planned response prior to the Darfield Earthquake with the actual 
response following the Christchurch and Sumner Earthquakes. 
The objectives of this research are to: 
1. Examine the preparedness of the resident population of Lyttelton and surrounding 
area for a natural or manmade disaster; 
2. Examine the vulnerability of the resident population of Lyttelton and surrounding 
area to impactful disaster; and, 
3. Examine the immediate response of the resident population of Lyttelton and 
surrounding area to recent disasters. 
1.3 A multi-disciplinary approach 
The study has taken a multi-disciplinary approach of physical hazard analysis, demographics, 
and social science methods, under a common approach to hazards. This study has been 
handled as neither a social sciences nor a psychology research topic, but it is unavoidable in 
the context of the research to touch on the human response: vulnerability of a population is 
dependent on socioeconomics as well as natural hazards. The definition of a disaster, as 
used by this study, refers to this socioeconomic relationship. 
In the wake of the Kobe, Honshu Earthquake in Japan in 1995, the World Conference on 
Disaster Reduction (18th – 22nd January 2005, Hyogo, Japan) provided a unique opportunity 
to promote a strategic and systematic approach to reducing vulnerabilities and risks to 
hazards. It underscored the need for, and identified ways of, building the resilience of 
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nations and communities to disasters. This was embodied in the Hyogo Framework for 
Action (ISDR 2005). 
An inter-disciplinary approach is also suggested by the International Council for Science 
(ICSU) (International Council for Science 2008). 
1.4 Composition of the thesis 
The thesis is composed of eight parts. This first chapter introduces the thesis and establishes 
a literature review of current knowledge of the preparedness for and response of 
populations to impactful hazardous events.  
Chapter two examines the natural and manmade hazards that could impact the study area. 
Chapter three explains the methodology employed to collect data to support the research. 
Chapter four examines the exposure of the population to hazardous events, including the 
dispersion of the population throughout a typical week, leading to a model of vulnerability 
of the population to such hazardous events. 
Chapter five examines the preparedness of the households within the study area for an 
impactful hazardous event, prior to the Darfield Earthquake on 4th September 2010 and 
after the February and June 2011 aftershock events, including households’ plans and 
supplies. 
Chapter six examines the movement of the population immediately after the February and 
June 2011 aftershock events. 
Chapter seven examines the evacuation of affected households and the triggers that could 
precipitate a household to evacuate in future events. 
Chapter eight concludes the research and makes recommendations for future research. 
1.5 Literature Review 
Due to the compounding factors facing the resident population of study area (loss of home, 
loss of neighbourhood, loss of facilities), it is important to understand from contemporary 
hazard and disaster literature how to approach this research. 
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International terminology used to define natural hazards can be highly variable and 
ambiguous. This review takes some of these definitions, compares them, and then chooses 
the definition which will be applied to this study. 
This review has been undertaken to inform methodology and to guide interpretation of the 
results. 
1.5.1 Disasters 
To provide context, it is important to differentiate between an emergency, an incident, and 
a disaster. 
A disaster is not simply a bigger everyday emergency: almost all researchers and many 
policy and operational personnel in emergency planning and managing agencies now 
recognise and make that distinction, seeing a quantitative and qualitative difference 
between routine accidents and disasters (Quarantelli 2000). 
(Reid & van Niekerk 2008) define an incident as a relatively minor occurrence or episode of 
brief duration and that may have a potential to escalate. It is of limited magnitude and does 
not exceed the response capabilities of single response agencies or those agencies acting in 
support of the primary response agency. 
The most widely cited definition of a disaster in the social sciences is the one developed by 
(Fritz 1961), who defined disaster as: 
An event, concentrated in time and space, in which society, or a relatively self-
sufficient subdivision of society, undergoes severe danger and incurs such losses 
to its members and physical appurtenances that the social structure is disrupted 
and the fulfilment of all or some of the essential functions of the society is 
prevented. 
The ISDR (ISDR 2007) defines a disaster as: 
A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving 
widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, 
which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its 
own resources.  
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(Mileti 1999) asserts that natural disasters are simply recurrent events in natural ecological 
cycles, without respect to social repercussions, but this view is not held by all.  
(Quarantelli 1998) points out that a hazards perspective focuses on the hazard – 
earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, and so forth – and understanding the phenomena. Although 
there may be a concern with social and other issues, the real emphasis is on the processes 
associated with the target agent. Indeed, he points out that that some phenomena studied 
legitimately as disasters have no identifiable originating agent (Quarantelli 2005), such as 
famines or computer system failures.  
This study favours the definition of a disaster as when there has been large-scale injury, 
death, or disruption (Smith & Petley 2008). (Quarantelli 2005) points out that, firstly, 
disasters are inherently social phenomena: it is not the hurricane or storm surge that makes 
the disaster; these are the source of the damage. The disaster is the impact on individual 
coping patterns and the inputs and outputs of the social system. Secondly, the disaster is 
rooted in the social structure and reflects the processes of social change. It is from these 
features of the social system that we find vulnerability to the particular source. (Wisner et 
al. 2004) have proposed a framework representing vulnerability in the context of the social 
causation of disasters (see Figure 1-5).  
This study follows the social vulnerability approach by analysing the preparedness to and 
response of the study population, including the decisions concerning evacuation of 
individuals and households. 
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Figure 1-5 : The social causation of disasters (Wisner et al. 2012) 
1.5.2 Hazard 
A hazard is best comprehended as a naturally occurring or human-induced process or event 
that has the ability to generate loss and damage in the future. A natural hazard is a 
causative factor in any natural disaster, and hazards to human life are rated as the highest 
priority ahead of environmental modification and property damage (Smith & Petley 2008). 
The ISDR (ISDR 2007) defines a hazard as: 
A dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may 
cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of 
livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental 
damage.  
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The hazards of concern to this study, as stated in footnote 3 of the Hyogo Framework (ISDR 
2005), are “… hazards of natural origin and related environmental and technological hazards 
and risks.” 
1.5.3 Risk 
Disasters are usually not regular occurrences: they happen uncontrollably. People do not 
normally live as though they will encounter an imminent disaster situation: they ascertain 
the risk of a hazard turning into a disaster for them and behave accordingly.  
Risk is often used synonymously, albeit incorrectly, with hazard. They differ in that risk takes 
into account the extra implication of the chance of an event actually occurring (Smith & 
Petley 2008) and portrays the human response to the hazard in question. A disaster is the 
realisation of a hazard and the consequence of the hazard event. 
Risk has been defined as the product of the likelihood or probability of a hazard occurring 
and the adverse consequences from the event and is viewed by many as simply our 
exposure to hazards. Simply stated, 
                                              Eq-1 
This approach is based on the Royal Society Study Group defining risk as: 
The probability that a particular adverse event occurs during a stated period of 
time, or results from a particular challenge. (Royal Society 1993) 
The Society provides a basis for an analysis of risks associated with hazards by measuring 
the likelihood and consequence of hazards in the community.  
Risk can also be explained as a product of the hazard that may threaten a population, the 
vulnerability of the population to the hazard, and the exposure of the population to the 
hazard (Kron 2002). 
                                      Eq-2 
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Risk, as it pertains to hazard management, is defined ‘as the chance of something of human 
value being exposed to a natural hazard with negative outcomes’ (Keey et al. 2000; Smith & 
Petley 2008).  
The amount of risk is also affected by time and space: where the necessary components of 
the formula are, and when in relation to each other. E.g., a popular river-side Summer camp 
site would present a lower risk during a flood in Winter because the exposure to something 
of human value would be negligible. 
Therefore, we modify (Eq-2) to be: 
                                                    Eq-3 
It is this latter definition (Eq-3) which shall be used in this study. 
1.5.4 Exposure 
Exposure is a component of risk, and refers to that which is affected by natural disasters, 
such as people and property (ADRC 2005). Exposure has two characteristics: physical 
presence and temporal presence.  
The physical characteristics of exposure relates to the spatial relationship between that 
exposed and the hazard. Buildings and other permanent infrastructure are immovable, so 
may be continuously exposed to a hazard. People and cars are mobile, therefore their 
immediate, physical exposure corresponds to the risks in the environment where they 
currently are.  
The temporal characteristics of disasters are also crucial. The season they occur, day of the 
week, time of day (Wisner et al. 2004). For example, in the harsh winter conditions of the 
Armenia Earthquake of 1998 few survived, while in warmer climates or seasons, trapped 
people stand a greater chance of surviving until rescued (Noji 1997). There are festivals, 
market days, and national holidays that concentrate large numbers of people in particular 
places on specific dates. Finally, the time of day the disaster occurs at is of critical 
importance: whether people are at home, commuting, or at work, school, or shopping 
affects the exposure to the disaster. 
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Growing exposure and delays in reducing vulnerabilities result in an increased number of 
natural disasters and greater levels of loss (ADRC 2005). 
1.5.5 Vulnerability 
(Alexander 2000) distinguished between risk and vulnerability, noting that: 
Vulnerability refers to the potential for casualty, destruction, damage, disruption 
or other forms of loss in a particular element: risk combines this with the 
probable level of loss to be expected from a predictable magnitude of hazard 
(which can be considered as the manifestation of the agent that produces the 
loss). 
This definition does not take into consideration the socio-economic or political constraints 
imposed on certain members of the community, especially in less-developed communities. 
This study will therefore use the following definition of vulnerability (Wisner et al. 2004): 
The characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence their 
capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural 
hazard (as extreme natural event of process).”  
Vulnerability can reveal itself in many forms: 
 Physical 
 Social 
 Educational 
 Financial 
1.5.5.1 Physical vulnerability 
Physical vulnerability represents threats to physical structures and infrastructures, the 
natural environment, and related economic losses (Perry & Mushkatel 1984).  
1.5.5.2 Social vulnerability 
Social vulnerability represents threats to the well-being of human populations (e.g. deaths, 
injuries, other medical impacts, disruptions of behaviour and system functioning) and 
related economic losses. Social vulnerability also includes the relative potential for physical 
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harm and social disruption to subpopulations of societies and their larger subsystems based 
on socioeconomic status, age, gender, race and ethnicity, family structure, residential 
location, and other demographic variables (Perry & Mushkatel 1984). 
1.5.5.3 Educational vulnerability 
Educational vulnerability represents threats that are unforeseen, i.e. the person or 
community has not learned about hazards they may face, either willingly or because the 
information has not been communicated. If someone is not informed of a hazard their 
hazard perception is reduced, and the choices available to them to mitigate the risk is 
similarly reduced (OECD 2010). 
The presence of the unknown can be caused through lack of situational awareness of a 
hazard: people may be unfamiliar with the hazards of their immediate environment, or only 
familiar within the confines of a restricted, previous non-hazardous exposure, e.g. a 
mountain pass during benign weather conditions, or a riverside camping ground during the 
summer dry season. To avoid these gaps in knowledge of hazards in a particular location or 
situation, (Hewitt & Burton 1971) studied “all hazards-at-a-place” instead of considering 
each hazard in isolation. A major emphasis is the importance of the co-existence in time and 
space of a natural event and a human use domain as the basis for a multi-disciplinary 
approach to hazards study. 
Complicating this simple notion is the exposure of the homes people return to and shelter 
in, and the roads and bridges they travel over: for example, a family holidaying overseas 
returning to their devastated home after an earthquake may make decisions prior to 
returning not being aware they may not be able to live in their home. 
1.5.5.4 Financial vulnerability 
Financial vulnerability may affect the individual, the household, the community, or even the 
State (Mechler et al. 2006). Lack of funds reduces the choices an individual or organisation 
can make, increasing their vulnerability. 
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1.5.6 Risk perception 
How one perceives the adverse impacts of risk, either from an individual, organisational, or 
societal perspective, certainly influences strategies to address risk of natural hazards: to say 
the least, how risk may be perceived and the process for analysis will shape individual and 
institutional approaches to deal with risk (Hewitt & Burton 1971; Pine 2009). 
Recent research found that, prior to the Darfield Earthquake, residents in Christchurch, 
Wellington, and Palmerston North were equally aware of earthquake information, yet those 
from Christchurch found it less relevant to them. Further analysis showed that those who 
knew people in Christchurch saw the risk of another earthquake in Canterbury as higher 
than those who did not, but did not see the risk of another earthquake in their own city as 
higher than those who did know anybody in Christchurch (McClure et al. 2011).  
People in regions that are objectively deemed a lower risk than other regions appear to 
think that they are not at risk at all – they think the hazard will strike the higher risk region 
first. This line or reasoning can have disastrous consequences, because people think they do 
not need to prepare (McClure et al. 2011).  
1.5.7 Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) 
Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) was adopted in the New Zealand 
emergency management setting with the advent of the Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management (CDEM) Act (2002). The CDEM Act is applied to natural and man-made hazards 
that result in emergency situations. These may be of rapid onset such as earthquake, 
warned onset such as volcanic eruption, wildfire, or far-field tsunami, or slow onset such as 
a pandemic or drought. 
Civil Defence Emergency Management includes the planning, organisation, coordination, 
and implementation of measures designed to guard against, prevent, reduce, or overcome 
any harm or loss associated with any emergency (CDEM Act, 2002). CEM comprises the 
“4Rs” that make up the phases of emergency management activities; these being: 
 Reduction 
(mitigation) 
Activities that reduce the degree of long-term risk to human life 
and property arising from natural and man-made hazards.  This 
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includes identifying and analysing long-term risks to human life 
and property from natural and man-made hazards and taking 
steps to reduce these risks by reducing the likelihood and 
magnitude of their impact. 
 Readiness 
(preparedness) 
Activities that develop operational capabilities for responding 
to an emergency. For individuals and households, this also 
means preparing an emergency inventory of supplies, and an 
action plan for meeting and possible evacuation, without an 
expectation of external assistance. 
 Response Activities taken immediately before, during, or directly after an 
emergency that can save lives, minimize property damage, or 
improve recovery. 
 Recovery Activities that stabilize the affected community and assure that 
life support systems are operational, and longer term actions 
for community rehabilitation and restoration. This restoration 
needs to have a Reduction focus.  It is important that the same 
hazard vulnerable community is not rebuilt (Build Back Better). 
The four phases are interrelated and the effectiveness of each phase affects and is impacted 
by each other phase (Petterson 2009). This study concentrates on the Readiness2 and 
Response phases as addressed by and to the population, but by the very nature of the 4Rs, 
Reduction and Recovery are not entirely excluded. 
                                                        
2 In the international literature, readiness is referred to as preparedness. Preparedness shall 
be used in this thesis. 
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Figure 1-6 : Emergency Management Phases (Julian Idle) 
1.5.8 Preparedness 
Once the risk of a disaster for a population has been ascertained, a plan to mitigate that risk 
should be prepared. If risks cannot be reduced effectively, a plan to prepare for the disaster 
by increasing resiliency, response, or recovery affectivity should be drawn up.  
(Russell 1995) has shown that pre-earthquake preparedness may be predicted by home 
ownership, income, education, marital status, number of children at home, number of  
years in the neighbourhood, and the number of earthquakes experienced. Post-earthquake 
preparedness may be predicted by proximity to the earthquake epicentre, earthquake-
related experiences, fear, and levels of pre-earthquake preparedness. 
Of particular interest informing this research (due to the many disasters that occurred in 
quick succession affecting the study population) is a survey (Bourque et al. 1973) conducted 
after the 9th February, 1971 San Fernando – Sylmar, CA Earthquake [Mw 6.5 (MM XI), 65 
deaths, 2000 injured, USD 505M damage to property] (National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) 2012). This found that 11% of a random sample of Los Angeles 
County residents reported some form of emergency preparations. Six years after the Sylmar 
Earthquake and about a year after the announcement of the discovery of the Palmdale 
bulge (Holdahl 1982), thought to be a precursor to a local and damaging earthquake, a 
further study (Turner et al. 1986) found fewer than 11% of a random sample of respondents 
in Los Angeles County reported some form of emergency preparations. Despite the recency 
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of the Sylmar Earthquake and the recent public announcement of the Palmdale bulge, the 
level of earthquake preparedness had not increased but had decreased.  
A further study, within a month after the 28th June 1992 Landers, CA Earthquake [Mw 7.6 
(MM IX), 3 deaths, 400 injuries, USD 92M damage to property] in Southern California, found 
that preparedness rates had risen to 27% for Northern Californians and 33% for Southern 
Californians, reinforcing the correlation between proximity to the earthquake epicentre as a 
prediction of preparedness as postulated in (Russell 1995). However, (Mulilis & Duval 1992; 
Mulilis & Duval 1991) suggest that experiencing a recent damaging earthquake does not 
seem to be adequate to inspire preparedness activities. Rather, motivation is provided by 
subjective and objective impact of the earthquake on that individual’s life as represented by 
the amount of earthquake damage experienced, the level of fear during the shaking, and 
thoughts of it afterward, and whether evacuation was necessary; this motivation may result 
from increased perceived earthquake vulnerability. This is reinforced in (Awasthy 2009), as 
what helps explain preparedness evolves from a complex and diverse set of factors; stocking 
up on provisions stems from how individuals acted in previous disaster situations, knowing 
the survival skills needed in emergencies being explained by accessibility to this knowledge, 
planning for emergencies being related to religious-cultural attitudes, and exhibiting 
protective behaviour being correlated to amounts of disposable income, nationality, and 
risk perceptions. 
The stress-appraisal model (Lazarus & Folkmann 1984) postulates that when aspects of a 
threat, such as an earthquake, are perceived to be uncontrollable, a threatened individual is 
more likely to cope with threat by denying its existence rather than by taking action to 
reduce the risk of harm.  
Research has shown that people often make biased appraisals of their own risks and 
prospects relative to other persons. This bias is usually optimistic, meaning people see 
themselves as less likely to be harmed by future risks than others (Helweg-Larsen 1999). 
Further research found that participants judged they were less likely to suffer harm in a 
major earthquake than acquaintances in their peer group, however the same participants 
judged that their own property was more likely than others’ to be damaged in an 
earthquake (Spittal et al. 2005). 
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A study in Christchurch and the wider Canterbury region (Becker 2010) displayed this 
optimistic bias in preparedness for a major earthquake. It showed that respondents 
considered they were halfway between being very prepared (Likert scale value 5) and not at 
all prepared (Likert scale value 1), with respondents in the wider Canterbury region (Mean 
value 3.3) being more prepared than those living in the city (Mean value 2.7). 
Following the trend from (Becker 2010), although they were not explicitly asked, the 
population in this study is assumed to have been previously exposed to preparedness 
information through various sources (e.g., from (Becker 2010), television [82%],yellow pages 
in the telephone book [78%], newspapers/magazines [72%], and other written brochures 
[69%]). The New Zealand Earthquake Commission (EQC) have broadcast their Get Ready Get 
Thru message regularly on TV in New Zealand, have dropped pamphlets and brochures to 
households, and has a web site available for information (MCDEM 2011a). The telephone 
directory also has a dedicated section to guide people in the event of an emergency. 
Viewers and readers have the opportunity to be educated on the basic plans and supplies 
they should have for the first three days after a disaster, a period for which experts believe 
the populace will need to be self-sufficient. In schools, What’s the Plan Stan (Kia Takatū is 
the Māori version) is a resource for teachers to help them develop students’ knowledge and 
skills to prepare for, and safely respond to, disasters (EQC 2012). It also encourages students 
to take this information home to their families to help them get ready, too. 
 
Figure 1-7 : What's the Plan Stan? – Kia Takatū 
1.5.9 Preparing to recover 
Disaster preparedness includes actions taken in advance of disasters to deal with 
anticipated problems of emergency response and disaster recovery. Of particular 
importance to disaster recovery preparedness, hazard insurance is designed to provide 
financial protection from economic losses caused by disaster events, the purchasing costs of 
which are based on actuarial risk. Whereas money cannot mitigate disaster, it does enable 
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choice in the response. It can also lower the overall cost of protection by encouraging risk 
prevention measures. The insurance industry will pay an estimated 80% of the overall cost 
of the February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake in New Zealand, but no more than 17% for 
the disastrous event in Japan in March 2011. Earthquake insurance penetration, in fact, is 
highest in New Zealand, and is very low in Japan, particularly for commercial properties 
(Bevere & Grollimund 2012) – refer to Table 1-1. 
In New Zealand, the Earthquake Commission (EQC) underwrites the first NZD 20’000 + GST 
for contents and NZD 100’000 + GST for dwellings of an insurance claim arising from a 
disaster event: the contents and property must be privately insured in order for it to be 
covered by EQC (Earthquake Commission (EQC) 2011). Bare land and houses that are in the 
process of being built are not insured by EQC. 
Table 1-1 : Recent major earthquake events and associated economic losses (Bevere & Grollimund 2012) 
Date Country Economic losses, 
USD bn 
Economic losses as 
% of GDP 
Insured losses, 
USD bn 
Insurance industry contribution 
11.03.2011 Japan 210 to 300 3.8% to 5.4% 35 12% to 17% 
27.02.2010 Chile 30 18.60% 8 27% 
22.02.2011 New Zealand 15 10.00% 12 80% 
12.01.2010 Haiti 8 121% 0.1 1% 
04.09.2010 New Zealand 6 5.30% 5 81% 
06.04.2009 Italy 4 0.20% 0.5 14% 
23.10.2011 Turkey 0.75 0.10% 0.03 4% 
04.04.2010 Mexico 0.95 0.09% 0.2 21% 
Not everyone can afford house insurance. Tenants are not usually insured for alternative 
accommodation, unlike an owner-occupier, should the house they are occupying needs to 
be vacated and repaired. This can increase the vulnerability of the under-insured or not-
insurable. 
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1.5.10 Evacuation 
Evacuation may be a response to a forewarned disaster that can be practised (tsunami 
evacuation), planned for (e.g. a hurricane), agency-lead (e.g. response to rock fall danger, 
wild fire, or encroaching flood waters), or self-evacuation (such as after an earthquake) 
when the individuals evacuate by themselves without external assistance.  
In the case of earthquakes, one of the few natural hazards that have little or no available 
warning time, decisions to evacuate will typically be made after the onset of the event and 
mostly after the shaking of the main earthquake has stopped. The threat of aftershocks will 
provide pre-warning of possible further events (Mileti & O'Brien 1989). 
Evacuation can be mandatory (ordered by authorities and backed by statutory powers), or 
voluntary (advised but not regulatory or via self-evacuation where the evacuee decides 
without an advisory to leave). 
The process of evacuation may be organised and coordinated by authorities or largely the 
outcome of self-evacuation; in either case, there will nearly always be some evacuees who 
will require assistance to evacuate (e.g. transport, mobility aid, resources) (Wright & 
Johnston 2010).  
A part of being prepared for a disaster is a plan to evacuate from the affected area, if 
required. It could be part of the plans a household has made independently, or plans lain 
out by a community. Evacuation of the population may be part of a comprehensive 
Emergency Management plan by the emergency management authorities, which covers all 
phases of a disaster, from beginning to end. Unforeseen events mean evacuations cannot 
always be planned for and so evolve as they progress. 
Evacuation is advised when the damage or consequences of staying are deemed to pose a 
life safety risk to those impacted and evacuation is expected to pose a reduced risk. In all 
circumstances, it is the movement of the population away from immediate danger to a less-
dangerous place. An evacuee may have time to prepare or may have to leave immediately. 
An evacuation may be temporary or permanent. 
Evacuation, whether for a few hours, a few days, or permanently, is a factor in social 
vulnerability, as subpopulations are separated. A post event factor that contributed to 
21 
 
delayed evacuation following Hurricane Katrina was the loss of access to livelihoods. 
Businesses were physically disrupted due to building damage, employees and owners were 
evacuated, potential customers were evacuated, or the reason the business existed was 
erased (Campanella 2006). For those contemplating evacuation, even if unemployed, 
seeking employment out of the region may not be possible, so how strong a factor loss of 
livelihood will be as an evacuation decision contributor will be difficult to calculate. 
1.5.10.1 Evacuation decision framework 
An evacuation and decision needs framework (Figure 1-8) has been developed for 
Wellington, based on a Californian model (Chang et al. 2009). Because transport out of 
Wellington is expected to be severely hampered by a major event in the region, many of 
those that choose or are forced to evacuate their homes will require public shelter within 
the damaged area. A model  framework for calculating evacuation numbers and sheltering 
requirements is proposed based on a variety of damage and non-damage related factors 
that contribute to evacuation decision making (Wright & Johnston 2010). The resident 
population of the Lyttelton study area also faced similar issues to Wellington due to 
restricted egress routes, and so public shelter would need to be established within the area. 
Multiple factors that contribute to household evacuation decision-making have been 
included to recognise that post-earthquake evacuation decisions are based not only on 
damage states of buildings or loss of lifeline utility services, although they contribute to the 
process (Wright & Johnston 2010). The three decisions leading to evacuation in the model 
concern: 
 The structural safety of the building 
 The functional soundness of the building 
 Neighbourhood liveability 
Each of these decisions is discussed further, below. 
Once a decision has been made to self-evacuate, a final decision must be made to where. 
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Figure 1-8 : Framework of the evacuation and sheltering needs decision tree based on Chang et al 2009 (Wright & 
Johnston 2010) 
1.5.10.1.1 Building structural safety 
New Zealand has adapted the US building safety evaluation process: red (unsafe); yellow 
(restricted use); green (safe to use) in the 1990’s (NZSEE 2008). It was used for the first time 
in New Zealand after the 2007 Gisborne Earthquake (Brunsdon 2009). The same process was 
used after the main and major aftershocks in 2010 and 2011 by CDEM, in and around 
Christchurch, during the State of Emergency. 
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Figure 1-9 : Red, Yellow, and Green Stickers (Brunsdon 2009; NZSEE 2008) 
Once the State of Emergency under which the stickers are applied is ended, the Building Act 
2004 (New Zealand Government 2004a) applies, and it is this act which governs the 
structural soundness of the building. In the case of Christchurch, CERA (the Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Authority) operates under the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 
2011 (New Zealand Government 2011), and has the powers to demolish or require 
immediate rectification of building faults. The Christchurch City Council has the power to 
issue a ‘notice to fix’ under the Buildings Act 2004. A notice to fix is a statutory notice 
requiring a person to remedy a breach of the Building Act 2004 or regulations under that 
Act. It is similar to a notice to rectify under the Building Act 1991 but, unlike a notice to 
rectify, a notice to fix can be issued for all breaches of the Act, not just for building work. If 
such a notice to fix is not complied with, the building can no longer be occupied as it has 
technically not been issued a building consent authority/code compliance certificate, which 
forces owners to immediately vacate their property or face fines of up to NZD 200’000 plus 
NZD 20’000 / (part)day thereafter, in accordance with Section 168 of the Building Act 2004, 
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and associated court appearances. Notices to Fix have been re-issued to 27 homes in the 
Christchurch Port Hills area that are still occupied (Canterbury Earthquake Recovery 
Authority 2011), although not all of these are within the study area. For the most part, the 
notices have been issued because of on-going threat of rock fall, cliff collapse, or land slide. 
The majority of those residents still occupying their properties do not see the same risk 
potential as the CCC, and so are protesting the council decision by remaining (Greenhill 
2012). Two notices to fix were withdrawn after the affected Lyttelton residents made safe 
their property by securing or breaking apart threatening boulders above their property 
(Young 2012). 
The damage after the recent Canterbury earthquakes was widespread to the degree that 
building damage classification systems were initially and in the medium-term overwhelmed. 
For the most severe damage it would have been obvious whether a residence is inhabitable 
or not due to structural integrity failure such as roof collapse, movement on foundations, or 
walls failing. Where professionals are unavailable to classify building damage, residents 
were left to decide themselves whether it was safe to remain in their home based on their 
own knowledge of building design and construction. How residents determined what was 
structural (dangerous) and what was cosmetic (relatively safe) damage is unknown. 
A further issue is that of the surrounding structures: neighbouring buildings; retaining walls; 
areas in rockfall- and mass movement-prone areas. Given that many residents were 
concentrating on their own property meant that they were unaware (until advised by a 
professional assessor or neighbour) of potential danger to themselves and to their property. 
Even after having their residence yellow or red stickered, people still tended to use at least a 
part of their property if they were not concerned of the potential risk. 
1.5.10.1.2 Building functionally sound 
Whether utilities continue to function affects a person's ability to continue habitation in 
their residence (e.g. prepare meals, drink uncontaminated water, keep warm, wash utensils 
and clothes, bathe, receive messages via electronic media, or communicate with others) 
(Bourque et al. 1992). Inability to perform these basic activities often motivates people to 
evacuate their homes after a disaster (Bolin & Stanford 1991).  
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Case studies of disaster-struck communities (Nigg 1990; Tierney 1991) illuminate the 
advantages and disadvantages of functionally interconnected utility and lifeline failures. 
Among the drawbacks, for example, is that power failure often impacts the functioning of 
water, sewage, and communication systems. Work undertaken by the Canterbury 
Engineering Lifelines Group (Gordon 2009) concerning lifeline interdependencies has 
highlighted cascading failures should the electrical utility be lost (Figure 1-11, below).  
Widespread loss of water supply is not a common occurrence in Lyttelton, or New Zealand 
in general, and could pose severe problems for many households. This study suggests more 
than 75% of households have a contingency supply of water (the recommended amount is 3 
litres per day per person for three days). Loss of waste water utility (either at the treatment 
centre or destruction of pipes) can be offset by having people dig their own long-drop in 
their garden or by the adequate distribution of Portaloos or chemical toilets to affected 
neighbourhoods. 
 
Figure 1-10 : Clockwise from top left - His Worship the Mayor of Christchurch, Bob Parker, demonstrating how to 
operate a chemical toilet at a press conference (Heather 2011), delivery of Portaloos to Lyttelton (CERA 2011), a 
decorated back-garden long-drop (McLean 2011) 
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Figure 1-11 : Cascading Impacts of Power Failure (Gordon 2009) 
1.5.10.1.3 Household liveability 
Factors that are not structural- or lifeline-related, that are recognised as part of the decision 
making process for individuals or households, often involve the functional needs of the 
household members (e.g. mobility, income, dependencies) (Vogt & Sorenson 1992). Factors 
that make it more likely for a household to evacuate are: access to a vehicle; access to 
resources for travel (money, fuel); a household that includes dependant children (except 
sole parent/caregiver households); a household where members have somewhere 
accessible to evacuate to (Bourque et al. 1973; Bourque et al. 1992; Chang et al. 2009). 
Factors likely to make sheltering at home more likely include: whether the household is a 
sole-parent or sole-caregiver home; whether members of the household have mobility or 
health issues (medication, support equipment requirements); whether the house is rented; 
whether the house is close to the earthquake epicentre; and whether the household is 
experiencing (or members have a fear of) aftershocks. Because these factors vary from 
household to household, identification of households more or less likely to evacuate is 
problematic. 
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1.5.10.1.4 Neighbourhood liveability 
Evacuation decision-making not related to structural damage is based upon neighbourhood 
liveability, as well as household liveability. Neighbourhood liveability is determined by the 
support systems and services required for household wellbeing and function. The longer 
recovery takes, the more difficult it becomes for households to remain in their homes when 
these systems and services are removed  (Wright & Johnston 2010). 
Transport is required by many households to allow them to meet their everyday needs for 
social and retail contact (visiting friends and family, purchasing household supplies, seeking 
medical attention, travelling to and from work or school, etc.). Transport, whether public or 
private, requires passable roads. 
Community groups are focal to maintaining cohesion and social networks. The various 
church congregations help each other in times of need. The Lyttelton Timebank initiative 
and Project Lyttelton help the general community in Lyttelton. The marae at Rapaki is a 
crucial meeting and communal gathering place for Maori. London Street is the business, 
retail, and social heart of Lyttelton. 
In the communities based within the study area, cultural- and ethnic-based groups (such as 
Maori communities centred on the marae in Rapaki), church groups of all denominations, 
common interest groups (such as the Lyttelton Timebank and Project Lyttelton), and 
recreational clubs (such as the Rugby Football Club and marina) provide essential services to 
residents. Where these groups and clubs are disbanded due to hazard events, individuals 
and households can feel isolated or unsupported. The loss of social support networks can 
increase the stress of the event, and can contribute to the desire to relocate. Where social 
support networks continue to function, sheltering in place is likely to be viewed more 
favourably. These networks and groups can often take on new response and recovery roles 
during and after emergencies, when this process occurs they are termed “emergent groups” 
(Murphy 2007) and ideally their skills and resources incorporated into civil defence 
emergency management (CDEM) planning.  
Another factor that affects whether residents of a particular neighbourhood will evacuate is 
whether a mandatory evacuation order is given, and how it is delivered and by whom. As 
has been researched extensively for many types of disasters, even under a mandatory 
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evacuation not all residents will leave (Elder et al. 2007; Hauser et al. 2006; Haynes et al. 
2010; Heath et al. 2001). When this occurs the decision can be based on individual factors 
(e.g. don’t believe the threat is real, lack of trust in authorities, unable to evacuate due to 
mobility, etc.) or neighbourhood factors (e.g. local friends and family are choosing not to go, 
can’t evacuate with a pet) (Wright & Johnston 2010). 
If authorities supply ill-suited accommodation to evacuate to, residents may rather attempt 
to find their own (Riad et al. 2001).  
1.5.10.2 Emergency Evacuation drills 
Emergency evacuation drills, either organised by and for the authorities alone, or for the 
affected population, is one way authorities from a number of countries have prepared for a 
disaster. Japan has a yearly drill that involves residents and authorities. California and other 
West-coast states have an annual shakeout: in 2010, 7.9 million residents took part, 
including school and university campuses, private businesses, and households (ShakeOut 
2011). Similar exercises with popular participation have been carried out in New Zealand 
(Earthquake Country Alliance). Most other exercises in New Zealand have concentrated on 
the CDEM and associated services response, based on a simulation of communication traffic 
and a few physical exercises in the field, but with little involvement of the general 
population due to the perceived social and economic cost (MCDEM 2011b,2012). 
1.5.10.3 Pre-evacuation journeys 
A phenomenon observed before warned events, such as hurricanes or far-field tsunami, is 
the behaviour of individuals prior to evacuation as they make trips (Murray-Tuite & 
Mahmassani 2007) or otherwise delay their evacuation journey, or make detours en-route 
during evacuation, to do business, check on neighbours, purchase provisions, etc. (Noltenius 
2008). Such behaviour affects evacuation models and can cause congestion on parts of the 
road system that are temporarily adapted to single-flow traffic to aid evacuation.  
1.5.10.4 Evacuation decision making 
Research into evacuation decision making has largely been focussed on those hazards for 
which warnings are provided, examining how people receive and interpret warnings, and 
whether they choose to evacuate or not (Fischer III et al. 1995). A large body of research 
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into hurricane and tsunami evacuation behaviour exists in the international literature, but 
there have been limited studies into the post-event evacuation process that follow 
earthquake events (Bourque et al. 1973; Bourque et al. 1992). Reports from the Loma Prieta 
earthquake of 1989 (Bourque et al. 1992; Tierney 1994) found that overall 22 per cent of 
respondents in their survey reported having evacuated from their homes for at least some 
period of time. Official shelter use was at a peak of 2’500 displaced persons nightly, about 
20% of the estimated 12’000 to 13’000 left homeless (Bolin & Stanford 1991). By the end of 
the third week after the earthquake, all but 500 of those displaced were either relocated 
into temporary housing or were back in their homes. Most residents in the sample that 
evacuated returned to their homes within 24 hours.  
The model proposed by (Chang et al. 2009; Wright & Johnston 2010) is perhaps too 
simplistic, as other factors affecting the process of evacuation, and therefore the decision to 
evacuate, are not addressed: these include access to transportation, mobility, caring for 
dependents (including animals), and children. Indeed, (Heath et al. 2001) showed that 
households with children responded more readily to evacuation than those with pets.  
Studies of actual and modelled events in the United States suggest that post-earthquake 
evacuation decision making is complex, and not solely explained by building structural 
safety or loss of lifeline utility factors (Wright & Johnston 2010). 
1.5.10.5 Children 
(Heath et al. 2001) report that households with children have a lower threshold to 
evacuation than those without. Evacuation of children must, however, be done in a safe and 
secure environment so as not to increase the potential for post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) (Smith et al. 2005). Unfortunately, one of the symptoms of PTSD is separation angst, 
something which must be guarded against in an evacuation by emergency services. 
It should be important not to subject children to over-stressed adults, especially their 
parents and the caregivers they turn to for security. “Many children experience their parents 
screaming, crying and being out of control as never before” (Shelby & Tredinnick 1995). It 
has been found that positive adult attitudes facilitate a child’s ability to deal with trauma 
(Davidhizar & Shearer 2002). 
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A quick return to normalcy is critical for the child’s mental wellbeing. It is important for 
schools to be opened as quickly as possible: they are at the heart of the child’s life and 
community. If a child is at school when a disaster occurs, to avoid mental stress on the child, 
it is imperative that the school and the child’s parents and caregivers have communicated 
beforehand on the procedure to be followed. It is the responsibility of schools and families 
to prepare for an emergency, but they often have little or no experience of hazards, and any 
knowledge they do have is often of minor events (Johnston et al. 2010). 
1.5.10.6 Animals 
Those with pets have a higher threshold to evacuation than those without (Heath et al. 
2001). In a recent survey (Glassey 2010a), 79% of respondents strongly agreed and 20% 
agreed that pets were family members. Impediments to evacuation with animals are also 
the ability to take companion animals (Glassey & Wilson 2011) or pets (Glassey 2010a) into 
emergency shelters, owning multiple pets (too many to transport at one time), owning 
outdoor dogs, or not having a cage or transport (Glassey 2010b). A further dimension is 
owners not prepared to evacuate if their cats have gone missing during an earthquake 
(Press 2010). Pre-disaster planning should place a higher priority on facilitating pet 
evacuation, as 56% of respondents in a recent survey (Glassey 2010a) agreed or strongly 
agreed that they would not evacuate if told to do so unless they could take their pets with 
them.  
Additionally, some owners may no longer be able to cope with their pets and have to simply 
abandon them (Stylianou 2011). New Zealand’s animal welfare legislation, the Animal 
Welfare Act 1999 (New Zealand Government 1999), requires owners of animals, and 
persons in charge of animals, to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the physical health, 
and behavioural needs of the animals are met. 
Physical health and behavioural needs are defined in the Act as what are generally referred 
to as the Five Freedoms (WSPA 2012): 
 Proper and sufficient food and water 
 Adequate shelter 
 Opportunity to display normal patterns of behaviour 
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 Physical handling in a manner which minimises the likelihood of unreasonable or 
unnecessary pain and distress 
 Protection from and rapid diagnosis of any significant injury or illness 
In a disaster, these ‘Five Freedoms’ are at risk and must still be met. The Animal Welfare Act 
therefore remains in force and the owner or carer is legally responsible for the animals in a 
disaster (WSPA 2012). 
The importance of specific animal welfare emergency management legislation has not been 
realised in New Zealand, in contrast to the passage of the Pet Emergency Transportation 
and Standards (PETS) Act 2006 by US lawmakers to address major lessons learned following 
Hurricane Katrina (Glassey 2010b; Glassey & Wilson 2011). The PETS Act 2006 required local 
and state emergency management plans to include arrangements for pets and service 
(disability assistance) animals; funding for state and local pet and service animal emergency 
preparedness; and lastly, requirements that pets were rescued, cared and sheltered during 
emergencies (Edmonds & Cutter 2008). 
The Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 however is not so clear in its 
application to animal welfare during a state of emergency. Under Section 86, powers to 
evacuate may only be executed for the preservation of human life, and such evacuations 
only provide for the exclusion of persons or vehicles – not animals (Glassey & Wilson 2011). 
1.5.10.7 Speed of evacuation 
When agency-lead evacuation is required for a rapid-onset disaster, easily digested 
situational awareness information should be available to the population, and time provided 
to organise themselves. (Busby 2010) noted that one consequence of rapid evacuation 
during the Eastern Bay of Plenty, New Zealand, flood event was that emergency service 
personnel operated with such a sense of urgency that this heightened the level of shock and 
cognitive disruption for the evacuees, which in turn exaggerated the trauma and impeded 
individual recovery (Gordon 2008). Pre-event training and information dissemination can 
alleviate some of this angst and help the community respond and recover more quickly. 
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1.5.11 Flight 
Movement away from immediate danger to a place perceived to be less dangerous can be 
defined as flight if an unplanned reflex action, but the place of perceived less danger may 
actually be more dangerous. For example, the flight response may have contributed many 
deaths in the Christchurch CBD during the Christchurch Earthquake due to people 
immediately vacating buildings during the initial shaking and consequently being buried 
under collapsing façades, rather than sheltering under furniture in the building before 
proceeding out in a more orderly fashion once the shaking had subsided. 
Sometimes flight towards danger is altruistic in nature, to seek out loved ones, to help those 
in need, or to recover property. 
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2 Natural and manmade hazards 
2.1 Hazard Inventory 
Hazards can be divided into natural and man-made, and classified as to the veracity of their 
process: rapid-onset, warned, slow-onset (Table 2-1). 
 
 
Table 2-1 : Hazards 
 Rapid-onset Warned Slow-onset 
Natural    
 Earthquake    
 Rockfall and landslide    
 Tsunami    
 Loess-colluvial gully 
tunnelling  
  
 Flooding    
 Storm (including 
hurricane and tornado) () 
  
 Snowstorm    
 Fire    
 Drought    
 Pandemic    
Man-made    
 Explosion    
 Chemical spill    
 Noxious vapours    
 Terrorism    
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2.2 Geological setting of study area 
 
Legend 
Code Lithography Age Era/Period Simple unit 
Qfa Postglacial alluvium Late Quaternary Quaternary Quaternary 
sediments 
Qfd Dune sand Late Quaternary Quaternary Quaternary 
sediments 
Qfe Extensive thick loess Late Quaternary Quaternary Quaternary 
sediments 
M Mainly sandstone and siltstone (locally 
alternating and graded);  
local limestone 
Miocene Tertiary Tertiary 
sediments 
Mva Andesite Miocene Tertiary Tertiary 
volcanics 
Mvb Basalt, tuff (basal flows possibly Miocene) Miocene Tertiary Tertiary 
volcanics 
Mvr Flow rhyolite, breccia, obsidian Miocene Tertiary Tertiary 
volcanics 
T Interbedded greywacke and argillite  
(greywacke graded in places); minor  
basaltic and spilitic volcanics, chert;  
rare limestone lenses 
Triassic Mesozoic Triassic 
sediments 
 
Figure 2-1 : Geological setting of study area  
Lyttelton lies within the highly eroded caldera of the Lyttelton volcano (11.0 – 9.7 Ma) 
(Hampton & Cole 2009). 
The study area is surrounded by highly jointed basaltic lava flows, which are interbedded 
with loessal and colluvial-loessal deposits (Bell & Trangmar 1987). The loessal and colluvial-
loessal deposits have been the cause of erosion over the past 150+ years of development on 
the Port Hills (Yetton 1986), including the creation of rills and tunnelling, and have thus 
been the focus of engineering geology investigations. 
The Lyttelton Port wharves are mostly built on reclaimed land. The area used for the sport 
field and marina are also built on reclaimed land. 
2.2.1 Tectonic setting of New Zealand/Canterbury 
New Zealand lies on the boundary of the Pacific and the Australian plates and its active 
tectonics are dominated by three main features (Figure 2-2). Beneath the North Island and 
northern South Island the Pacific plate is subducting obliquely beneath the Australian plate 
at the Hikurangi trough. In contrast, in the Fiordland region in the southwest of the South 
Island subduction is reversed, with the Australian plate subducting obliquely beneath the 
Pacific plate at the Puysegur trench. Between these two subduction zones the plate 
boundary is characterized by continental convergence (Gledhill et al. 2011). 
In the central South Island, the velocity of the Pacific plate relative to the Australian plate is 
38 mm/yr at an azimuth of 248° (DeMets et al. 2010). The Alpine fault accommodates at 
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least 70–75% of this relative plate motion. Paleoseismic studies indicate 27 ± 5 mm/yr of 
strike-slip and 5–10 mm/yr of dip-slip motion on the Alpine fault (Norris & Cooper 2001). 
 
Figure 2-2 : Tectonic setting of New Zealand (GNS Science 2011b) 
The dip-slip component of motion is largely responsible for the uplift of the Southern Alps. A 
balancing of the plate motion budget across the central South Island using GPS, 
seismological, and geological data suggests that up to 5 mm/yr of active deformation is 
possible on faults distributed within the Southern Alps and up to 100 km to the east of the 
Alpine fault (Wallace et al. 2007). 
Seismicity in the South Island is nearly all confined to the crust (Figure 2-3) with the 
exception of a small number of 40 – 100 km deep earthquakes beneath the Southern Alps 
(Figure 2-4). Deeper events are confined to the subduction zone to the south of the Alpine 
Fault near Fiordland (Puysegur Trench) and to the north around the Marlborough Sounds. 
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Figure 2-3 : Shallow (0 - 40km) seismic activity in the South 
Island, New Zealand (1990-2009) 
 
 
Figure 2-4 : Deeper (>40km) seismic activity in the South 
Island, New Zealand (1990-2009) 
 
2.3 Earthquake 
2.3.1.1 Alpine Fault 
The plate boundary at the surface is marked by the Alpine fault, a 650-km-long (850 km 
inclusive of the offshore section), right-lateral strike-slip fault that has had 460 - 480 km of 
displacement since the Late Oligocene-Early Miocene (Yetton 2000). Paleoseismic evidence 
suggests that the Alpine fault ruptures in major earthquakes (Mw > 7.5) with recurrence 
intervals of ~200–300 years, with the most recent event in 1717 (Rhoades & Van Dissen 
2003). 
 
Table 2-2 : Alpine Fault 
Alpine Fault 
Fault sense Dextral 
 
Recurrence interval < 2000 years 
Last event Last Millennium 
Slip rate High 
Single event displacement Major 
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Based on Californian, Japanese, and Turkish examples, seismological evolution takes place 
as the fault plane is smoothed by successive offsets (Stirling et al. 1996). As a result of this 
structural and seismic evolution the size of major earthquakes increases and the relative 
frequency of intervening smaller earthquakes decreases (Yetton 2000). 
(Adams 1980) suggests that the anomalously low levels of recorded seismicity along the 
Alpine Fault points to a “seismic gap” where comparable sections of the plate boundary 
have had large earthquakes predicted after relatively low recorded seismicity (Sykes 1971) 
(Rong et al. 2003). Current analysis  shows 69%-89% of the Australian-Pacific plate motion is 
accommodated by the major faults (Alpine-Hope-Kakapo) in the transitional area between 
Hokitika and Inchbonnie, and the 50% drop in slip rate on the Alpine fault is taken up by the 
Hope and Kakapo faults at the southwestern edge of the Marlborough Fault System 
(Langridge et al. 2010). 
The paleoseismic history can be used in conjunction with typical recurrence data from other 
plate boundary faults to predict the probability of the next earthquake using the method of 
(Nishenko & Buland 1987). This indicates a probability over the next 50 years of an Alpine 
Fault rupture as 65 ± 15%, increasing to 85 ± 10% over the next 100 years (Yetton et al. 
1998). A later study (Rhoades & Van Dissen 2003), which takes into consideration many of 
the uncertainties, indicates the 20-year hazard under the lognormal model (18%) is about 
double the long-term average rate but less than half of that estimated in previous studies 
(Table 2-3). 
Table 2-3 : Comparison of estimated probability of rupture of the central Alpine Fault using different methods 
 Time interval 
Model 1 year 20 year 50 year 100 year 
Lognormal (Rhoades & Van 
Dissen 2003) 
1% 18% 38% 60% 
(Yetton et al. 1998) after 
(Nishenko & Buland 1987) 
  65 ± 15% 85 ± 10% 
2.3.1.2 Nearby Active Faults 
(Elder et al. 1991) discussed the active faults within 200 km of Christchurch as likely having 
the most severe consequences in a future earthquake. These faults include the Porters Pass 
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Fault, Ashley Fault, and Hope Fault. (Pettinga et al. 2001a) continues this work to provide 
the foundation for the probabilistic, seismic hazard assessment (PSHA) for the Canterbury 
region. The PHSA is further qualified in (Stirling et al. 2001), that suggests a 1’000-year 
return period for 0.2 g PGA 1-second period shaking, increasing to 1.3 g PGA 0.2-second 
period shaking in the Canterbury region. Both reports have presumed the presence of 
unknown faults (prior to the Darfield Earthquake) but have found little direct evidence in 
the geological record. 
 
 
Table 2-4 : Hope Fault 
Hope Fault 
Fault sense Dextral 
 
Recurrence interval < 2000 years 
Last event Historical 
Slip rate High 
Single event displacement Major 
 
  
 
Table 2-5 : Porters Pass Fault 
Porters Pass Fault 
Fault sense Dextral 
 
Recurrence interval < 2000 years 
Last event Historical 
Slip rate Medium 
Single event displacement Major 
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The little-studied Canterbury Plain Seismicity Zone (CPSZ) has been the focus of a large 
number of shallow epicentres since 1942, and their location away from known active faults 
and their proximity to Christchurch means they are particularly important for determining 
seismic hazard in Christchurch.  
The epicentre of the most damaging historical Christchurch Earthquake prior to 2010, the 
Mw 5.7 (MM VII – VIII) 5
th June 1869 New Brighton Earthquake (Pettinga et al. 2001b), lies 
just within this zone, and borders the Pegasus Bay Seismicity Zone (PBSZ). 
2.3.2 Effects of historical earthquakes 
The 31st August 1870 Lake Ellesmere Earthquake (estimated Mw 5.6 – 5.8) strongly shook 
Lyttelton with rocks falling from cliffs around Lyttelton Harbour (Webb et al. 2011). 
The 5th December 1881 Castle Hill Earthquake (Mw 6.0) (Pettinga et al. 2001b), centred on 
the Castle Hill Basin, damaged buildings in Christchurch, including the spire of the Christ 
Church Cathedral, and broke windows and felled chimneys (NHRP 2011). 
The 1st September 1888 Mw 7.0 – 7.3 North Canterbury (Amuri) Earthquake on the Hope 
Fault, which caused the top 8 metres of the Christ Church Cathedral stone spire to collapse, 
also caused minor rock falls around Lyttelton Harbour (Webb et al. 2011). 
Table 2-6 : Ashley Fault 
Ashley Fault 
Fault sense Reverse 
 
Recurrence interval 2000 - 3500 years 
Last event Not established 
Slip rate Not established 
Single event displacement Not established 
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2.3.3 Possible effects of a large earthquake from the Southern Alpine fault, Hope 
fault, etc 
(Yetton 2000) argues that the recurrence behaviour of the Alpine Fault will resemble other 
plate boundaries around the world, so the little evidence available for ruptures along the 
Alpine Fault can be further extrapolated.  
When applied to the Alpine Fault, this method of using similarities produces a much higher 
probability estimate of rupture when compared with (Elder et al. 1991): a 50-year 
probability of rupture of 65 % (range 50 – 80 %) and a 100-year probability of rupture of 90 
% (range 80 – 95 %). 
Recent modelling of attenuation for Christchurch have revised the severity of previous 
prediction down to a likely MM VII, with MM VIII extremes in locations of amplification 
caused by underlying soft sediment, as predicted by (Elder et al. 1991). The likely long 
period and duration of the earthquake shaking (upwards of 2 minutes) will increase the 
likelihood of liquefaction (Yetton 2000), with taller buildings subject to short-period 
acceleration. 
The increased duration of shaking will probably lead to an increase in the liquefaction 
effects and ground cracking at the hazardous goods wharf and Lyttelton Port over that 
experienced in the Darfield Earthquake and similar to that of the Christchurch and Sumner 
Earthquakes of February and June 2011, as affected soils will have a greater opportunity to 
mobilise. 
Prolonged shaking will have a negative affect on structures and infrastructure. 
2.3.4 Effects of the Mw 7.1 Darfield Earthquake (September 2010) 
2.3.4.1 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 
At 04:35 on Saturday 4 September 2010 local time,  the moment magnitude (Mw) 7.1 
Darfield Earthquake struck approximately 10 km southeast of the town of Darfield and 
within 40 km of New Zealand’s second largest city, Christchurch, causing extensive damage 
in the city and surrounding region. There was no loss of life due to a fortunate combination 
of strict building codes and the earthquake occurring at 04:35 local time when the streets 
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were largely empty, but about 100 people were injured (two seriously) and many more 
were made homeless, at least temporarily. Regional planning had been undertaken to 
reduce critical infrastructure and lifelines vulnerability to natural hazards in 1997 (Lamb et 
al. 1997). 
 
Figure 2-5 : Seismicity 4th September 2010 to 31st January 2012, surrounding Christchurch, New Zealand (from GNS 
Science) 
2.3.4.2 Greendale Fault 
The importance of the Canterbury Plains Seismic Zone was recognised on the morning of 4th 
September 2010 when the Greendale Fault (and possibly two or three others in sympathy 
(Gledhill et al. 2011)) ruptured, causing the Mw 7.1 Darfield Earthquake and subsequent 
aftershock sequence. 
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The Darfield Earthquake, although not devastating, caused major disruption to Christchurch 
and surrounding areas.  
Lyttelton Port was affected by liquefaction of the wharf area and there were failures of the 
spans between wharves and the docks. The tunnel and railway lines out to Rolleston 
suffered damage, so that goods trains were not able to run. The earthquake also caused 
widespread liquefaction in the dangerous goods terminal under the berms surrounding the 
fuel tanks (Figure 2-9).  
The building stock of Lyttelton, consisting of many older properties, some dating back to the 
Port Cooper era, suffered from collapsed chimneys and brick frontages. Major unreinforced 
stone buildings suffered some light damage. 
The Lyttelton Road Tunnel was closed for inspection and maintenance. The anticipated slips 
at the portals (Lamb et al. 1997) did not eventuate, however the canopy was judged to be 
subject to failure, leading to an inspection.  
A large portion of Castle Rock (Figure 2-6, below), situated in close proximity to the 
Heathcote portal, did fall, resulting in blasting and scaling work and the required temporary 
closures of the tunnel approach (see Figure 2-18, below).  
Table 2-7 : Greendale Fault 
Greendale Fault 
Fault sense Dextral 
 
Recurrence interval 10’000 – 20’000 
years 
Last event Historical 
Slip rate Low 
Single event displacement Major 
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Figure 2-6 : Rock falls from Castle Rock on to old talus slope. Most are from the 4 Sep 2010 Darfield Earthquake, with 
some from the 22 February event (GNS Photo-GTH_6017). 
The Sumner Road over Evan’s Pass was closed whilst scaling, blasting and rock removal work 
took place. The road was reopened in the beginning of December (stuff.co.nz 2010a), with a 
speed restriction in place. At the time of road reopening, the retaining wall to the south of 
the road, protecting traffic from the precipice into Lyttelton Harbour, was still in need of 
repair in places, with subsidence evident on the road surface. 
Within Lyttelton, many scoria retaining walls have slumped or have fallen into or away from 
roads. 
London Street, Lyttelton, was closed to traffic due to building collapses, notably the 
Repertory Theatre (CCC 2010b). 
The Governor’s Bay Road, although suffering from cracks and collapse of some supporting 
walls, was not closed. This was the only road access into and out of Lyttelton during periods 
immediately following the event, taking traffic over Dyers Pass or Gebbies Pass. 
2.3.5 Effects of the Mw 4.9 Boxing Day Earthquake (26th December 2010) 
2.3.5.1 Christchurch Fault 
On 26th December 2010, a swarm of earthquakes (the largest at Mw 4.3 at 5km depth) 
located directly beneath Christchurch CBD caused further distress and limited damage. 
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2.3.6 Effects of the Mw 6.3 Christchurch Earthquake (22nd February 2011) 
2.3.6.1 Port Hills Fault 
On 4th February 2011, the Lyttelton Fault sprang to life with a Mw 6.3 shallow event, causing 
the first fatalities of the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence. A vertical peak-ground 
acceleration (PGA) of 2.2 g was recorded at Heathcote School, very close to the epicentre, 
and 1.8 g in the CBD. 
The old Lyttelton Road Tunnel toll gate structure was badly damaged during the 
earthquakes and was removed. The tunnel control building was also extensively damaged 
and needed to be demolished. 
After opening in December 2010 following the Darfield Earthquake, Evan’s Pass has been 
closed since the Christchurch Earthquake. The Christchurch Earthquake again dislodged 
bolders and loosened bluffs, such that even after much scaling work, the road was not 
deemed safe to travel and remained closed. The small parapet walls protecting the traveller 
from the steep slopes down to Gollen’s Bay and the harbour were also damaged by falling 
rocks. The road surface exhibited major cracking perpendicular to the slope.  
Dyer’s Pass Road was temporarily closed due to rockfall and rockfall danger, but reopened 
soon thereafter. 
Roads throughout Lyttelton and the study area took severe punishment from the 
Christchurch Earthquake. Many retaining walls, especially those built of red volcanic scoria 
rock, which were precarious after the Darfield Earthquake failed and diversions and road 
closures were put in place. Roads through the town were also affected by buildings, either 
having fallen onto the road or which were threatening to do so. Many roads suffered from 
unevenness as the base layers were delaminated (due to the high PGA and shaking) and 
drains and other underground utilities ‘floated’ in the substrate. 
All major unreinforced stone buildings suffered extensive damage. Many other unreinforced 
masonry buildings suffered from frontages and cladding failure. Many parapets were lost 
from hotels and other historical buildings. The Lyttelton Timeball building suffered extensive 
damage. Many chimneys that were still standing after the Darfield Earthquake succumbed 
to gravity and fell or became unsafe. 
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Rockfalls caused roads to shut and threatened residents at the outskirts of developments 
under or close to bluffs. Residents at Hyllton Heights were evacuated due to rockfall danger. 
A car-sized boulder rolled across Governors Bay Road and crashed straight through a house 
in Rapaki, leaving a trail of deep indentations across the hillside and paddocks, ending up on 
a lower roadway. People travelling along Evans Pass Road and over the Bridal Path walkway 
witnessed boulders the size of cars or busses falling from the surrounding cliffs. 
There was little reported liquefaction in Lyttelton.  
The Lyttelton port of Christchurch was extremely close to the epicentre. Port wharves, 
breakwaters, quays and reclaimed land moved significantly – in some instances over a 
metre laterally and nearly a metre [vertically] (Lyttelton Port of Christchurch 2011). 
 
Figure 2-7 : Damage to wharves at Lyttelton Port (Lyttelton Port of Christchurch 2011) 
The water supply to Lyttelton, being fed from Christchurch, was mostly unaffected by the 
Christchurch Earthquake. There was minor reported damage to water pipes. The waste 
water system was affected. Residents were affected by a power cut but services were 
restored to most customers within 24 hours. 
A 3.5 m high tsunami wave was created in the Tasman Lake, Mount Cook National Park, as 
the earthquake triggered icebergs to calve off the Tasman Glacier. 
2.3.7 Effects of the Mw 5.8/6.4 Sumner Earthquake (13th June 2011) 
2.3.7.1 Sumner Fault 
On 22nd June 2011, the Port Hills Fault rattled the study area twice within 2 hours, with 
large, shallow Mw 5.7 and Mw 6.1 events. One individual died and 46 were injured 2 
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seriously. A vertical peak-ground acceleration (PGA) of 2.13 g was recorded at the epicentre. 
The larger event followed the initial, smaller event. 
The Lyttelton Tunnel was closed as a precautionary measure but was reopened shortly 
thereafter. Evans Pass Road remains blocked with further rockfalls and slips reported. Dyers 
Pass Road remained open but there were reports of small rockfalls.  
The roads sustained more damage but retaining walls that were not previously damaged did 
not sustain further major damage. 
Further buildings crumbled and many are in need of demolition. The Lyttelton Timeball 
building, seriously affected in the Christchurch Earthquake, came down on its own in June. 
All major unreinforced stone buildings became unrecoverable. 
Rockfalls continued from the bluffs. 
No major liquefaction was reported. 
Further movement and damage to the Port infrastructure occurred (Lyttelton Port of 
Christchurch 2011). 
2.3.7.2 On-going aftershock sequence 
The aftershock sequence after the Darfield Earthquake was reinvigorated after each of the 
subsequent Christchurch and Sumner Earthquakes. This is clearly seen in the chart of 
number of earthquakes of Mw 3.0 or greater against the timeline (Figure 2-8). 
 
Figure 2-8 : Aftershock decay sequence for Canterbury (Mag 3.0 and greater) (GNS Science 2011a) 
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It is important to recognise that when dealing with a large earthquake disaster, subsequent 
aftershocks can be as or more destructive than the initial earthquake, and plans that 
mitigate further exposure to the hazard should be well-designed and circulated. 
2.3.8 Pegasus Bay Seismic Zone 
On 23rd December 2011, faults under Pegasus Bay produced four shallow Mw 5.1 to Mw 6.0 
events with four hours (Table 0-1-1). Again, the largest of these, with its epicentre under 
New Brighton coastline, was not the first event. 
2.4 Liquefaction and lateral spreading 
Liquefaction is a phenomenon whereby soil substantially loses strength in response to 
earthquake shaking, causing it to behave like a liquid. Liquefaction often causes ground 
settlement as silt is forced out of the soil. Over larger areas, differential settlement can 
cause certain parts of a large building or industrial complex to settle more than others. 
Liquefaction also causes problems with underlying structures, such as tanks and pipes, 
which can become buoyant and start to float towards the surface. 
Liquefaction-induced lateral spreading is defined as the finite, lateral displacement of gently 
sloping ground as a result or pore pressure build-up or liquefaction in a shallow underlying 
deposit during an earthquake (Rauch 1997). Lateral spreading occurs when uncontained 
soils are shaken and start to flow downslope or towards shorelines or river banks. Lateral 
spread can affect sub-soil infrastructure, such as pipes, as well as buildings and highways, 
caused by surface spreading and cracking. 
After the September 4th Darfield Earthquake, a team from the Department of Geological 
Sciences, University of Canterbury, was deployed to Lyttelton to map liquefaction at the 
marina and dangerous goods wharf. This area is built on reclaimed land. 
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Figure 2-9 : Montage of liquefaction and spreading effects at the Lyttelton Marina and Dangerous Goods Wharf, caused 
by the Darfield Earthquake 
2.5 Tsunami 
2.5.1 Near-field tsunami 
Lyttelton and the surrounding areas are affected by tsunami physically, economically, and 
socially, being a coastal town and heavily invested in the harbour. Confined within the 
natural topography of Lyttelton, a sheltered-harbour environment, it is prone to much-
stronger attenuation and amplification of long-period waves than the open coast of 
Christchurch (Heath 1976).  
Near-field tsunami originating in lcoal waters will result in minimal warnings being able to 
be broadcast. The likely scenarios for near-field tsunami generation are a coseismic event 
(Walters et al. 2006a) or a submarine landslide (Walters et al. 2006b). The referenced 
scenarios describe the likely location for these events as surrounding Kaikoura, 100 - 150 km 
north of the Lyttelton harbour mouth.  
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Figure 2-10 : Active sub-sea faults north of Lyttelton (ECan 2010b) 
Due to the orientation of the harbour mouth, and the wave-guide properties of the ocean 
surface, there will likely be not greater that a 2 m tsunami wave affecting Lyttelton harbour. 
However, the affects of the tsunami will reverberate for a prolonged time, again due to the 
properties of the ocean floor and the harbour bathymetry (Heath 1976). 
 
Figure 2-11 : Active submarine faults beneath Pegasus Bay (NIWA, University of Otago) (ECan 2011b) 
A survey of the previously unknown faults under Pegasus Bay show that the recently active 
ones may have a length of 25 km, similar in length to the Greendale Fault, and therefore 
capable of producing a Mw 6 - 7 earthquake (Barnes 2011). It has been calculated that it 
would require a Mw 6.5+ earthquake to displace the sea floor enough to create a 
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tsunami.  The small aftershocks experienced in Canterbury over recent months are not big 
enough to generate tsunami.  If a larger earthquake were to occur offshore in the 
Canterbury region, any resulting tsunami would be small in size and not expected to 
inundate land (Grant 2012). 
2.5.2 Far-field tsunami 
Distant tsunamis originating from across the Pacific Ocean will be predictable in their timing 
but unpredictable in their local strengths, the latter caused by the complex refractive nature 
of the Chatham Rise, offshore seabed topography surrounding Banks Peninsular, and 
natural resonance of Pegasus Bay (de Lange & Moon 2009).  
Numerical modelling (Downes 2007) shows that tsunami sourced from plate interface 
effects along the southern coastline of Peru and northernmost area of Chile are orientated 
in such a way that a large proportion of the wave energy is directed towards New Zealand. 
  
Figure 2-12 : Double amplitude H2 in metres for the 500-year (left) and 2500-year (right) return period South American 
tsunami for each location around the South Island, New Zealand, coastline (Downes 2007) 
(Power & Gale 2010) have created a scenario database that is the result of multiple forecast 
simulations of possible tsunami-inducing earthquakes at likely locations and strengths. The 
model has been tested against known historical tsunamis. 
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Figure 2-13 : Model results for a Mw 9.0 earthquake in the approximate location of the 1868 Peru earthquake. 
Superimposed triangles show the estimated maximum water-levels from historical observations of the 1868 tsunami at 
key locations (Power & Gale 2010) 
2.5.2.1 Large, historic events 
On 13th August 1868, an earthquake in Arica, Chile, judged to be of around Mw 8.5 in 
strength, caused the early morning 15th August tsunami that devastated Lyttelton’s harbour 
and ships with a greater than 7m high surge (de Lange & McSaveney 2009). 
On 10th May 1877, a great earthquake off the northern coast of Chile, estimated to be of 
approximately Mw 8.3, produced a smaller tsunami that affected Lyttelton harbour. 
The Mw 9.5 Puerto Montt, Valdivia, Chile Earthquake of 1960 produced an observed 2.7m 
waves with 3 – 4 m run-up height around Banks Peninsula, but due to near low tide, its 
impact was markedly reduced. Notwithstanding, it damaged boats and electrical gear at the 
port, and inundated a hotel and several houses: 200 sheep also drowned (The Encyclopedia 
of New Zealand 2011). 
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Figure 2-14 : Water poured into the dry dock at Lyttelton, in the South Island, during several of the surges from the Chile 
tsunami in May 1960. 
2.5.2.2 Recent events (Chile February 2010) 
On 27th February 2010, a magnitude Mw 8.8 earthquake off the coast of Concepcion, Chile 
generated a tsunami that caused a 2.2 m surge (Figure 2-15) to enter Lyttelton Harbour 
(stuff.co.nz 2010b).  
 
Figure 2-15 : Lyttelton tide gauge 28-Feb-2010 
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The sea at Godley Head was reported to be flowing into the harbour like a river, and 
exceeding 5 knots headway alongside the wharves (ECan 2010a). 
2.6 Slope hazard: Rock fall and landslide 
The Port Hills are at significant risk of landslides and rockfalls caused by earthquakes or 
severe rainstorms. Earthquakes continue to represent a risk of rockfall or slope failure. Slope 
failure is more common in mid-Winter to early spring when soil moisture levels are high 
enough to reduce the cohesive strength of loessal soils.  
After the recent earthquakes, bluffs and steep rocky slopes are more prone to loosening due 
to freeze-thaw cycle mechanisms, and cracks and fissures have opened to allow rain water 
to ingress and cause hard to detect erosion deep within the rocks. 
Rainstorm-induced landslides tend to be associated with prolonged wet periods, for 
example two or more consecutive wet winters, or after a major snowstorm when soil 
moisture levels are close to saturation. These conditions only require a minimal increase 
from moderate frequency storms to initiate movement. There appears to be a period of 10-
20 years between significant events on the northern slopes of the Port Hills, but rills and 
fissures develop in the southern-facing slopes surrounding Lyttelton. 
In historical times, a landslip behind Hawkhurst Road nos. 54 and 56 caused considerable 
dismay to the residents, but no structural damage [pers comm - local resident]. 
   
Figure 2-16 : Suddenly strange: (left) Boats sit on the seabed after tsunami surges drained Cass Bay in Lyttelton 
Harbour (Rudge 2010) – (right) The Governors Bay jetty is covered by tidal surges caused by the Chile quake 
(Hallett 2010) 
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Figure 2-17 : Hawkhurst Road historical landslip above nos. 54/56 
 
Figure 2-18 : Large boulders from rock falls on Castle Rock (mainly during the 4 September earthquake) near north 
Tunnel Portal (P), plus debris on tunnel maintenance road (GNS Photo-GTH_6084). 
The Bridal Path was widely used by those on foot to get back to Lyttelton after the 
earthquakes struck, as the tunnel and Evans Pass Road was closed. Aftershocks caused 
boulders to fall onto the track and cause at least one fatality. 
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Evans Pass Road was closed after the Darfield Earthquake but re-opened on 21st October 
2010, after scaling work to make safe and remove 15’000 m3 of loose rock above the road 
and repair retaining walls alongside the road was completed. After the Christchurch 
Earthquake, the road was again closed such that further work could be undertaken to make 
the road safe, but has since not re-opened. During the Christchurch Earthquake, cyclists 
travelling the route escaped narrowly from falling rocks (Figure 2-19), as did a petrol tank 
driver (Figure 2-20). 
 
Figure 2-19 : Cyclists dodge rocks the size of busses on Evan's Pass (Photo Andre Chappell) 
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Figure 2-20 : After the Christchurch Earthquake, an abandoned petrol tanker pictured on Evans Pass Road. © The 
Atlantic 2010 
Hyllton Heights, a new subdivision high above Lyttelton, situated below the bluffs of Mt 
Pleasant, has been zoned red due to the danger of rock fall. The Christchurch Earthquake 
left a number of houses without roofs, or otherwise severely structurally damaged, and still 
in danger of tumbling boulders. 
Figure 2-21, below, shows landslides and mass ground movements caused by the 
Christchurch Earthquake, identified during a GNS Science reconnaissance flight (Hancox et 
al. 2011). 
 
Figure 2-21 : Landslide map, February 2011, with Christchurch Earthquake epicentre marked - from (Hancox et al. 2011) 
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Figure 2-22, below, shows areas where boulders threaten infrastructure and landslides and 
mass movements have occurred in Lyttelton and surrounds. 
 
Figure 2-22 : Local failures - mass movement and rockfall – after (McFarlane 2011) - draped over 90m DEM 
Many of the retaining walls in Lyttelton are constructed from the local, red scoria rock. They 
were not resilient during the Darfield Earthquake and failed catastrophically after the 
Christchurch and Sumner Earthquakes.  
 
Figure 2-23 : Failure of retaining wall: St David's Street (above), Sumner Road (below), looking along Sumner Road 
towards Evans Pass. 
The extremely high ground-shaking during the Christchurch and Sumner Earthquakes in the 
northern Port Hills lead to extensive rockfalls and rock slope failures. Rockfalls mostly 
occurred from the jointed lava flows, leading to tens of houses being impacted by falling 
rock in Lyttelton and Rapaki (Giovinazzi et al. 2011). The time of day (mid-day) meant few 
were occupied which reduced the number of potential casualties. In Rapaki, a boulder 
dislodged from the hills above, bounced over Governors Bay Road, rolled through a house, 
tumbled through a paddock, and came to rest in the road below. 
Joint-controlled lava blocks were dislodged from lava flow outcrops often high up on the 
slopes of the valleys and bluffs in the Port Hills. Once dislodged, these blocks could in some 
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cases roll, bounce and slide hundreds of metres before coming to rest, either as the slopes 
flattened out, or at the bottom of valleys (Dellow et al. 2011). 
 
Figure 2-24 : Source area (S on 405 m peak) and travel path of the boulder (B) that hit the house 241 Governors Bay Road 
(H) at Rapaki (GNS Photo-GTH_5853). Inset right - House at 241 Governors Bay Road, Rapaki, 3 km west of Lyttelton, 
showing the entrance path of the large (~3 m long) boulder (GNS Photo-GTH_5842). 
 
Figure 2-25 : Where the rock came to rest (Photo: Julian Idle) 
The mitigation measures in place (fences, benches and trees) were overwhelmed by the 
large number and volume of rocks, which came down off the hills (Bell 2011). 
2.7 Loess-colluvial tunnel-gulley erosion 
The then-Lyttelton Borough Council cut two rough vehicle tracks across the Lyttelton 
Reserve in the mid 1970’s to provide access for a shrub planting programme (Yetton 1986). 
It was also hoped that the tracks would help direct slope water away from Council-owned 
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rental properties along Foster Terrace. Tenants in these properties had complained of water 
flowing off the reserve and saturating their sections. 
Over the following 5 years, erosion tunnels developed under the tracks where, in many 
cases, existing tunnels had simply been filled over. Although the track had a slight crossfall 
into the slope, a side channel had not been fully formed and was never lined. During 
rainstorms water had opened sinkholes to the tunnels passing underneath, and in this 
manner the tunnels effectively enlarged their catchments. 
By November 1983, one property, at 14 Foster Terrace, was particularly badly affected by 
water off the reserve. 
In a study for Christchurch City Council (Trangmar 2003), the areas suffering from tunnel-
gully erosion was given as (Table 2-8): 
Table 2-8 : Areas affected by tunnel-gully erosion 
Total area of study area in Lyttelton: 2587.4 ha  
Of that affected by tunnel-gully erosion: 
Slight: 264.8 ha (10%) 
Moderate: 68.8 ha (3%) 
Severe: 196.0 ha (8%) 
Indeterminate: 0.8 ha (<1%) 
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Figure 2-26 : Engineering geological map of Reserve 61, East Lyttelton, after (Yetton 1986) 
The slope above the house in Rapaki that was hit by the boulder (No. 241 Governors Bay 
Road), above, is filled with rills and tunnel-gully erosion through the loess-colluvial soils 
(Figure 2-27). 
61 
 
 
Figure 2-27 : Rills and tunnel-gully erosion through loess-colluvial soils above Rapaki 
2.8 Storm 
Lyttelton does not experience the intensity of rainfall that occurs in other parts of New 
Zealand. Generally, 24-hour rainfall with return periods of five years produces 100 – 150 
mm on the Port Hills. The effect of heavy rainfall is covered in the flood hazard and slope 
hazard sections. 
The most severe winds are associated with north-westerly and southerly airflow over the 
South Island. Severe events occurred in 1945, 1964, 1975, and 1988. The peak wind in 
Christchurch in 1975 was 193 km/h, which exceeded the 100-year return period (CCC 2003). 
Extreme winds can cause personal injury and death, and extensive damage to buildings, 
vegetation, and infrastructure. 
It is possible that during a strong Nor’Wester a vortex could touch down on the leeward 
hillsides. Winds may gust up to 40 knots in the harbour: the warmer the air the stronger the 
gusts! The Nor’west winds seem to funnel near the Corsair Bay area. 
Gale force winds occur roughly twice a year. In October 2000, the storm is estimated to 
have caused $8m worth of damage to the incomplete Lyttelton marina, sinking many yachts 
in the process (Salinger et al. 2000) 
In November 2009, high winds blew a container ship off its moorings. In June 2010, 
“humungous” waves sank two boats in Lyttelton harbour, with wind gusts reaching 111 
km/h causing two-metre-high waves (Williams 2010). 
A significant tornado event was recorded in Governors Bay in 1975 (CCC 2003). 
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Lightning has been recorded at Lyttelton, on the Port Hills. Electrical storms tend to occur 
between September and March but are relatively infrequent. With lightning comes the 
possibility of house or vegetation fire, or even death for walkers in the hills. 
Canterbury normally has one significant hail storm a year, usually between October and 
March (CCC 2003). No damaging hail storm has been recorded for Lyttelton.   
2.9 Flooding 
Lyttelton is built high up from the mean high-tide mark, so only tsunami and extreme storm 
surges would endanger the population. Stream breakout, especially coupled with storm and 
snow melt, could cause floods to occur in parts of the study area, perhaps even causing road 
and bridge washouts. Areas such as Cass Bay, where streams are channelled through 
residential areas, pose serious issues of flooding if the channels are not kept clear and 
upstream debris within the catchment not removed. 
 
Figure 2-28 : Streams flowing through Lyttelton, Corsair Bay, Cass Bay, and Rapaki 
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2.10 Snowstorm 
Significant snowstorms have occurred in 1895, 1896, 1901, 1918, 1945, and 1992. Snow 
storms cause damage to buildings and power lines, disruption to traffic and 
communications, and stock losses in rural districts (CCC 2003). A secondary effect is 
snowmelt flooding, which could induce mass-movement of slopes due to soils reaching 
saturation.  
Due to its steep slopes, walking or driving in Lyttelton is perilous. The snow storm that 
enveloped the greater Canterbury region in July 2011 caused chaos in Lyttelton due to 
inaccessibility and steep, icy roads. In the days following the snow, the roads were still 
difficult to navigate due to the attempts of authorities (CCC 2011a) and locals in spreading 
gravel on to the icy surfaces that resulted later in driving and walking on what appeared to 
be ball-bearings (pers comm – the author). 
2.11 Fire 
The historic fire of 24th October, 1870 destroyed the commercial centre of Lyttelton. Not 
having a fire brigade at the time, residents were forced to destroy buildings to create a fire 
break in order to save the rest of the town. It was New Zealand’s most extensive urban fire 
to date. 
Fortunately, the Darfield Earthquake of September 2010, although it caused chimneys to 
collapse, did not occur when those chimneys were in use, thus reducing the risk of fire in the 
aftermath of the earthquake.  
Some of the 148 fires reported in the 4 days after the Hyogoken-Nanbu (Kobe) Earthquake 
of 1995 were caused directly by the earthquake as people were cooking their breakfasts, 
but 25% were attributed to the restoration of power igniting damaged reticulated gas 
supplies (Borcherdt et al. 1998). The fires were also hard to extinguish due to the typical 
wooden houses, narrow streets blocked by debris, and the lack of water. 
Unlike in some parts of the country (such as Wellington), gas is not reticulated to homes in 
Lyttelton, so there were no gas mains to break during the earthquake events. 
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The risk of fire was also significantly reduced in the wintertime earthquakes in June as weak 
chimneys had already been felled in the Christchurch Earthquake and were therefore not in 
use. 
2.12 Drought 
On average, the Canterbury region is affected by one significant drought about every six 
years. Since 1970, severe droughts have occurred in 1977-78, 1985, 1988-89, 1992, 1997-98, 
2000-01, and 2002-03 (CCC 2003). Lyttelton is not a directly agricultural-based economy and 
so did not suffer losses. However, drought does increase the risk of fire and allows the fine 
loessal soils to dry out and winds cause dust to be blown into the air, increasing respiratory 
conditions. 
2.13 Heatwave 
Lyttelton has not been affected by a heatwave since records began. This is probably due to 
its disposition close to the harbour and the predominantly South-facing aspect. 
2.14 Pandemic 
Pandemics are worldwide outbreaks of disease or viruses. Being an international port 
catering for cruise liners, Lyttelton is on the front line. SARS and H1N1 (bird flu) were heavily 
reported in the media, but once the number of infections had died down and other news 
interested the media, coverage has waned. This is not to say either threat has gone away, as 
recent reports and warnings by the United Nations testify (World Health Organisation 2011). 
2.15 Explosion 
Stringent safety procedures have been put in place by the Lyttelton Port Company when 
unloading hazardous goods, such as LPG and fuel. Downstream operations by the tank farm 
owners also need to be of the highest quality. Even in the heavily-regulated oil & gas 
industry in the United Kingdom, accidents such as Buncefield, UK, have occurred (Buncefield 
Major Incident Investigation Board 2007), so their findings regarding societal risk can inform 
local operators (Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board 2008). 
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2.16 Noxious vapours 
Release of noxious chemicals (in aerosol or gaseous form) into the atmosphere and their 
dispersion is subject to the wind conditions and topography of the area, as well as their 
specific gravity (which helps define their propensity to sink or rise through the surrounding 
air column). Noxious vapours can cause nausea, headaches, fatigue, and other symptoms, 
especially if those affected have long-term exposure (Akland 1993). 
The Lyttelton hazardous goods wharf and surrounding tank farm is overlooked by residential 
properties. LPG (a mixture of butane (C4H10 – 2.0061) and propane (C3H8 – 1.5219)) 
(Engineering Toolbox 2011), petrol (C8H18 – 0.71 to 0.77), and diesel (C12H23 – 0.82 to 0.95) 
(SImetric 2011) are stored in these tanks. LPG vapour is heavier than air, and therefore has a 
propensity to sink to the ground, whereas petrol and diesel vapour have a specific gravity 
less than air, causing them to rise. Notwithstanding the possibility of an inversion layer 
forming within the Lyttelton Harbour, the tank farm at Lyttelton is surrounded by a 20m cliff 
to the north which, together with a southerly wind, can cause vapours to be trapped or be 
swept towards the main town. 
The Lyttelton wastewater treatment plant was constructed in 1996 and is located below 
Sumner Road between the container terminal and the coal stockpile yards of the Lyttelton 
Port Company. Methane (CH4 – 0.5537) is usually generated in the anaerobic digestion 
process used to break down sewage by bacteria. This unpleasantly pungent gas can be 
detectable in surrounding houses near to the Timeball during an easterly. 
2.17 Terrorism 
Being a strategic regional asset, Lyttelton Port is a prospective terrorist target. Although 
New Zealand is not seen as a high-risk target for terrorist activity, it can be used as a transit 
country for an attack on Australia. Depending on the nature of the attack, an unforeseen 
incident could therefore occur at Lyttelton. 
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3 Research Methodology and Data Collection Techniques 
3.1 Context 
The research project commenced shortly after the 26th February 2010 (Mw 8.8, MM IX) 
Chilean Earthquake (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 2012) which 
generated a tsunami that affected Lyttelton Harbour (Lyttelton Port of Christchurch 2010). 
The original research used that tsunami event as a base-line for a natural hazard event to 
inform the sampled community. Two written surveys were conducted during this study: the 
first, prior to the 4th September Darfield Earthquake; the second, after the 13th June Sumner 
Earthquakes.  
Concurrent with the 2010 survey, a structured interview comprising of 6 questions was 
carried out at random households. The interview was suspended after the 4th September 
Darfield Earthquake. A passive census of parked vehicles was also carried out in mid-2010 
on different days of the week and at different times, acting as a proxy to population 
movement and distribution. 
The 22nd February 2011 Mw 6.3 Christchurch Earthquake changed the research focus 
entirely, and a new survey of the original 500 recipients of the pre-September survey was 
commissioned for delivery after the government moratorium on social sciences research 
was lifted on 31st May 2011. Before this survey was ready, the 13th June Mw 5.7/Mw 6.0 
Sumner Earthquakes happened. The survey was quickly broadened to accommodate the 
Sumner Earthquakes, and expended to a complete census of the 1’400 households in 
Lyttelton, Corsair Bay, Cass Bay, and Rapaki. This census was carried out in the period July – 
August 2011. 
3.2 2010 Written Survey 
The 2010 written survey was implemented prior to the Mw 7.1 September 2010 Darfield 
Earthquake. It was conceived as a written preparedness survey due to the breadth of the 
information being requested. The survey was anonymous and confidential. 
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To inform the objectives of the research concerned with preparedness, the survey 
incorporated questions regarding triggers to evacuation, meeting places and emergency 
plans, provisions, community relationships, and household demographics.  
To inform the objectives of the research concerned with vulnerability, the details of 
locations and activities of household members throughout the week in three-hourly 
intervals were also requested in order to build a spatiotemporal population distribution 
model. Furthermore, vulnerability to loss of utilities or house structure was inferred by 
asking about the type of structure and foundation the house was built on, age and general 
state of repair of the house, and necessarily layman’s geotechnical observations from the 
respondents.  
To inform the objectives of the research concerned with the immediate response to recent 
disasters, there was a specific reference to the tsunami at the end of February 2010, which 
was regarded as a baseline experience of a natural disaster to inform the respondents’ 
answers regarding their experience of other disasters and their anticipation for another. 
A sample size of 500 was chosen due to cost constraints. Each package contained a cover 
letter, the survey (a 12-page booklet format, monochrome printed on 3 double-sided A4 
leaves, folded to A5, and centre stapled), and a C5 reply-paid addressed envelope, all 
stuffed into a C5 envelope with University of Canterbury logo and researcher contact 
details, and addressed to The Occupant. Each survey was uniquely numbered using a self-
inking self-incrementing number stamp and the same number stamped on the envelope. 
The written surveys were randomly and evenly delivered by hand to post boxes within the 
study area (every second or third mail box). As each survey was posted it was geo-tagged 
using a Trimble Juno SB handheld with integrated GPS running Trimble TerraSync data 
collection software. 
The result geo-tagged data files were processed using Trimble GPS Pathfinder Office 
software and exported to various formats, including KML (Keyhole Markup Language) for 
viewing preliminary survey distribution data in Google Earth, text file in tabular format for 
later collation with returned survey data, and Esri ShapeFile for use in Esri ArcGIS to perform 
spatial analysis with the data. 
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To provide anonymity, the survey number and the geo-tag is only known to the principal 
researcher and kept separate from the raw data.  
To complete the 500 samples, remaining written surveys were delivered a few days after 
the Darfield Earthquake. 
The date of delivery of each survey to the mailbox was recorded, as well as the time it was 
posted (date printed on the cancellation mark on the return envelope). Because surveys 
were being delivered in the evening immediately before the Darfield Earthquake, some 
were not received until after the earthquake. This means there are three groupings: 
Table 3-1 : Temporal distribution of the 2010 written survey delivery and replies 
Delivery and receipt dates Count Column % N=81 
 Surveys received and returned before the 
Darfield Earthquake 
18 22% 
 Surveys received before the Darfield 
Earthquake and returned after the Darfield 
Earthquake 
31 38% 
 Surveys received and returned after the 
Darfield Earthquake. 
32 40% 
A brief analysis of the results was performed and no significant bias was indicated for return 
rates: 63% (317) of surveys were delivered before the Darfield Earthquake and 37% (183) 
afterwards. Of those returned, 60% (49) were delivered before the Darfield Earthquake and 
40% (32) afterwards. 
The answers of the surveys returned after the Darfield Earthquake were affected by the 
recipient having experienced the earthquake, most notably recognised in the record of 
previous earthquakes felt. Some respondents made mention that they filled out the survey 
as though they had not experienced the earthquake, others mentioned the effects of the 
earthquake on their property: chimneys down, etc. 
The replies were hand-coded into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. The spreadsheet was then 
combined as a data table with the survey delivery spatial data in Esri ArcGIS to produce 
spatial maps. 
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3.3 2010 Structured Interviews 
A further 6-question face-to-face doorstep interview was conducted at the same time as the 
2010 survey delivery. The interviews concerned the likelihood to evacuate, travel plans, and 
meeting plans, and therefore informed the research objective concerning preparedness of 
the population for a disaster.  
(McFarlane & Garland 1994) indicate that the respondents in their trial were more likely to 
respond to the face-to-face interview. Furthermore, the presence of the interviewer did not 
necessarily yield greater amounts of information, nor did their results show any conclusive 
difference in the quality of responses. For this study, sufficient resources were not available 
to attempt to survey everyone in the sample population to the depth of the written survey. 
To save further time, only a third of the sample population was selected to take part in the 
face-to-face interview.  
Every 10th house where a survey was to be delivered was also approached. If no answer 
came from inside when the door knocked or bell rung, the written survey was delivered and 
the face-to-face doorstep interview was attempted at the 10th house further along. If the 
person that answered the door was obviously under age, they were requested to fetch an 
adult: if one was not available, the interview was terminated and the written survey 
delivered in the mailbox when leaving. If the person that answered the door was an adult, 
the purpose of the survey was explained and they were invited to answer the 6 questions. 
The replies were coded immediately into the Trimble Juno SB handheld and also geo-
tagged. At the end of the interview, the respondent was invited to participate in the written 
survey, and if they accepted, they were handed a survey and the number recorded. 
Due to the 4th September Darfield Earthquake, the interviews were suspended after 26 
deliveries. The last interviews were carried out on the evening of 3rd September, the last 
one being just eight hours before the 4th September Darfield Earthquake. 
3.4 2010 Parked vehicle census 
The parked vehicle census was conducted to collect information regarding where vehicles 
were located at different days of the week and times of day. This information was used as a 
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proxy to population movement and distribution to help inform the research objective 
concerning population vulnerability. 
The census was carried out on Sunday late afternoons, Monday early afternoons (before 
end of school), and Wednesday evenings. It was carried out from the public Right Of Way 
(ROW); therefore, vehicles not visible from the footpath (for instance, in closed garages or 
on private property not visible from the public ROW) were unable to be sampled. 
 
Figure 3-1 : Walking route used to survey vehicles (5 sectors) 
Because of the distance involved and the limited time available for each day’s time slot, the 
study area was split into 5 sectors and each sector walked three times, each on the 
designated day and the designated time, but in different weeks. The total length of a single 
route is ca. 37 km. 
Each vehicle was identified by the license registration plate (if visible), and certain 
characteristics were recorded. All information was recorded on a Trimble Juno SB handheld 
with integrated GPS running Trimble TerraSync data collection software. The data sets were 
uploaded to Trimble GPS Pathfinder office, where they were post-processed (to increased 
spatial accuracy) and exported to various formats, including KML for viewing preliminary 
vehicle distribution data in Google Earth, text file in tabular format for later collation with 
returned survey data, and Esri ShapeFile for use in Esri ArcGIS to perform spatial analysis 
with the data. 
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3.5 2011 Written Survey 
The 2011 survey was originally conceived to be delivered after the 22nd February 
Christchurch Earthquake moratorium on research was lifted on 1st May 2011 (Johnston 
2011), but was reworked after the 13th June Sumner Earthquakes to incorporate responses 
to those earthquakes. 
Ethical considerations were addressed by sending the survey for review by social science 
and psychology researchers: Dr William (Deak) Helton (Department of Psychology, 
University of Canterbury), Kim Wright (GNS Science), and Dr Sarah Beaven (Department of 
Geological Sciences, University of Canterbury) all reviewed the survey and offered 
comments. As with all research conducted by the University of Canterbury, approval was 
sought and received from the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee. 
A complete census of 1’400 households in the study area was chosen, mainly enabled by 
financial support from the Canterbury Civil Defence and Emergency management group.  
The census asked many of the same questions as the 2010 survey, but also asked specific 
questions about where people were and their actions after each of the Christchurch and 
Sumner Earthquakes. This additional information allowed comparisons between the 
Christchurch and Sumner Earthquakes to be made, and to inform the research objective 
concerning the preparedness and the immediate responses of the population to the events. 
A census format was chosen so all households would be sampled. Each package contained a 
cover letter with important contact information fact sheet for earthquake victims on the 
reverse, the survey (an 8-page booklet format, full-colour printing bled to edge on 2 double-
sided A3 leaves, folded to A4, and centre stapled), and a C4 reply-paid addressed envelope, 
all stuffed into a C4 envelope with University of Canterbury and CDEM logos and researcher 
contact details, the name of the survey and “Census”.  Each survey was uniquely numbered 
by hand and the same number written on the envelope.  This number was known as the 
“Internet Serial Number”. The census was also available to participants to take online using a 
Qualtrics survey tool (Qualtrics 2011). Of the 521 replies received, 31 (5.9%) were 
completed online. 
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A postcard was also designed to appear attractive, with a colour University of Canterbury 
logo on the front and information pertaining to the survey on the rear, including a hyperlink 
to an online copy of the cover letter and explanatory text for the survey 
(http://www.nhrc.canterbury.ac.nz/julian_idle.shtml). Each postcard was also uniquely 
numbered by hand.  
The hand-written numbers on the survey and the postcard were also appended with a two-
digit checksum to avoid fraudulent replies: no fraudulent replies were received, however. 
Online surveys were only allowed to use the ISN once in order to avoid duplicate 
submissions. 
The surveys and postcards were hand-delivered at least once to each accessible household, 
with a second delivery of either, i. a second census package or, ii. a reminder/thank you 
postcard two weeks later. As each survey or postcard was delivered it was geo-tagged using 
a Trimble Juno SB handheld with integrated GPS running Trimble TerraSync data collection 
software, and the street number recorded. If a house was unoccupied, demolished, or there 
was a vacant plot, this was recorded in the collected data.  
Because of the accuracy of the geo-tagging, it was possible to know all of the Internet Serial 
Numbers that were delivered to a single mailbox, thus making duplicate returns (whether 
physical or online) detectable. As a precaution, the street number was also recorded 
alongside the GPS coordinates. Two sets of duplicates replies were received during the 
course of the survey: two written surveys from the same address; and, one written and one 
online survey.  
The census was further socialised in the media in the Mainland Press (Doudney 2011). 
Inaccessible, missing (demolished), or vacated houses were noted and the addresses used to 
attempt later delivery of the full package using New Zealand Post-paid postal delivery. This 
method was used to involve recipients that had moved out of the study area. 
The result geo-tagged data files were processed using Trimble GPS Pathfinder Office 
software and exported to various formats, including KML for viewing preliminary survey 
distribution data in Google Earth, text file in tabular format for later collation with returned 
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survey data, and Esri ShapeFile for use in Esri ArcGIS to perform spatial analysis with the 
data. 
The written replies were hand-coded using a special version of the public-facing Qualtrics 
survey that did not have the special navigation or verification logic. The results of the two 
Qualtrics surveys were downloaded from the Qualtrics survey manager and combined into a 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. The spreadsheet was then combined as a data table with the 
survey delivery spatial data in Esri ArcGIS to produce spatial maps. 
3.5.1 2011 Survey design  
Because of the relatively low 16.2% reply rate from the 2010 survey, there was a wish to 
increase this value. The single point of contact with the 2010 survey was determined to be 
one reason for the low return rate. A further factor was the quality and size of the survey. 
Thirdly, it was predominantly a student research project and possibly not taken as seriously 
as hoped. It has been suggested that high response rates are achieved through five design 
elements of the survey (Dillman 1999): 
 Respondent-friendly questionnaire 
 Four contact by mail, plus a special contact 
 Return envelopes with real stamps 
 Personalisation of correspondence 
 Token prepaid financial incentives 
3.5.1.1 Respondent-friendly questionnaire 
The envelope was made to be more official and less like junk mail. It had the University of 
Canterbury and CDEM logos, with the name of the census, the information that it was being 
delivered to all residents in the study area, and the word “Census” in the middle. 
Inside, a full-colour cover letter with fact sheet of useful contacts was provided for 
reference. The design of the questionnaire was also made more official looking. It was 
modelled on the NZ Statistics 2011 census that was cancelled due to the earthquakes. The 
printing was in full-colour with bleeding to the edge of the paper. The pages were large and 
accessible and the questions well-spaced. The A4 size when folded had the effect of it not 
being so easily lost or mislaid. 
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The postcard was of the attractive University of Canterbury logo in full-colour. On the 
reverse was a small amount of information and the suggestion to visit the researcher’s web 
page at the university web site. 
3.5.1.2 Four contact by mail, plus a special contact 
Due to cost constraints, the survey was delivered by hand. Also, a database of addresses 
was not available to the researcher at the time the survey was delivered.  
According to (Dillman 1999), the most success from a mail survey is when the researcher has 
five contacts with the recipient: 
 A brief pre-notice letter 
 A questionnaire 
 A thank you postcard 
 A replacement questionnaire 
 A final contact 
Due to timing constraints, a pre-notice letter was not delivered. The article in the Mainland 
Press did fulfil some of the criteria, albeit after the first surveys had been delivered. The 
survey was delivered at least once, with either a follow-up survey package (the 
replacement) or a postcard. No final contact was attempted. 
3.5.1.3 Return envelopes with real stamps 
Due to cost, it was not possible to invest in the number of stamps required to attach to all 
replied-paid envelopes in the delivered surveys. For this reason, the pre-paid University 
authorised envelopes were used. Only those replies returned would be charged. 
3.5.1.4 Personalisation of correspondence 
There was nothing in the correspondence that was sent, other than the ISN was hand-
written. 
3.5.1.5 Token prepaid financial incentives 
This was not considered for ethical reasons. 
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3.6 Response rate 
From the sample of 500 surveys delivered in the 2010 survey, N=82 (16.4%) surveys were 
returned.  
Of the 1’400 surveys delivered in the 2011 survey, N=520 (37.1%) were returned. This 
included 36 replies online using the Qualtrics Internet survey. 
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4 Exposure and vulnerability of the population of Lyttelton and surrounding 
area to hazardous events 
3’075 people regularly live in the study area, in 1’326 occupied dwellings (Statistics New 
Zealand 2006c). 1’400 households were identified during the course of this study. Of the 
500 households sampled prior to the Darfield Earthquake, N=82 (16%) replied. Of the 1’400 
households sampled in July-August 2011, N=520 (37%) replied. 
This chapter uses the aggregate data gathered from the 2010 and 2011 surveys. It is 
recognised that due to the smaller sample size, the 2010 survey data has a statistically lower 
confidence level than that from the 2011 survey. The treatment of the data sets from these 
two surveys should therefore be treated as two separate populations.  
Because the questionnaires were geo-tagged at the time of delivery, it was possible to 
identify 55 replies in common from the 2010 and 2011 as having been delivered to the same 
addresses. Of those, 50 households were identified as being common between the 2010 and 
the 2011 June surveys. The remaining 5 households were not deemed to be the same due to 
a significant change to the household’s demographics between 2010 and 2011. 
Statistics taken from Statistics New Zealand are obfuscated to conserve confidentiality. This 
results in percentages that do not sum to 100%. 
4.1 Population variables 
4.1.1 Age and Gender (2011 survey) 
 
Figure 4-1 : Population distribution by Age and Gender 
70% of respondents’ households participating in the 2011 survey were made up of adult 
couples, 20-years and older. 11% of couples were retired (65-years or older). The 2011 
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survey captured proportionally more replies from retirees than would be expected when 
compared to the 2006 census data age distribution. 
  
Figure 4-2 : Disproportionally more retirees answered the 2011 survey than accounted for by (Statistics New Zealand 
2006c). Males are also slightly underrepresented in the 2011 survey returns. 
The 2010 and 2011 surveys allowed the opportunity to analyse the mix of males and 
females in each household. They both revealed that households were predominantly made 
of one male and one female. However, the 2010 survey showed there were more single 
females in households that replied than in 2011. 
 
Figure 4-3 : Household make-up - number of Males vs. 
Females (%) – 2010 Survey 
 
Figure 4-4 : Household make-up - number of Males vs. 
Females (%) – 2011 Survey 
4.1.2 Children 
Of the 520 households participating in 2011 Survey, 25% indicated they had children. This 
compares with 47% in (Statistics New Zealand 2006c). Of those with children, couples with 
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children made up 19% of the sample, and single parents a further 3%: this compares with 
38% and 15%, respectively, in (Statistics New Zealand 2006c). 
 
Figure 4-5 : Household make-up - Children vs. Adults (%) – 
all households - 2010 Survey  
 
Figure 4-6 : Household make-up - Children vs. Adults (%) – 
all households - 2011 Survey 
No single parents participated in the 2010 Survey: in 2011, 3% of respondents were single 
parents. The number of single-child families increased from 6% to 13%. 
 
Figure 4-7 : Household make-up - households with children 
(%) - 2010 Survey 
 
Figure 4-8 : Household make-up - households with children 
(%) - 2011 Survey 
4.1.3 Ethnicity 
The population of Lyttelton is predominantly European (> 80%). Māori represent a further 
ca. 10% (Statistics New Zealand 2006c), although they represented only 6% of the Survey 
2010 sample. There is a small Asian community, and the rest are made up of other 
backgrounds: Middle-Eastern, African, Latin American, etc.  
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Figure 4-9 : Ethnicity of sample population - Survey 2010 vs. Census 2006 
4.1.4 Income 
The census questionnaire and the 2010 survey use two scales for income, so a direct 
comparison is not possible. However, based on the scatterplot (Figure 4-10) it is possible to 
observe that the 2010 survey has captured the long tail of the high income earners. 
 
Figure 4-10 : Household income - Census 2006 vs. Survey 2010 
4.1.5 Medical needs 
10 (12.2%) of the 82 respondents in the 2010 survey reported having a condition requiring 
medication. 3 respondents were being treated at the time and had visits by their doctor to 
their home. There were no reported instances of household members being on life-support 
machinery, nor did anyone report requiring a constant water or electricity supply for 
medical reasons. Of the 9 replies that suggested they would require assistance in case of a 
disaster, 4 households noted this was because of help with young children, 4 were due to 
frailty, and one for help cleaning up. 
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Figure 4-11 : Medical attention – September 2011, 
February 2011 and June 2011 
 
Figure 4-12 : Medical attention availability – September 
2011, February 2011 and June 2011 
4.1.6 Animals 
In the 2010 survey, 57 (69.5%) of the 82 responding households reported having animals in 
their care: 57 (69.5%) with small animals (cats, dogs, birds); 3 (3.6%) also having larger 
animals or livestock; and, 3 (3.6%) also having chickens. 3 (3.6%) replies indicated very 
strongly that they would not leave their dog in any circumstance. 
In the 2011 survey, 59% responding households reported having animals in their care in 
February, rising to 60% by June: 3% also reported having larger animals or livestock in both 
months. 
 
Figure 4-13 : Households with animals in their care 
4.2 Population spatiotemporal distribution 
The resident population moves without and outside of Lyttelton during the course of each 
day over a week. Two surveys were completed that studied this distribution over time and 
place. 
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4.2.1 Population spatiotemporal distribution survey (2010) 
The written questionnaire in the 2010 survey asked respondents to record the location and 
activity throughout a typical week for up to 4 significant household members. 
The weekly schedule was divided into 7 days each of 6 three-hour segments spanning 06:00 
– 00:00, and one six-hour segment between 00:00 and 06:00. The assumptions for deciding 
this particular segmentation are as follows: 
00:00 – 06:00 Most people would not have a separate activity between 00:00 – 03:00 
and 03:00 – 06:00. 
06:00 – 09:00 Most people would be waking up and getting ready for work or school. 
09:00 – 12:00 General morning period, to coincide with morning school. 
12:00 – 15:00 General afternoon period, to coincide with afternoon school. 
15:00 – 18:00 After school, late worker, or returning home. 
18:00 – 21:00 Evening meal or evening activity. 
21:00 – 24:00 It is assumed that most people would be at home, but some would be at 
work or be relaxing outside of the home. 
Each respondent (as many as four per household) was requested to populate every daily 
segment according to the following key: 
 H – Home 
 W – Work 
 E – Education 
 S – Shopping 
 R – Recreation 
After the questionnaire was returned it was found necessary to code a sixth activity: V for 
variable. Some people were on shift work and the model as defined would not be able to 
accommodate them. Rather than show the schedule as blank it was filled in as a Variable 
schedule and treated for this analysis as being at home. 
The data points of interest were when the individual was at home (H), or indicated a 
variable (V) schedule. 
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Figure 4-14 : Population density of study area population over a complete week, pre-September 2010 
4.2.2 Vehicle Proxy Census 
The vehicle proxy data was imported into Esri ArcGIS and analysed using the kernel density 
tool. The analysis was carried out in triplicate, once for each day of the census. 
The data was further normalised to allow comparison of the density and the colour ramp 
chosen to show dense vehicle distributions as red and low distribution as green (Figure 
4-17).  
It can be seen that during the daytime (Mondays and Sundays) there is a higher density of 
vehicles parked in the central town along London Street. This is a popular destination during 
weekends for day-trippers and on Mondays for workers and residents getting a bite to eat 
or doing shopping. 
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Figure 4-15 : Road map of Lyttelton 
 
Figure 4-16 : Road map of Rapaki, Cass Bay, and Corsair Bay 
On Wednesdays, the density changed to reflect the higher number of people returning 
home. A dense area on Winchester Street shows the high number of vehicles parked outside 
the recreation centre. 
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On the particular Sundays the data was collected, the study detected a high density of 
vehicles on Reserve Terrace (marked with a triangle - Figure 4-15) due to a popular party 
being held. 
 
Figure 4-17 : Lyttelton mid-2010 parked vehicle census as proxy for population distribution 
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4.3 Vulnerability 
Vulnerability refers to the potential for casualty, destruction, damage, disruption or other 
forms of loss in a particular element (Alexander 2000). 
4.3.1 Deprivation index 
The Atlas of Socioeconomic Deprivation in New Zealand NZDep2006 (White et al. 2008) 
describes the deprivation experienced by groups of people in small areas. It is created from 
data from the Statistics New Zealand 2006 Census of Population and Dwellings (Statistics 
New Zealand 2006a). 
It is mainly used as a tool to determine funding levels in certain areas for health and social 
services, but increasingly is used as a measure or proxy for other purposes (e.g. vulnerability 
for CDEM purposes) (Daly 2009). 
The index is constructed from nine variables, reflecting eight types of deprivation. The 
variables, in decreasing importance in NZDep2006, are summarised in Table 4-1. 
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Table 4-1 : Description of the nine variables, in decreasing importance, used to construct the New Zealand Index of 
Deprivation 2006 
Deprivation domain Census variable 
Income Aged 18-64 years receiving a means-tested benefit 
Income Living in households with equivalised income below an income 
threshold 
Owned home Not living in own home 
Support Aged under 65 years living in a single-parent family 
Employment Aged 18-64 years and unemployed 
Qualifications Aged 18-64 years and without any qualifications 
Living space Living in households below an equivalised bedroom occupancy 
threshold 
Communication With no access to a telephone 
Transport With no access to a car 
The deprivation index is a number ranging from 1 to 10. 1 represents the least deprived 10% 
of the population of New Zealand and 10 represents the most deprived 10% of the 
population. 
Lyttelton exhibits a small core of very high deprivation (Deprivation index = 9) centred on 
the west end of London Street. This area is a mixture of residential property, retirement 
flats, light engineering and industry, the recreation centre, and the Lyttelton Club and Four 
Ships Restaurant complex. Two blocks to the North of London Street is another high 
deprivation centre (Deprivation index = 7), bounded by Canterbury Street, Winchester 
Street, Oxford Street, and Ripon Street. This area is a mixture of residential property, 
retirement flats, and churches and associated properties. 
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Figure 4-18 : Deprivation Index map for Lyttelton and surrounding areas - from (White et al. 2008) 
4.3.2 Access to transport 
The 2011 survey identified 935 vehicles (excluding motorcycles) at the 520 households 
participating in the study (Figure 4-19). 
 
Figure 4-19 : Vehicles per Household (% of households) - Census 2006 vs. Survey 2011 
Further analysis of the 2011 Survey results shows the predominant ownership of vehicles 
comes from 2-person households, who own 2 vehicles (Figure 4-20). This is reflected in the 
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analysis of how the vehicles are distributed between households, showing two-person two-
vehicle households own 30% of the whole vehicle fleet (Figure 4-21). 
 
Figure 4-20 : Number of Households per Number of 
vehicles per household vs. Household size - Survey 2011 
 
Figure 4-21 : Distribution of Vehicles per Household size 
vs. Vehicles per household – Survey 2011 
Access to private transport became very important after the Christchurch Earthquake as 
public transport services were shut down. Not having access to transport would increase the 
household vulnerability to losing work if unable to get to it, financial penalties if they had to 
pay for a taxi, and loss of mobility. 
4.3.3 Building stock 
Prior to the Darfield Earthquake, the town of Lyttelton was a gem of historical and heritage 
buildings (Burgess 2009b). A large part of the town was considered to be of heritage status, 
retaining the context of the early settler years, with the preponderance of 19th century 
homes (see Figure 4-22) being what made Lyttelton Lyttelton.  
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Figure 4-22 : Year of construction for buildings in Lyttelton and surrounding area 
Unreinforced masonry was prevalent in the built landscape (Figure 4-23), especially for 
chimneys, which played a role in the felling and holing of a few chimneys and roofs after the 
Darfield Earthquake. It may have been good fortune that the Darfield Earthquake felled a 
number of chimneys in September. The Christchurch and Sumner earthquakes played a 
major role in casting the architectural heritage of the town to the ground, among them all of 
the stone churches and one of the still operational Timeball stations in the world that 
Lyttelton was famous for. 
Many timber buildings also suffered damage, but luckily there were no fires unlike after the 
1995 Mw 6.9 Kobe or the 1906 Mw 7.9 San Francisco Earthquakes. Things may have been a 
lot worse had the Darfield and Christchurch Earthquakes not occurred, as people would 
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most likely have been heating their homes using log burners come June.
 
Figure 4-23 : Wall construction type for buildings in Lyttelton and surrounding areas 
4.4 Discussion 
Other than a few small pockets, Lyttelton residents are in the least-deprived half of the 
population with respect to deprivation. The population consists of a well-mixed cross-
section through New Zealand society, with little evidence of discrimination against 
minorities.  
Help for those in need came from the community rather than from a government-directed 
source: 
“During the recent earthquake 4/09/10 there seemed to be no CD here in 
Lyttelton. However the Lyttelton Time Bank took over that role & did a great 
job.” – Reply from 2010 Survey 
“The Lyttelton Civil Defence Post did not open on the morning of the earthquake. 
It should have been. Several people went but nobody was there.” – Reply from 
2010 Survey 
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“Support after Feb was excellent, water, Navy, Red Cross etc. / After June, 
nothing.” – Reply from 2011 Survey 
 Community groups, such as the Project Lyttelton and Time Bank, play a strong role in the 
community.  
Many households are families with children, and many have animals in their care. There is 
concern that children are vulnerable, especially when at school and their parents at work, 
perhaps on the other side of the tunnel.  
Many of the vulnerable buildings in Lyttelton have collapsed, are being demolished, or are in 
the process of being supported ready for a possible rebuild to higher standards. There is 
little land left in Lyttelton for new subdivisions to be built on. New subdivisions are 
encroaching on the land adjacent to the reserves running above Lyttelton, but that leaves 
them exposed to rockfall hazard and possible mass movement or landslide hazard. The 
alternative would be to remove an existing or demolished building, remediate the land, and 
replace with a new, stronger building, but being a town of exceptional heritage character, 
this would prove time-consuming and expensive to accommodate. 
The 2011 Survey found 16 households (23 individuals) which did not have their own private 
vehicle. This could make them vulnerable in case they chose to evacuate, or if they were 
dependent on public transport to get them to work they could lose their job. It is likely that 
they would find other transport alternatives, for instance with neighbours, but if they relied 
on the bus to take them and a bicycle through the tunnel, they would be disadvantaged.
Although following the major events affecting Lyttelton some employment sectors typically 
experience increased activity (e.g. construction, Lyttelton Port), many sources of 
employment and income were disrupted following the Christchurch Earthquake. This 
increased the financial vulnerability of those households with a higher Deprivation Index. 
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5 Preparedness of the households 
5.1 Pre-Darfield Earthquake vs. Post-Sumner Earthquakes 
The 2010 and 2011 surveys carried similar questions regarding preparedness, allowing 
comparisons to be made. 
5.1.1 Household inventory comparison – 2010 vs. 2011 
Most households replying to the 2010 survey had some form of provisions that could be 
accessed during an emergency. Most households replying to the 2011 survey also had some 
form of provisions; however, the proportional mix had changed3 (Figure 5-1). 
                                                        
3 The 2010 survey did not include the data points for “Tent or other portable shelter” or “Cash”. 
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Figure 5-1 : Emergency household provisions, across all household (with and without children) - 2010 vs. 2011 
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Table 5-1 : Emergency household provisions, across all household (with and without children) - 2010 vs. 2011 
All households 2010 2011 
Blankets or sleeping bags 89% 85% 
Non-perishable food (canned or dried rations) 89% 87% 
Hand-operated can opener, eating utensils 87% 78% 
First aid kit and essential medicines 85% 81% 
Strong outdoor shoes 85% 80% 
Toilet paper and large rubbish bags for disposal 85% 74% 
Towels, soap, toothbrush and sanitary items 84% 73% 
A change of clothes 83% 69% 
Sharp (utility) knife, scissors, etc. 83% 64% 
Wind and rain-proof clothing 83% 76% 
Drivers licenses and Passports 82% 72% 
Duffel bag, backpack, holdall, suitcase, etc. 79% 69% 
A supply of drinking water other than from the tap 76% 87% 
Sun hats and sunscreen 74% 52% 
Waterproof torch and spare batteries 74% 86% 
Birth and Marriage certificates 68% 42% 
Insurance policies 66% 48% 
Water for washing and cooking 61% 55% 
Portable cooking stove or gas BBQ 60% 69% 
AM/FM radio and spare batteries 59% 84% 
Pet supplies 59% 44% 
Family photos (for identification) 56% 30% 
Face and dust masks 33% 40% 
Toys, baby care, nappies, etc. 20% 9% 
Tent or other portable shelter 0%3 39% 
Cash 0%
3
 47% 
 
Of particular interest is the rise between 2010 and 2011 of the percentage of households 
with drinking water storage, torch, portable cooking stove, battery-powered AM/FM radio, 
and dust masks. This suggests the direct effects of the Darfield Earthquake on the study area 
population, as well as media reporting of the Christchurch Eastern suburbs that were heavily 
affected by liquefaction, which may have directly or indirectly informed people to stock up 
on certain items (Table 5-2): 
95 
 
Table 5-2 : Possible reasons for households stocking up on certain provisions 
Item Possible reason 
Drinking water Failure of reticulated water supply 
Torch The Darfield Earthquake struck in the early hours when it was still dark 
Portable cooking stove Failure of electricity supply, kitchen in home not usable 
Battery-powered radio Seeking information and entertainment 
Dust masks Dust caused by liquefaction and winds 
The results of all samples were further decomposed into households with and without 
children and a comparison made. 
 
Figure 5-2 : Inventory - Households without children - 2010 vs. 2011 
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Table 5-3 : Inventory - Households without children - 2010 vs. 2011 
Households with no children 2010 2011 
Blankets or sleeping bags 87% 84% 
Non-perishable food (canned or dried rations) 87% 88% 
Hand-operated can opener, eating utensils 84% 78% 
Strong outdoor shoes 84% 81% 
Toilet paper and large rubbish bags for disposal 82% 77% 
First aid kit and essential medicines 82% 80% 
Sharp (utility) knife, scissors, etc. 80% 64% 
Towels, soap, toothbrush and sanitary items 80% 75% 
Wind and rain-proof clothing 80% 77% 
A change of clothes 79% 70% 
Drivers licenses and Passports 79% 74% 
Duffel bag, backpack, holdall, suitcase, etc. 75% 69% 
A supply of drinking water other than from the tap 74% 87% 
Waterproof torch and spare batteries 72% 86% 
Sun hats and sunscreen 69% 51% 
Birth and Marriage certificates 62% 41% 
Insurance policies 62% 50% 
AM/FM radio and spare batteries 57% 84% 
Pet supplies 56% 45% 
Water for washing and cooking 54% 56% 
Family photos (for identification) 52% 30% 
Portable cooking stove or gas BBQ 49% 67% 
Face and dust masks 31% 42% 
Toys, baby care, nappies, etc. 5% 2% 
Tent or other portable shelter 0% 35% 
Cash 0% 50% 
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Figure 5-3 : Inventory - Households with children - 2010 vs. 2011 
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Table 5-4 : Inventory - Households with children - 2010 vs. 2011 
Household with children 2010 2011 
Toilet paper and large rubbish bags for disposal 95% 66% 
A change of clothes 95% 68% 
Towels, soap, toothbrush and sanitary items 95% 69% 
Hand-operated can opener, eating utensils 95% 77% 
First aid kit and essential medicines 95% 83% 
Non-perishable food (canned or dried rations) 95% 84% 
Blankets or sleeping bags 95% 87% 
Sun hats and sunscreen 90% 55% 
Sharp (utility) knife, scissors, etc. 90% 63% 
Drivers licenses and Passports 90% 68% 
Duffel bag, backpack, holdall, suitcase, etc. 90% 69% 
Portable cooking stove or gas BBQ 90% 73% 
Wind and rain-proof clothing 90% 74% 
Strong outdoor shoes 90% 77% 
Birth and Marriage certificates 86% 46% 
Water for washing and cooking 81% 51% 
Waterproof torch and spare batteries 81% 84% 
A supply of drinking water other than from the tap 81% 87% 
Insurance policies 76% 42% 
Family photos (for identification) 67% 31% 
Pet supplies 67% 41% 
Toys, baby care, nappies, etc. 62% 29% 
AM/FM radio and spare batteries 62% 83% 
Face and dust masks 38% 35% 
Cash 0% 37% 
Tent or other portable shelter 0% 49% 
5.1.2 Household inventory comparison – with vs. without children 
Before the Darfield Earthquake the households with children were considerably better-
stocked than those without. 
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Figure 5-4 : Inventory - 2010 Households - with vs. without children 
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Table 5-5 : Inventory - 2010 Households - with vs. without children 
2010 Households Without 
children 
With 
children 
Blankets or sleeping bags 87% 95% 
Non-perishable food (canned or dried rations) 87% 95% 
Hand-operated can opener, eating utensils 84% 95% 
Strong outdoor shoes 84% 90% 
First aid kit and essential medicines 82% 95% 
Toilet paper and large rubbish bags for disposal 82% 95% 
Towels, soap, toothbrush and sanitary items 80% 95% 
Sharp (utility) knife, scissors, etc. 80% 90% 
Wind and rain-proof clothing 80% 90% 
A change of clothes 79% 95% 
Drivers licenses and Passports 79% 90% 
Duffel bag, backpack, holdall, suitcase, etc. 75% 90% 
A supply of drinking water other than from the tap 74% 81% 
Waterproof torch and spare batteries 72% 81% 
Sun hats and sunscreen 69% 90% 
Birth and Marriage certificates 62% 86% 
Insurance policies 62% 76% 
AM/FM radio and spare batteries 57% 62% 
Pet supplies 56% 67% 
Water for washing and cooking 54% 81% 
Family photos (for identification) 52% 67% 
Portable cooking stove or gas BBQ 49% 90% 
Face and dust masks 31% 38% 
Toys, baby care, nappies, etc. 5% 62% 
Cash 0% 0% 
Tent or other portable shelter 0% 0% 
 
By July 2011, the situation had changed markedly, with households with children being less 
prepared on average than those without in most provisions listed. This could be explained 
by those without children purchasing more inventory after the Darfield Earthquake to make 
them more prepared than those with children. 
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Figure 5-5 : Inventory - 2011 Households - with vs. without children 
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Table 5-6 : Inventory - 2011 Households - with vs. without children 
2011 Households Without 
children 
With 
children 
Non-perishable food (canned or dried rations) 88% 84% 
A supply of drinking water other than from the tap 87% 87% 
Waterproof torch and spare batteries 86% 84% 
AM/FM radio and spare batteries 84% 83% 
Blankets or sleeping bags 84% 87% 
Strong outdoor shoes 81% 77% 
First aid kit and essential medicines 80% 83% 
Hand-operated can opener, eating utensils 78% 77% 
Wind and rain-proof clothing 77% 74% 
Toilet paper and large rubbish bags for disposal 77% 66% 
Towels, soap, toothbrush and sanitary items 75% 69% 
Drivers licenses and Passports 74% 68% 
A change of clothes 70% 68% 
Duffel bag, backpack, holdall, suitcase, etc. 69% 69% 
Portable cooking stove or gas BBQ 67% 73% 
Sharp (utility) knife, scissors, etc. 64% 63% 
Water for washing and cooking 56% 51% 
Sun hats and sunscreen 51% 55% 
Insurance policies 50% 42% 
Cash 50% 37% 
Pet supplies 45% 41% 
Face and dust masks 42% 35% 
Birth and Marriage certificates 41% 46% 
Tent or other portable shelter 35% 49% 
Family photos (for identification) 30% 31% 
Toys, baby care, nappies, etc. 2% 29% 
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5.1.3 Household inventory comparison  - 2011 Survey vs. Deprivation Index 
2006 
An analysis of the inventory as of July 2011 against the Deprivation Index 2006 of each 
household was performed. A visualisation of the results is shown in Figure 5-6. 
 
Figure 5-6 : Comparison of household inventory in July 2011 vs. Deprivation Index 2006 
 The individual inventory items are further decomposed and ordered to allow comparison 
between the households of normalised Deprivation Index, plus the percentage of all 
households. 
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Figure 5-7 : Individual inventory items vs. uptake in households per Deprivation Index 
5.1.4 Longitudinal study 
Of the 50 households identified as being in common between the 2010 and 2011 surveys, 
37 were households not having children and 8 had children. A further 5 households were 
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identified where the number of children was reported as being zero in one sample and non-
zero in the other. 
Comparison of the inventory movement in these households (Figure 5-8) reveals that all 
categories increased in households without children in general, whereas only radios and 
travel bags increased in household with children in general, portable shelter and cash being 
ignored. 
 
Figure 5-8 : Household inventory - comparison of reduced, maintained, or increased inventory between 2010 and 2011 
for those with and without children 
5.2 Emergency supplies 
An emergency supply is something that is easily accessible and usually kept on the person or 
nearby. A personal emergency supply pack consists of a water bottle, some nutritional food 
Important: Maintaining inventory does not mean they have inventory, just that they have neither increased nor reduced inventory! 
This is a one-to-one comparison between the 50 households identified as being included in both the 2010 and 2011.  
 
How to interpret: the green shaded areas shows the percentage increase of specific inventory by households, and the red shaded 
areas shows the percentage decrease by households. Take as an example face and dust masks: 30% of households without children 
increased their inventory of face and dust masks, and 9% reduced their inventory, the remaining 41% maintaining their inventory; 
whereas 7% of households with children reduced their inventory and the remaining 93% maintained their inventory.  
106 
 
such as an energy bar, a torch, and perhaps a radio, cell phone, and a whistle. A household 
emergency supply contains the provisions listed in the section above in a convenient box or 
rucksack that is accessible after an emergency. A household emergency supply may be 
portable, in which case it may also be called an emergency getaway kit. 
5.2.1 Personal emergency kit 
Participants were asked if they had a personal emergency kit with them at the time of the 
Christchurch and Sumner Earthquakes, respectively (Figure 5-9 and Figure 5-10). There was 
an increase in the number of participants having a personal emergency kit nearby during the 
earthquake. Those with children had a lower ownership level than those without.  
 
Figure 5-9 : Personal Emergency Kits - February 2011 
 
Figure 5-10 : Personal Emergency Kits - June 2011 
The participants were asked if they had a personal emergency kit now, and where: at home; 
in the office; in the car. 
 
Figure 5-11 : Personal emergency provision kit ownership and location – now 
25% of those participants with children and 20% of those without replied that they did not 
have a personal emergency kit. More than 70% replied that they had such a kit at home, 
with ca. 10% in the office, and 28% having one in the car. 
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5.2.2 Household emergency kit 
Participants were asked if their household had an emergency kit (Figure 5-12 and Figure 
5-13). 25% did not in February, falling to 15% in June. Of those that had one, 50% used it in 
February, falling to 42% in June. 
 
Figure 5-12 : Household Emergency Provision Kits – 
February 2011 
 
Figure 5-13 : Household Emergency Provision Kits – June 
2011 
The participants were further asked if their household emergency provision kits had lasted 
for 3 respective 7 days (Figure 5-14 - Figure 5-17).  
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Figure 5-14 : Household Emergency Provision Kits – 
February - Enough for 3 days 
 
Figure 5-15 : Household Emergency Provision Kits – June - 
Enough for 3 days 
 
Figure 5-16 : Household Emergency Provision Kits – 
February - Enough for 7 days 
 
Figure 5-17 : Household Emergency Provision Kits – June - 
Enough for 7 days 
The responses showed that in June emergency provisions provided more than 95% of the 
household requirements, whereas only 85% were covered in February. Households with 
children were consistently under-provisioned. 
5.2.3 Re-provisioning 
Participants were asked from where they obtained provisions during the 7 days after the 
Christchurch and Sumner Earthquakes. Most could get them from a dairy or city 
supermarket.  
In February, the Royal New Zealand Navy’s Multirole Vessel HMNZS CANTERBURY was 
berthed at Lyttelton as part of Exercise Southern Katipo (NZ Defence Force 2011). The ship’s 
company organised a kitchen and cooked meals for many residents. On Sunday, 27th 
February, the ship left for Wellington to remove military supplies and equipment for that 
exercise and returned on Monday, 28th February with the available space filled with water, 
20 plus vehicles, a fuel tanker, fire appliances, telecom vans, engineer bridging and general 
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materials. During her absence, HMNZS OTAGO and HMNZS PUKAKI continued to provide 
assistance to the people of Lyttelton, joined later by HMNZS PEGASUS. 
The local supermarket cleared its shelves of stock that could spoil due to the failure of the 
electricity supply and allowed residents to take what they needed [pers comm]. 
 
Figure 5-18 : Household re-provisioning in the 7 days after the Christchurch and Sumner Earthquakes 
5.3 Discussion 
This study shows that the majority of the study area population was not directly affected by 
the Darfield Earthquake (other than a short suspension of utilities) and so did not undertake 
preparations for another earthquake. As the Lyttelton Road Tunnel and Evan’s Pass were 
shut for a time, residents were required to drive over Dyers Pass Road to visit a 
supermarket. Even after the Christchurch Earthquakes, when the population was very much 
affected, they did not undertake to increase their preparedness for a further disaster. There 
are parallels here with the Loma Prieta, California, Earthquake of October 17, 1989. The lack 
of main-shock damage of the Loma Prieta Earthquake created a “normalisation bias” for 
non-victims. This bias limited their perception of risk to damaging aftershocks and 
protective response to warnings (Mileti & O'Brien 1989). 
It is likely that, after Darfield Earthquake, some people in the study population would have 
thought the threat of a devastating earthquake had passed, and therefore they would not 
need to be prepared for another. The Christchurch Earthquake would have shocked them, 
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but again, would they have needed to become more prepared for another, large 
earthquake/aftershock, as warned by GNS Science? 
“We're most unlikely to have a future serious earthquake in our lifetimes. Present 
tensions will fade” – reply from 2011 Survey 
 “What astounds me is my own failure to prepare for future disasters having 
survived three earthquakes. We still don't have a readily accessible and 
comprehensive survival kit. I'm not sure why that is. Is it just the sheer exhaustion 
that follows such events that makes one disinclined to prepare for another? Is it 
the hope there won't be another? Whatever the reason it means despite all the 
information that's been disseminated to us and our own experiences, we are still 
unprepared for a disaster!” – reply from 2011 Survey 
About the same number of households used their household emergency kit in February 
2011 as did in June 2011. About twice as many had one but did not use it. The percentage of 
households that did not have a household emergency kit fell from ca. 20% in February 2011 
to 10% in June 2011. This last finding contradicts some comments received: 
“Every time we have another earthquake, we swear we will get our survival kits 
together.” – reply from 2011 Survey 
Of important note is that > 80% of the population has supplies to last for 3 days. For seven 
days’ supply, this dropped to about 50% for the population in February 2011, but rose to 
75% by June 2011. This may have been because in June people were more prepared and 
had stocked up, but it may also be because the town was not cut off from Christchurch for 
as long as it was in February. 
It is likely that having the Navy in port at the time of the Christchurch Earthquake in 
February calmed fears. The order and discipline of the sailors would probably have steadied 
the population that came into contact with them. Their action in setting up a food station 
was a focal point for the community in Lyttelton.  
“We very much appreciated the help of the navy during the Feb quake, Life would 
have been very dire if they hadn't been around. It was amazing to see how 
Lyttelton pulled together.” – reply from 2011 Survey 
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“The Army and Red Cross' immediate response has been invaluable” – reply from 
2011 Survey 
It is unsure how much this outside help benefitted residents in Cass Bay and Rapaki, as no 
mention was made of the Navy from their replies. Together with the Navy, the local 
emergency services stepped in where leadership from Civil Defence was not apparent. 
In June, due to broken chimneys, many residents were not able to heat their homes other 
than to use electric oil heaters. Given how expensive they are to run, people with little 
means are vulnerable to the cold as they cannot afford to keep warm. One participant in the 
2011 survey quoted receiving an electricity bill of over NZD 600 in order to keep warm over 
some of the coldest weather in a century. 
In the 2011 survey, two new provisions were added: a tent or other portable shelter; and, 
cash. It is interesting to note that the highest percentage of households with cash on hand 
came from the group with the highest Deprivation Index. This could be because they 
operate in a cash economy and rely less on banks and credit cards.
112 
 
6 Post-event movement of the population 
This chapter analyses the spatiotemporal movement of the normally resident population of 
Lyttelton and surrounding area. The 2011 survey was used to compare the whereabouts of 
the individuals of households when the Christchurch and Sumner Earthquakes occurred, 
where they moved to, how long it took, the mode(s) of transport they took, and if and 
where they evacuated to. This analysis informs the objective of the research concerned with 
the immediate response of the population. 
6.1 Contacting other household members, friends and family 
Due to the disorientation the earthquakes had on people, many of them first tried to 
contact friends and family. To many this may have offered relief but for others it may have 
been a source of consternation as phone lines were blocked, telephones went unanswered, 
calls were dropped, or messages were not answered. 
 
Figure 6-1 : Time it took to contact a family member – February 2011 vs. June 2011 
The participants recorded 479 contacts with family members in the first 6 hours after the 
Christchurch Earthquake, and 255 contacts in the first 6 hours after the Sumner 
Earthquakes. Figure 6-1 shows the distribution of the time it took to contact family. In 
February, 174 contacts were made immediately (mostly due to physical proximity), 
increasing to 241 in June. 
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6.1.1 Landline telephones 
Many households now use wireless phones, consisting of a mains-powered base station that 
takes a call (and sometimes includes an answering machine) and relays it to one or more 
handsets using short-distance radio waves. Due to the power outages, even though the 
telephone network was still functioning on back-up battery power, many households were 
unable to make or receives telephone calls as their base station units were not working. 
Shortly after the quake, Telecom began collecting “old-fashioned” analogue phones that 
plug in directly to the telephone socket from donors around the country for redistribution in 
Christchurch (Telecom New Zealand 2011). 
6.1.2 Cellular telephone 
The use of text messaging (TXTing) or SMS has become ubiquitous and commonplace for 
recreational and business purposes. It was used to good effect immediately following the 
Christchurch and Sumner Earthquakes when friends and family wanted reassurance others 
were OK, or in planning to meet somewhere. Indeed, people were urged through messages 
over the public radio broadcasts to TXT rather than voice-call someone.  
“Cellphones - allowed us to know that our family i.e. children were ok 
immediately after both quakes. We could txt teachers and get a reply to know 
they were ok. This is a very powerful tool - to be able to know young ones are 
safe” – reply from 2011 survey 
Unfortunately, some TXTs did not get through or were delayed, raising the angst of the 
sender that the recipient was in trouble. This is similar to what you can experience around 
events such as New Year, when many people send (but still get billed for) TXTs but many do 
not arrive.  
Although Emergency Alert Systems (EAS) over SMS is still in its infancy in New Zealand (NRC 
2012) and has only just been implemented for Christchurch and Canterbury (ECan 2011a), 
(Traynor 2008) argues and demonstrates several reasons why EAS over SMS in current 
cellular systems is simply not feasible or recommended, such as: 
 Cellular networks are not designed to delivery emergency-scale traffic loads 
 Cellular networks are not the Internet 
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 Targeting users in a specific location is extremely difficult 
 There is no way to authenticate the source of messages, making fraudulent alerts 
easy to send 
 SMS is not a real-time service 
 Message delivery order is not always predictable 
The physical infrastructure was able to cope, mainly due to lessons learned from the 1996 
Canterbury snow storm when cell towers worked on batteries until depleted and then failed 
(Wilson et al. 2009). Telecom reported having 60 portable generators deployed to network 
sites without power a few days after the Christchurch Earthquake (ONE News 2011). 
6.2 Immediate homeward journey after the Christchurch and Sumner 
Earthquakes 
It was shown by the results of the survey that side-trip and trip-chaining behaviour was 
evident after the Christchurch and Sumner Earthquake events when individuals were 
returning to their homes or meeting places after a disaster. Many of these detours can be 
explained as attempting to ascertain the location and status of other household or family 
members, or of property other than the family home. Some people helped others to get 
home by providing them with transport, even if it meant driving a detour. 
This extra traffic on an overstretched and damaged road network exacerbated the 
congestion. At road junctions, lack of electricity meant automatic traffic light signals were 
not operational. 
6.2.1 Travel times 
The respondents were asked in the 2011 Survey how long it took them to travel home. They 
reported on 702 journeys after the Christchurch Earthquake and 583 journeys after the 
Sumner Earthquakes. 
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Figure 6-2 : Travel home journey time - February 2011 vs. June 2011 
The journey time in June was much quicker than that for February, even though the Evan’s 
Pass Road was not in operation (Figure 6-2). Perhaps it was because this was known about, 
time was not heedlessly spent attempting to drive via Sumner to get home using that route 
after the June events. The average journey time home for those completing it within the 
first 6 hours was 161 minutes in February and 81 minutes in June. 
14 individuals reported spending 24 hours or more in returning home in February, but this 
involved stopping at a friend or family member’s home for the night, or returning from 
abroad. 
In February, 88 individuals reported being home (a zero-minute journey) and in June that 
had risen to 106. 
6.3 Origins 
6.3.1 Pre-September 2010 
In the pre-September 2010 survey, the respondents were asked their place of school or 
work so that a destination/origination map could be generated.  
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Figure 6-3 : Pre-September 2010 Work/School Location 
 
Figure 6-4 : Pre-September 2010 population density of Lyttelton residents in Christchurch suburbs 
84% of respondents reported they would use the Lyttelton road tunnel as their preferred 
route of ingress/egress, with 4% indicating Evan’s Pass, and 3% via Rapaki on Governor’s Bay 
Road. 9% gave no response. 
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73% of respondents that gave an answer reported they use a private car as their primary 
mode of transport, with 10% sharing a car with another person (not necessarily from their 
own household). 11% answered that they use the public bus, and 4% and 2% travelled on 
foot or by bicycle, respectively. No-one reported using a taxi as their primary mode of 
transport. 
 
Figure 6-5 : Preferred ingress/egress routes and primary mode of transport 
6.3.2 February 2011 
Respondents reported their whereabouts during the initial 22nd February and 13th June 
(13:00) earthquakes. 
 
Figure 6-6 : Respondents' Locations during the initial Christchurch and Sumner Earthquakes 
There was a marked decrease in the number of people reporting their locations in February 
as being in the CBD and Halswell: this is mainly due to the Darfield Earthquake, the effects 
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of which reduced access and closed many businesses. The increase in respondents in outer 
suburbs may be attributed to relocation of businesses from the CBD. 
 
Figure 6-7 : Changes in population density of Lyttelton residents between pre-September 2010 and February 2011 
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Figure 6-8 : February 2011 - population density of Lyttelton residents in Christchurch suburbs 
Respondents were asked all modes of transport they used to get home. The alternatives 
were: 
 Drove own vehicle 
 Rode in a vehicle belonging to another household member, a neighbour, or a friend 
 Rode in a vehicle with a stranger 
 Took a taxi 
 Rode the bus 
 Rode own bicycle 
 Went on foot 
In February 2011, of the 878 combined journeys recorded, the majority (55.5%) were made 
(at least in part) using their own vehicle. A further 24.0% (not including those that drove 
themselves a part of the way) rode in a vehicle driven by another household member, a 
friend or a neighbour. 15.9% made the journey home solely on foot. 
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Table 6-1 : Modes of transport taken - February 
D R S T B C F Qnt % 
       7 0.8% 
       12 1.4% 
       1 0.1% 
       5 0.6% 
       3 0.3% 
       1 0.1% 
       3 0.3% 
       1 0.1% 
       62 7.1% 
       392 44.6% 
       6 0.7% 
       1 0.1% 
       2 0.2% 
       3 0.3% 
       2 0.2% 
       31 3.5% 
       166 18.9% 
       1 0.1% 
       8 0.9% 
       11 1.3% 
       1 0.1% 
       4 0.5% 
       7 0.8% 
       3 0.3% 
       5 0.6% 
       140 15.9% 
       878 100.0% 
         
Code Description of mode of transport 
D Drove own vehicle 
R Rode in a vehicle belonging to another household member, a neighbour, or a friend 
S Rode in a vehicle with a stranger 
T Took a taxi 
B Rode the bus 
C Rode own bicycle 
F Went on foot 
 
6.3.3 June 2011, 13:00 
The respondents were asked to report their location for the 13th June, 13:00 Sumner 
Earthquake. 
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Figure 6-9 : Changes in population density of Lyttelton residents between 22nd February 2011 and 13:00 13th June 2011 
The data showed a marked decrease in the number of people reporting their locations in 
June as being in the CBD (Figure 6-6): this is probably due to the Christchurch Earthquake, 
the effects of which reduced access due to the cordon (CERA 2012) and forced many 
businesses to close and relocate.  
The decrease was accompanied by a slight increase in the number of people located in 
Lyttelton. Again, the increase in respondents in Riccarton, Halswell, Barrington, and 
Merivale may be attributed to the closure of retail businesses in the CBD.  
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Figure 6-10 : 13:00 13th June 2011: population density of Lyttelton residents in Christchurch suburbs 
6.3.4 June 2011, 14:20 
The respondents were asked to report their location for the 13th June, 14:20 Sumner 
Earthquake. This information has been used to show how the aggregate of people moved in 
the 80 minutes between the two events. 
 
Figure 6-11 : Respondents' Locations during the 13:00 and 14:20 Sumner Earthquakes on 13th June 
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Figure 6-12 : Changes in population density of Lyttelton residents between 13:00 and 14:20 13th June 2011 
 
Figure 6-13 : 14:20 13th June 2011: population density of Lyttelton residents in Christchurch suburbs 
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The location reports show a redistribution of the respondents towards the study area, 
although some people at home in Lyttelton travelled out in order to help other household 
members. 
A movement analysis was performed for the 13th June event, using people’s reported 
localities at the 13:00 and 14:20 events. Localities were first aggregated into city sectors to 
reduce complexity: 
Table 6-2 : City sectors and localities 
Sector Localities         
Cass Bay Cass Bay         
CBD CBD         
Central East Avonside Dallington Linwood Phillipstown Richmond 
Central 
North 
Bryndwr Merivale Strowan St Albans Edgeware 
Central 
South 
Addington Opawa Somerfield Spreydon St Martins 
Sydenham Waltham Barrington Hoon Hay  
Central West Fendalton Hillmorton Middleton Riccarton  Riccarton Park 
Corsair Bay Corsair Bay         
East Aranui Avondale Bromley New Brighton South New Brighton 
Wainoni Woolston Bexley   
Lyttelton Lyttelton Ship in Harbour       
North Belfast Bishopdale Casebrook Mairehau Marshland 
Northwood Papanui Redwood Shirley  
North East Waimari Beach Burwood North New Brighton Parklands  Spencerville 
North West Harewood        
Rapaki Rapaki         
South Beckenham Cashmere Cashmere Hills Cracroft Governors Bay 
Hillsborough Port Hills Huntsbury Westmorland  
South East Ferrymead Heathcote Mt Pleasant Redcliffs Sumner 
Monck’s Bay     
South West Halswell  Oaklands  Paparoa  Kennedy’s Bush   
Tunnel Tunnel         
West Avonhead Burnside Hornby Ilam Russley 
Islington Sockburn Upper Riccarton Wigram Hei Hei 
 
Figure 6-14 shows the number of journeys made by the resident population of Lyttelton 
within the city sectors. No journey has been recorded where someone has not travelled 
across a sector boundary. Of particular interest are the journeys originating in Lyttelton. It 
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shows people travelled from Lyttelton into the South (5), South East (6), and East sectors 
(5), as well as into the CBD (8).  
 
Figure 6-14 : Resident Lyttelton population movement between city sectors between 13:00 and 14:20 on 13th June 2011 
– Population 
In June 2011, of the 783 combined journeys recorded, the majority (67.3%) were made (at 
least in part) using their own vehicle. A further 20.4% (not including those that already 
drove themselves a part of the way) rode in a vehicle driven by another household member, 
a friend or a neighbour. 9.8% made the journey home solely on foot. 
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Table 6-3 : Modes of transport taken - June 
D R S T B C F Qnt % 
       1 0.1% 
       6 0.8% 
       1 0.1% 
       3 0.4% 
       516 65.9% 
       1 0.1% 
       1 0.1% 
       2 0.3% 
       1 0.1% 
       155 19.8% 
       1 0.1% 
       4 0.5% 
       2 0.3% 
       1 0.1% 
       1 0.1% 
       3 0.4% 
       7 0.9% 
       77 9.8% 
       783 100.0% 
         
Code Description of mode of transport 
D Drove own vehicle 
R Rode in a vehicle belonging to another household member, a neighbour, or a friend 
S Rode in a vehicle with a stranger 
T Took a taxi 
B Rode the bus 
C Rode own bicycle 
F Went on foot 
 
6.3.5 Out of town respondents 
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Figure 6-15 : Respondents' Locations during the initial Christchurch and Sumner Earthquakes for those out of town 
Respondents in out of town locations were widespread and there was no appreciable 
increase between February and June. The majority of respondents out of town in June were 
overseas; based on replies, many of the respondents were on holiday. 
6.4 Subsequent journeys 
Some respondents who were at home in the study area at the time of the Christchurch and 
Sumner Earthquake(s) immediately struck out on a journey towards Christchurch. Replies 
report reasons such as contacting other household members, buying provisions, curiosity 
(reconnaissance), and wishing to help others in need (emergency services or volunteers). 
After the Christchurch Earthquake, the respondents reported making 1380 separate 
journeys to 170 unique destinations. After the Sumner Earthquakes, the respondents 
reported making 918 separate journeys to 91 unique destinations. 
The top journey destinations were given as: 
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Table 6-4 : Top journey destinations after the Christchurch and Sumner earthquakes 
 Feb Jun 
Lyttelton 564 494 
CBD 68 37 
Heathcote 39 18 
Cass Bay 34 47 
Opawa 32 12 
Sumner 29 12 
Cashmere 25 18 
Bridle Path 24 0 
Halswell 17 13 
Linwood 16 8 
Sydenham 16 8 
Rapaki 15 10 
St Martins 15 4 
Riccarton 14 16 
Spreydon 14 10 
Hillsborough 13 0 
Ferrymead 12 7 
Hagley Park 12 4 
Ilam 12 3 
Papanui 12 11 
Rangiora 12 2 
Mount Pleasant 11 0 
Woolston 11 4 
Bromley 10 5 
The reasons reported for travelling included: 
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Table 6-5 : Some popular reasons given for subsequent journeys 
Reason to travel Count Column % 
N=1242 
Return home 476 38.3% 
Go to work 98 7.9% 
Collect children 94 7.6% 
Go to meeting point 92 7.4% 
Shelter at neighbours 82 6.6% 
Care for other family 81 6.5% 
Shelter with other family 76 6.1% 
Collect household member 62 5.0% 
Check house 33 2.7% 
Local shelter 27 2.2% 
Care for neighbours 22 1.8% 
Evacuate household 22 1.8% 
Care for household 12 1.0% 
Volunteer 12 1.0% 
Take someone home 11 0.9% 
Evacuate self 9 0.7% 
Seek medical attention 8 0.6% 
Holiday 6 0.5% 
Seek provisions 5 0.4% 
Looking for animals 4 0.3% 
Evacuate other family 3 0.2% 
Looking around 3 0.2% 
Evacuate others 2 0.2% 
Retrieve car 2 0.2% 
 1242 100.0% 
6.5 Ingress-egress routes 
There are three main vehicular routes into Lyttelton: the Lyttelton road tunnel (to 
Heathcote); Evan’s Pass (to Sumner); and, Governor’s Bay Road (via Rapaki) towards 
Governor’s Bay, Dyer’s Pass, and Gebbies Pass. All routes are subject to rock fall danger in 
the case of a strong earthquake. 
The port can facilitate larger vessels so evacuation could occur, should the port facilities be 
operational. Rapaki and Cass Bay each have jetties that can accommodate smaller vessels, if 
required. 
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6.5.1 Pedestrian/cycle tracks 
The Bridle Path, Major Hornbrook Track, and Chalmers Track are popular walking tracks 
leading to Mt Cavendish, above Lyttelton. The Bridle Path is capable of taking a vehicle.  
A number of Lyttelton residents reported in their replies that they used the Bridle Path to 
navigate over the Port Hills on their return home. Owen Wright, 40, a Lyttelton resident, 
was subsequently killed during an aftershock by falling rocks on the Major Hornbrook Track, 
shortly before reaching his home and family (Mann 2011).  
 
Figure 6-16 : Rock fall on slope and walking track below Gondola Building (possible fatality site) (GNS Photo-GTH_5933) 
(Hancox et al. 2011) 
The ferry service to Diamond Harbour offers a further route for cyclists and pedestrians. 
Service was affected by the damage to the dock at Lyttelton but resumed in early March 
2011 (Bingham 2011). 
6.5.2 Governor’s Bay Road 
Governor’s Bay Road is subject to rock fall danger (the boulder that passed through the 
house at 241 Governor’s Bay Road is evidence of the danger) and slumping. Dyer’s Pass road 
remained open after the earthquakes but care and a certain amount of courage was 
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required to navigate around the dislodged boulders on the road. Gebbies Pass remained 
opened with little road damage. 
6.5.3 Evans Pass Road/Sumner Road Closures 
After the Darfield and Christchurch Earthquakes, Evan’s Pass remained closed whilst scaling 
and blasting work was undertaken on the exposed cliffs and bluffs above and below the 
road. After briefly re-opening before the Christchurch Earthquake and subsequently re-
closed, it has since not been opened. 
 
Figure 6-17 : Evan's Pass Road (Julian Idle 2012) 
 
Figure 6-18 : Evan's Pass Road carriageway collapse (Alexander 2010) 
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6.5.4 Lyttelton Road Tunnel Closures 
The major route into and out of Lyttelton remains the Lyttelton road tunnel. After the 
Darfield Earthquake and Christchurch Earthquakes it was closed for detailed inspection, but 
also because the portals (especially at the Heathcote end) suffered damage. After each 
major aftershock, it was closed for a visual inspection before traffic was allowed to pass 
(NZTA 2010-2011).  
The tunnel was also closed whilst scaling work on and around Castle Rock was happening.  
The tunnel control building and toll booth gantry structure were damaged in the Darfield 
Earthquake and put beyond use in the Christchurch Earthquake (NZTA 2011b): they have 
since been demolished. 
The Lyttelton road tunnel was open only to emergency services and special goods transit to 
and from the Port after the major earthquakes. After three days access was opened to 
restricted use by the residents of Lyttelton (NZTA 2011a), and much later it opened to public 
access (NZTA 2011b). 
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Figure 6-19 : Lyttelton Road Tunnel - Full Closures (NZTA 2010-2011) 
 
Due to Evans Pass being closed, hazardous goods traffic (petroleum, LPG, etc.) are being 
diverted through the tunnel, necessitating closure during the transit. Wide loads also 
require the tunnel to be closed in one direction. 
134 
 
 
Figure 6-20 : Lyttelton Road Tunnel - Hazardous Goods Transits (NZTA 2010-2011) 
6.6 Regarding the February 2010 tsunami 
The 2010 survey used the tsunami at the end of February 2010 as a base line for a natural 
hazard that could affect the population of the study area. Of the 81 responses, 7 related 
having experienced a tsunami before: four of those replies referred to the February 2010 
tsunami in Lyttelton Harbour; one referred to the 1960 tsunami in Lyttelton; one referred to 
the 2004 Indonesian tsunami; and, one did not provide details. 
119 responses were received regarding the actions of participants during the time of the 
February 2010 tsunami (Table 6-6). 
135 
 
Table 6-6 : Reaction to the tsunami of February 2010 
Reaction to the tsunami 2010 
 Count Column % Valid N 
Didn't know it was happening 9 8% 
Found out too late to evacuate, so stayed at home 4 3% 
Stayed at home because house was high enough to not worry 62 52% 
Self-evacuated to higher ground 3 3% 
Went to the harbour to look out for the wave 1 1% 
Went up to Summit Road to watch 1 1% 
Went about normal business 29 24% 
Did not live in the area at the time 3 3% 
Other 7 6% 
 119 100% 
Participants also described the tsunami in their own words: 
Table 6-7 : Descriptions of the February 2010 tsunami experiences 
Description of tsunami actions 
Came back to Lyttelton from Pigeon Bay before 8am arrival due to avoid being trapped by road closures/bridge 
washouts. Happened to hear 3am news, so forewarned. Phoned neighbours in low lying houses in case they had 
not heard. 
Don't remember 
Had car parked and pointed up hill (25m+) 
Kept listening to media reports + watching harbour 
Learnt about it too late after tsunami had affected areas in Port of Lyttelton 
On holiday in Marlborough Sounds 
Stayed at home and conducted our normal lives 
Walking Taylor's Mistake and finding all these people looking out for the wave 
Was on our boat - put out to sea for the day 
Was prepared to leave (as live right by the sea) 
Watched out 
Watched the harbour from home in Lyttelton 
We lived at Waikuku Beach, had car ready to go, listened to radio 
6.7 Survey comments review 
From the comments received from the participants of the 2011 survey, there was a theme 
of feeling cut off from Christchurch. Residents were anxious for their friends and relatives in 
the affected eastern suburbs but couldn’t get through as all exits were blocked or closed.  
Likewise, people’s attempts in trying to get to Lyttelton to help relatives were stressful for 
all concerned: 
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“We are two elderly folk in their eighties, and cause concern and danger to our 
families in reaching us with both passes blocked and tunnel closed in an 
emergency” – reply from 2011 Survey 
Lyttelton is very dependent on the Lyttelton road tunnel, more than ever since Evan’s Pass 
Road is still closed. Some residents still do not want to pass through it, though, and prefer to 
drive over Dyers Pass Road. 
It was very apparent in February that the congestion after such a large event took 
emergency services by surprise.  
“The lack of communication about which routes we could used to get home from 
the city to Lyttelton caused a hassle. / Initially we drove to Sumner. / Finally 
Police there were able to say that Dyers Pass was open. Police at Cashmere High 
didn't have that” – reply 2011 Survey 
People’s situation and expectations had changed by the Sumner Earthquakes and the 
journey times were halved.  
The public transport system was shut down just when people needed it to evacuate to their 
homes, as they had to leave cars behind under collapsed buildings or impassable streets.  
“Feel that there hasn't been enough effort made to reinstate what was an 
excellent public transport system. In 10 years we have only used a car once a 
week. Now we are using 2 cars a day! This is only because the bus frequency has 
been reduced so that Lyttelton to the airport and back now takes a large chunk 
on the day which is ridiculous. While it might sound insignificant it causes much 
more congestion on the roads and reduces people's, particularly children and the 
elderly, options.” - reply from 2011 Survey 
Where vehicles could be used, due to the damage and destruction to roads and bridges, 
congestion became an immediate issue. Emergency services seeking to rescue people were 
diverted from crowd control and traffic management: members of the public took it upon 
themselves to act as best they could to help manage the situation: 
“…Husband at … time of quake he was on ferrymead bridge. He had to redirect 
traffic.” – reply 2011 Survey 
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7 Actions of affected households 
7.1 Evacuations - Planning vs. Actions 
The 2010 survey asked respondents for likely scenarios concerning evacuation or sheltering 
in place after a large disaster had struck the area: whether they would evacuate (and how) 
or whether or not they would stay (and why). The 2011 survey asked respondents whether 
their household evacuated or stayed at home for both the Christchurch and Sumner 
Earthquakes. It recorded the reasons for evacuating and destination, when they evacuated 
and for how long. If they stayed at home, it recorded whether it was through choice or 
necessity. 
7.1.1 Comparison of anticipated action if a disaster were to occur with actual 
actions – 2010 survey vs. 2011 survey 
In 2010, 24% of respondents answered that they anticipate they would self-evacuate at 
least one member of their household from their home, even if structurally sound, yet critical 
services (water, power, telephone) were disrupted, to somewhere outside of the affected 
area within the first three days of the disaster unfolding.  
 
Figure 7-1 : Comparison of anticipated (left) and actual evacuation (right) decision, even if home still structurally sound 
As events transpired, only 11% of respondents evacuated one or more of their household 
due purely to loss of services in February, falling to 3% in June (Figure 7-1). 
The 2010 survey asked respondents their anticipated actions should their home suffer 
structural damage (Figure 7-2). Two-thirds (67%) of respondents in 2010 replied that they 
would evacuate their home if it was structurally unsound, but in February only a half (51%) 
of households had decided to evacuate at least one member in those circumstances, and in 
  
138 
 
June this had fallen to 15%. A quarter (25%) of those surveyed in 2010 anticipated that they 
would evacuate some from their household, even if the home suffered no structural 
damage, this climbing to a third (32%) after the Christchurch Earthquake, and falling to one-
fifth (18%) in June after the Sumner Earthquakes. 
 
Figure 7-2 : Anticipated evacuation plans (2010 survey) (left) and (right) actions with structurally damaged home 
7.1.2 Comparison of actions after the Christchurch and Sumner Earthquakes 
The 2011 survey afforded the respondents the opportunity of categorising how they 
evacuated or why they stayed. It was also possible to detect when households split, with 
some staying (either to guard the property or to have a base from which to go to work from) 
and the others evacuating (due to stress, because they didn’t think it safe, or because they 
lacked creature comforts). 
Respondents had three alternatives to the reason why they stayed at home: 
 Wanted to There was no reason for them to stay other than their personal 
preference. 
 Needed to There was an external factor affecting their decision to evacuate. For 
example, they may have had to look after a dependent (an elderly 
household member or neighbour that didn’t want to evacuate, pet), or 
they needed to stay in the region and couldn’t evacuate. 
 Had to They did not have a decision to make. For example, they were a 
dependent and had to stay with their guardian, they perceived they 
had no alternative accommodation, they could not afford to evacuate, 
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or they could not evacuate because they were tenants and had to pay 
rent, even if they evacuated. 
In February, 527 (42.8%, N=1229) people from 226 (43.3%, N=520) households evacuated 
(refer to Table 7-1): 320 (60.7%, N=527) people evacuated on their own, 137 (26.0%, N=527) 
were evacuated by friends or family, and 70 (13.3%, N=520) people were evacuated by the 
emergency services. 695 (56.6%, N=1229) people stayed at home from 332 (63.8%, N=520) 
households: 643 (92.5%, N=695) stayed at home of their own choice, 28 (4.0%, N=695) had 
to stay to care for others, and 24 (3.6%, N=695) had nowhere else to go. 7 (0.5%, N=1229) 
people did not answer the question. 188 (36.2%, N=520) households evacuated as a whole, 
294 (56.5%, N=520) households stayed at home together, and 38 (7.3%, N=520) households 
split. 
Table 7-1 : February 2011 - individual responses to evacuation or stay at home 
  February N=1222 February % June N=1229 June % 
Evacuated By self 320 26% 106 9% 
By friends/family 137 11% 24 2% 
By emergency services 70 6% 6 0% 
Stayed Wanted to 643 53% 1045 85% 
Needed to 28 2% 31 3% 
Had to 24 2% 17 1% 
In June, 136 (11.1%, N=1229) people from 63 (12.1%, N=520) households evacuated: 106 
(77.9%, N=136) people evacuated on their own, 24 (17.6%, N=136) were evacuated by 
friends or family, and 6 (4.4%, N=136) people were evacuated by the emergency services. 
1093 (88.9%, N=1229) people stayed at home from 468 (90.0%, N=520) households: 1045 
(95.6%, N=1229) stayed at home of their own choice, 31 (2.8%, N=1093) had to stay to care 
for others, and 17 (1.5%, N=1093) had nowhere else to go. 52 (10.0%, N=520) households 
evacuated as a whole, 457 (87.8%, N=520) households stayed at home together, and 11 
(2.1%, N=520) households split.  
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In total, 239 (45.9%, N=520) separate households evacuated both after the February and 
June events. 11 (2.1%, N=520) households that did not evacuate in February evacuated in 
June: 4 (36.4%, N=11) due to structural concerns for their home, 1 (9.1%, N=11) due to lack 
of utilities, and 6 (54.5%, N=11) for various personal reasons (work-related, stress, caring for 
others) or reason not given. 
Analysis of the reasons to evacuate by individuals, normalised to their households, reveals 
that the most likely reason (when given) to evacuate is for personal reasons, for example 
because of stress, comfort, health, etc. (Figure 7-3). 
 
Figure 7-3 : Reasons given for evacuation normalised to the level of a household - February (N=226) vs. June (N=63) 
There was a very marked decrease in the number of evacuations after the Sumner 
Earthquake than recorded for the Christchurch Earthquake. 
 
Figure 7-4 : Evacuate or stay (households) - February vs. June 
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7.1.2.1 Gender as a predictor to evacuate 
It is not possible to ascertain the gender of individuals due to the construction of the 
questionnaire. However, it is possible to compare the relative male/female constitution of 
each household and relate that probabilistically to the number of evacuees and those that 
stayed home for each household: 
Table 7-2 : Formulae for calculating the probabilistic outcomes of Male vs. Female - Evacuate vs. Stay 
 Male Female 
Evacuate ∑
                                   
                                    
     
 
 ∑
                                      
                                    
     
 
 
Stay ∑
                                
                                    
     
 
 ∑
                                   
                                    
     
 
 
The probabilities of the four results are then aggregated and an average probability derived 
for the four possible outcomes: Male Stay, Female Stay, Male Evacuate, and Female 
Evacuate. 
By further normalising the values, such that the total evacuees and stays value 100% for the 
male and female groupings (i.e. Male Evac + Male Stay = 100%), a direct comparison can be 
made between genders.  
A non-normalised value can be interpreted as: “out of the whole population, males that 
evacuated made up 19%”. If the value was not normalised, a bias of gender across the 
population would be introduced. A normalised value can be interpreted as: “of males in the 
population, 40% evacuated”.  
The results show little to differentiate males and females and their actions after either of 
the Christchurch or Sumner Earthquakes (Figure 7-5). Gender is therefore not sufficient as a 
predictor on whether or not an individual would evacuate or stay at home. 
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Figure 7-5 : Gender as a predictor in the evacuation/stay decision - February vs. June 
The generalised statistical analysis is quite a blunt instrument, so a weighted scatter-plot 
(bubble diagramme) was used to detect nuances in the behaviour between genders. Two 
variables out of the possible four (Female Stay, Male Stay, Female Evac, Male Evac) were 
compared and plotted as coordinates on the scatter plot. The number of times each 
coordinate was encountered in the sample (N=520) was recorded as the diameter of the 
bubble centred at that coordinate. 
 Even though the average percentage of males and females that evacuated in February, over 
the complete sample (N=520), is almost equal (40% vs. 38%), the scatter plot unveils 
nuances and subtleties of distribution of results that are otherwise hidden. 
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 February 2011 June 2011 
Male evacuation vs. 
Female evacuation 
 
Figure 7-6 : Male Evac vs. Female Evac - Feb 
 
Figure 7-7 : Male Evac vs. Female Evac - June 
Male evacuation vs. 
Male stay 
 
Figure 7-8 : Male Evac vs. Male Stay - Feb 
 
Figure 7-9 : Male Evac vs. Male Stay - June 
Male Stay vs. 
Female Stay 
 
Figure 7-10 : Male Stay vs. Female Stay - Feb 
 
Figure 7-11 : Male Stay vs. Female Stay - June 
Female Evac vs. 
Female Stay 
 
Figure 7-12 : Female Evac vs. Female Stay - Feb 
 
Figure 7-13 : Female Evac vs. Female Stay - June 
In February 2011, 40% of males in households evacuated compared to 38% of females. The 
majority were probably couples (large bubble in (1,1) in Figure 7-6). Figure 7-6 also appears 
to show that females would evacuate without males, whereas males were less likely to 
leave without females. The same pattern presents itself in June 2011, although there are 
less households with large numbers of individuals evacuating (maximum size N=4). 
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In February 2011, it was very probable that couples would stay (large bubble in (1,1) in 
Figure 7-10). In June 2011, again this pattern presents itself, but there are slightly more 
females staying and not evacuating. 
7.1.2.2 Age Group as a predictor to evacuate 
It is not possible to ascertain the age group of individuals due to the construction of the 
questionnaire. However, it is possible to compare the relative age group constitution of 
each household and relate that probabilistically to the number of evacuees and those that 
stayed home for each household. This is similar to the process used for gender (above), 
except that instead of two there are 6 possible groups. 
Again, by further normalising the values, such that the total evacuees and stays value 100% 
for each of the 6 age groups, a direct comparison can be made between the age groups 
(Figure 7-14). 
 
Figure 7-14 : Age Group as a Predictor for the Evacuation/Stay decision - February vs. June (normalised) 
In February, after the Christchurch Earthquake, the younger age group an individual falls 
into predicts the evacuation outcome. This correlation is not so obvious in June, after the 
Sumner Earthquake.  
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Figure 7-15 : Age group as predictor of evacuation - February vs. June (normalised) - trends 
7.1.2.3 Households with children vs. without as predictor to evacuate 
The numbers of households with and without children have been normalised to make 
comparisons easier. It is apparent that after the Christchurch Earthquake, 58% of 
households with children evacuated compared with almost half of that number (34%) of 
households without children (Figure 7-16). 
In June, again, almost twice as many households with children (15%) evacuated than those 
without children (8%), yet, even so, only a quarter of the number when compared with 
February (58% vs. 15%). 
 
Figure 7-16 : The presence of children in the household as a predictor for evacuation - February vs. June (normalised) 
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7.1.2.4 Households with retirees vs. without as predictor to evacuate 
The numbers of households with and without retirees have been normalised to make 
comparisons easier. It is apparent that after the Christchurch Earthquake, 55% of 
households with retirees evacuated compared with two-fifths of that number (33%) of 
households without retirees (Figure 7-17). 
In June, just over a half of those households with retirees (7%) evacuated, compared to 
those without (12%), an eighth of the number from February. Of the 11 households that 
permanently evacuated after February, only 1 had retirees. That household accounted for 2 
retirees and one child. 
 
Figure 7-17 : The presence of retirees in the household as a predictor for evacuation - February vs. June (normalised) 
7.1.2.5 Household size as predictor to evacuate 
Table 7-3 : February 2011 - individual responses to evacuation or stay at home - per household size 
  Household Size 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 All 
Evacuated By self 25 94 71 99 15 16 320 
By friends/family 11 29 31 50 15 1 137 
By emergency services 3 34 14 13  6 70 
Stayed Wanted to 57 316 127 114 10 19 643 
Needed to  7 9 12   28 
Had to 3 10 3 8   24 
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Table 7-4 : June 2011 - individual responses to evacuation or stay at home - per household size 
  Household Size 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 All 
Evacuated By self 14 29 24 38  1 106 
By friends/family 2 7 2 13   24 
By emergency services  2  4   6 
Stayed Wanted to 81 436 221 232 40 35 1045 
Needed to  4 8 13  6 31 
Had to 2 12 3    17 
When comparing the size of households that stay and those that evacuate, there appears to 
be a trend in February that the larger the household the more likely they were to have 
evacuated (Figure 7-18). This trend was reversed in June. 
 
Figure 7-18 : Comparison of decision by individuals to evacuate or stay vs. household size – February/June (all results 
normalised) 
7.1.2.6 Households with animal vs. without as predictor to evacuate 
The numbers of households with and without animals have been normalised into three 
groups to make comparisons easier: those with no animals; those with small pets; and, 
those with livestock. After the Christchurch Earthquake there is a very slight correlation 
between caring for livestock and evacuation (Figure 7-19). This is not apparent in June. 
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Figure 7-19 : Households with animals as a predictor for evacuation - February vs. June (normalised) 
One respondent with livestock noted that, even though they had a 3000 litre water tank, it 
was contaminated with town water supply and could not be used to water the animals. The 
fire brigade could not help, so an alternative was found by trucking 500 litres of muddy 
water per day from Living Springs. 
7.1.2.7 Deprivation Index as a predictor to evacuate 
The Deprivation Index 2006 has been used to normalise the households into 7 groups to 
make comparisons easier (Figure 7-20). 
 
Figure 7-20 : Deprivation Index 2006 as a predictor to evacuate - February vs. June (normalised) 
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There is no clear trend to decide whether or not the Deprivation Index 2006 influences the 
decision to evacuate. After the Christchurch Earthquake, households with a higher 
Deprivation Index were more likely to have a member evacuate, but this reversed after the 
Sumner Earthquakes. The trend to stay was flat for June, with a very slight and probably not 
significant trend to not stay for individuals in households with a higher Deprivation Index. 
  
Figure 7-21 : Comparison Deprivation Index 2006 as predictor for evacuation (left) and stay (right) – February/June – 
trends 
These results point to the Deprivation Index 2006 not being a significant predictor of the 
decision to evacuation. 
7.1.2.8 Red/yellow/green stickers as predictor to evacuate 
The numbers of households with red/yellow/green rapid assessment placards (stickers) 
have been normalised into three groups to make comparisons easier: those with red 
stickers; those with yellow stickers; and, those with green or no stickers (Figure 7-22).  
 
Figure 7-22 : Households with red/yellow/green sticker as a predictor for evacuation - February vs. June (normalised) 
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It is clear to see that there is a positive correlation between evacuating and red stickers, and 
staying and green stickers (Figure 7-23). 
  
Figure 7-23 : Comparison of red/yellow/green placard as predictor for evacuation (left) and stay (right) – February/June 
– trends 
Note: this analysis is very tenuous. Because of the time it takes for a rapid building assessment to be 
performed, it is likely that people would either not wait in order to evacuate, or would continue to live in their 
properties without knowing the structural integrity. The 2011 survey specifically limits the times in which an 
evacuation related to the Christchurch and Sumner Earthquakes, which means that outside of this time, the 
building could be red-stickered.  
7.2 Destinations 
In February, 487 people were evacuated to 108 destinations. 203 evacuated to suburbs 
within Christchurch; 284 evacuated to destinations outside of Christchurch, including 13 
overseas destinations (Australia, UK). 
 
Figure 7-24 : February evacuation destinations within Christchurch (Lyttelton = 70) 
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Figure 7-25 : February evacuation destinations outside of Christchurch 
In June, 127 people were evacuated to 43 destinations. 60 evacuated to suburbs within 
Christchurch; 67 evacuated to destinations outside of Christchurch, including 2 overseas 
destinations (Australia, France). 
 
Figure 7-26 : June evacuation destinations within Christchurch 
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Figure 7-27 : June evacuation destinations outside of Christchurch 
7.3 Delay and duration 
After the Christchurch Earthquake, the majority of individuals that evacuated did so 
immediately on 22nd February. Significant numbers of individuals also evacuated in the 
following four days. When compared with evacuations after the Sumner Earthquakes, the 
overwhelming majority of evacuations occurred on 13th June. 
Evacuations in February lasted typically for just over a week, but again a significant number 
lasted for more the two weeks. A small number were permanent. In June, evacuations 
lasted typically less than a week. A small number of individuals evacuated for more than two 
week, and a very small number evacuated permanently. 
 
Figure 7-28 : Evacuation dates (vs. number of individuals) and durations – February/March 
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Figure 7-29 : Evacuation dates (vs. number of individuals) and durations – June 
7.4 Emergency shelter and accommodation 
The Department of Building and Housing (DBH) initially supplied 82 campervans on 14th 
March 2011 to the Canterbury Agricultural Park (Canterbury A & P Showgrounds) for use by 
those displaced by the Christchurch Earthquake from their own homes. By 1st April 2011, the 
number had risen to 350 campervans: 140 2-berth, 140 4-berth, and 70 6-berth (Robertson 
2012). The campervans were not provided free of charge: the hire cost to the occupier was 
NZD 190 per week for a two-berth, NZD 271 for four-berth, and NZD 337 for six-berth. 
Renters were also required to pay a two-week bond and to pay for their own electricity and 
insurance (3 News 2011). The campervans were progressively returned over a period of 
time, the last being removed from site on 18th July 2012. During this period, of the 350 
campervans made available, 5 were occupied (Robertson 2012): 
2 x 2-berth – 15 April – 29 April 2011 and 9 May – 28 July 2011 
2 x 4-berth – 10 June – 7 July 2011 and 10 June – 12 July 2011 
1 x 6-berth – 20 May – 28 May 2011 
A further 41 temporary 1-, 2-, 3-, and 4-bedroom houses were built at the Linwood Park 
Village, with rents set at NZD 190, NZD 271, NZD 337, NZD 423 respectively, with the first 
tenants moving in on 24th August 2011 (CCC 2011c). 22 of these houses have been occupied, 
with duration of tenancies ranging from 21 to 120 days (as of 6th January 2012) (Robertson 
2012).  
7.5 Structurally unsound yet still inhabited 
Even when the home is structurally unsafe, people will attempt to stay (even if they are 
accommodated in their garage). The surroundings (neighbours and other support networks) 
  
154 
 
are familiar and people may be anxious to guard against burglars a property that is no 
longer secure. Children may be sent away to relatives for a short while whilst the parents 
are busy organising repairs. 
There has been concern that the red, yellow, and green sticker system is being incorrectly 
applied to some earthquake-damaged buildings and causing confusion among owners 
(Barton 2011).  
"People didn't understand what the red, yellow, green meant. They thought it 
was a structural check and it's not. It's an access guideline on whether people can 
go into buildings or not." – Unitec Associate Professor Regan Potangaroa, RedR 
(Registered Engineers for Disaster Relief)  
It is likely this misunderstanding has unfortunately led to people occupying green-stickered 
buildings that were in danger from being collapsed on by neighbouring red-stickered 
properties. Further, because a building was green-stickered did not mean it was safe given a 
further large aftershock. These lessons are being heard at the Canterbury Earthquakes Royal 
Commission of inquiry, which will report on the causes of building failure as a result of the 
Darfield and Christchurch Earthquakes as well as the legal and best-practice requirements 
for buildings in New Zealand Central Business Districts. The inquiry began in May 2011 (The 
Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission 2011). 
7.6 Discussion 
When people evacuated, the distance they moved has many factors associated with it: 
finding a locality that is perceived to be safe; the commuting distance to work; availability of 
accommodation; finances available; familiar surroundings. In June, only a quarter of the 
number of people that evacuated in February did so (not necessarily evacuating after both 
events). Just over a half tended to move outside of Christchurch. 
The evacuate or stay decision is a very complex one: at the small scales used in this study, 
there are too many individual circumstances. The individuals’ circumstances simply create 
noise and any weak predictor variable can be easily lost in that noise. The questionnaire was 
not the best instrument to sort through the nuances, and a formal, guided interview is 
perhaps the best approach to take.  
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The perception shift from before the Darfield Earthquake to after the Sumner Earthquake 
regarding evacuation is interesting: more households self-evacuated even though their 
home was structurally intact than they indicated in the 2010 survey (32% actually left but 
only 24% indicated they would). Also, fewer households evacuated (51%) when their home 
was structurally damaged than they indicated in the 2010 survey (67%). Could it be that, like 
those affected slightly in the Loma Prieta Earthquake (Mileti & O'Brien 1989), the population 
of Lyttelton were “normalised” to the Darfield Earthquake so the Christchurch Earthquake 
did not appear to be damaging enough to warrant evacuation? This may explain the June 
Earthquake evacuation statistics, where only 15% of households with structural damage 
self-evacuated. This may have been because of cumulative normalisation bias caused by 
both the Darfield and Christchurch Earthquakes. 
No overly strong predictor variable was found, other than the colour of the sticker placard. 
As noted, the sticker is affixed after a period of time has passed and the occupants would 
have probably self-evacuated before that time: the sticker is therefore retrospective in 
making that evacuation decision. The occupier of a red-stickered house would have 
probably been able to sense the house was not safe and therefore left. A yellow-stickered 
house may have different justifications for being that colour and the occupier may have had 
a higher threshold to evacuate in that circumstance. Some may not want to leave the 
neighbourhood: 
“I sleep in my Van where i have a mattress, bedding, water, and food” – reply 
from 2011 survey 
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8 Research conclusions and further recommendations 
The objectives of this research are to: 
 Examine the preparedness of the resident population of Lyttelton and surrounding 
area for a natural or manmade disaster; 
 Examine the vulnerability of the resident population of Lyttelton and surrounding 
area to impactful disaster; and, 
 Examine the immediate response of the resident population of Lyttelton and 
surrounding area to recent disasters. 
8.1 Preparedness 
The majority of residents in Lyttelton to Rapaki are prepared for a disaster: they have 
sufficient provisions and community resilience to withstand a calamity for a minimum of 
three days. Lessons learned from the Darfield Earthquake have helped to guide many (not 
all) to be prepared. 
Due to the short period between the recent and various events experienced by this study 
population, it has not been possible to distinguish if emotional distress from the first event 
in September 2010 has increased the preparedness for subsequent events, as proposed by 
(Siegel et al. 2003). From the initial results of the surveys, it appears as though the 
population was actually less prepared in 2011 than in 2010. Perhaps this was because the 
2010 survey results showed the answers to be overly optimistic.  
This is an interesting outcome, as the Darfield Earthquake should have made the residents 
more aware of the risk of earthquakes, and to prepare for them. Because the Darfield 
Earthquake did limited damage to buildings and shut down the lifelines infrastructure for a 
short while, this created a “normalisation bias” for non-victims. This bias limited their 
perception of risk to damaging aftershocks and protective response to warnings (Mileti & 
O'Brien 1989). The Darfield Earthquake may have tempered the population further, as 88% 
stayed in Lyttelton even though the Sumner Earthquake caused more damage to the 
buildings and infrastructure. 
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Certainly, the respondents had never had the opportunity to test whether or not they were 
prepared. It is suggested that the recent events should make a wide-scale ShakeOut exercise 
with participation from the general public more important for other parts of New Zealand 
that are prone to earthquakes, especially Wellington. 
8.2 Vulnerability 
The vulnerability of the population has probably reduced since the Canterbury Earthquake 
Sequence started, with each successive earthquake tending to shift rocks and boulders to 
lower energy levels. Chimneys and unsafe buildings have fallen by themselves. This warning 
to residents may have educated them to the dangers of living in or near older structures, 
and may have prompted them to move away from danger or change the risk environment 
by strengthening their property. All other building stock has been systematically checked, 
and then demolished or strengthened. This was not conceivable to do before the Darfield 
Earthquake as resources were not available: the Christchurch City Council had only required 
earthquake strengthening of buildings to bring them up to partial code only when significant 
alterations or change of use required a building consent(CCC 2010a). 
Prior to the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence, the population of Lyttelton to Rapaki had 
been at risk of boulder roll and rockfalls from the steep slopes surrounding the residential 
areas (Elder et al. 1991). The Darfield Earthquake may have reduced the vulnerability to 
rockfall as people became aware of the dangers and the CCC sought to address the issue. 
The Christchurch Earthquake, however, with a very shallow epicentre under the Port Hills, 
made any remediation work or mitigation efforts to date appear insignificant when 
compared to the amount of rock mobilised. Nevertheless, work has carried on to ground-
truth boulder source and hazard areas (McFarlane 2011). In time, this work will make the 
Port Hills surrounding the study area safer, this reducing the physical source of the 
vulnerability of the population. 
Lyttelton Harbour has an historical record of far-field tsunami inundating land close to the 
shoreline. The February 2010 tsunami was small (2m) in comparison to the 7m wave of 1868 
that devastated the harbour (de Lange & McSaveney 2009; de Lange & Moon 2009). The 
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population is still at risk of such a wave (Power & Gale 2010). The communities of Cass Bay 
and Rapaki are sufficiently low-lying to be at risk of run-up. 
The snows of 25th July 2011 closed Dyer’s Pass Road for two days (CCC 2011a). The council 
spread sand on the steep slopes but when it melted the following weekend, it became very 
dangerous to drive and walk on (pers comms – the author). There is very little anyone can 
do to mitigate the effects of snow and ice in Lyttelton due to the very steep and narrow 
streets and the South-facing aspect which barely receives sun in the Winter. Snow clearing 
machinery is not effective due to the tight confines of most streets and the parked cars. The 
steepness of the slopes may make snow clearing dangerous, and the cleared streets would 
have the propensity of icing up overnight leading to a higher risk of accident in the morning. 
8.3 Response 
A constant theme throughout the comments from participants was the feeling of being cut-
off as the tunnel, Evan’s Pass, and Dyer’s Pass Roads were closed. Families were divided as 
the routes through and around the Port Hills were closed. Many individuals attempted to 
travel from Sumner to Lyttelton by foot when they couldn’t drive (survey). Others risked the 
fatal Bridle Path route (Mann 2011). 
The homeward journey was halved in June when compared with February. It is suggested 
that residents had become familiar with driving on roads with many defects and detours. 
They make more-informed decisions on where to park (so access to their car is more certain 
after an event). The Christchurch Earthquake unexpectedly closed all of the routes into and 
leaving Lyttelton whereas closures after the Sumner Earthquakes were anticipated and 
routes altered. 
As voice telecommunications were overloaded people turned to the Short Message Service 
(SMS) and started TXTing their family members. This lead to further overloading of the 
network: some TXTs were received after a long delay, which made making arrangements to 
meet difficult and, as the network is designed to drop these messages in extremes, there is 
no guarantee of delivery. Overall, the infrastructure handled the traffic well, but power 
outages required a quick deployment of electrical generators by Telecom, Vodafone and 2° 
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network engineers to cellular tower sites to keep the system running. The communication 
companies requested calls be limited in order to help preserve battery power in the interim. 
The vulnerability of children and retirees need to be further analysed. Whilst parents expect 
the school will keep their children safe, the teachers and support staff themselves may be 
parents, wishing to reunite with their own children and families. This is all the more pressing 
if the children and parents are on opposite sides of the Port Hills with no safe route 
between. Throughout this, children must be kept in a low-stress environment that will 
reduce psychological trauma. 
8.4 Further research 
It is suggested that further research on how schools manage their relationships with 
students and caregivers/parents in the event of an emergency be undertaken. This is 
especially more important given the frequency in which Lyttelton is cut-off from north of 
the Port Hills where many children go to school or parents are at work. 
The effects evacuation has on children (social upheaval, separation angst, etc.) should be 
compared with the effects staying in a place that may have bad memories and continuing 
aftershocks has. 
The evacuation decision model (Chang et al. 2009; Wright & Johnston 2010) is perhaps not 
suitable for the small community of Lyttelton and the surrounding area in the study. Could a 
less macro-oriented and more micro-oriented model be designed? Are there any more 
predictor variables that are easily visible from outside of the household? 
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B. Pre-September 2010 survey 
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C. Pre-September 2010 Interview 
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D. Post-June 2011 Survey 
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E. 2010 Parked vehicle census 
The parked vehicle census was performed on foot using a Trimble Juno SB handheld, a 
Windows Mobile data collector with an integrated mapping-grade GNSS receiver, running 
Trimble TerraSync software. The TerraSync software is loaded with a data dictionary for the 
data collection task at hand.  In this census, vehicles were recorded as point data with the 
following attributes: 
Table E-1 : Data Dictionary Schema for Vehicle census data collection 
Attribute Data type Data values Description 
Vehicle Registration Text maximum 6 characters If visible, the unique vehicle registration is 
recorded. This is used to identify the 
vehicle between the various survey 
sweeps. 
Position Menu Road The vehicle is parked on the carriageway, 
which may include a parking area. Many 
roads in Lyttelton are narrow and windy, 
and many vehicles are parked causing 
obstruction to emergency services. In the 
event of an earthquake when roads were 
even more impassable, quantifying the 
location of an obstruction by parked 
vehicles, as well as the likelihood of those 
cars being driven away as people evacuate, 
are of interest to emergency services. 
Path The vehicle is parked such that it obstructs 
pedestrians on the path. This also includes 
grass verges and median strips. The 
majority of vehicles parked on paths and 
verges were located at or near pinch-
points on the road network. Sometimes no 
parking zones meant vehicles would be 
parked away from the carriageway. 
Property The vehicle is parked on private property. 
This includes parking areas not on the 
carriageway. Sometimes, the hard stands 
would be contiguous with the carriageway 
and therefore represents a possible 
obstacle for emergency services travelling 
along the road. In the event of an 
evacuation, having the vehicle parked 
away from the road means that to 
evacuate the vehicle would need to join 
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Attribute Data type Data values Description 
the traffic flow, perhaps leading to a 
bottleneck. 
Garage The vehicle is parked in a private garage. 
Again, as with being parked on private 
property, opening the garage doors and 
entering the traffic flow may cause a 
bottleneck to form. Also, the garage itself 
may be susceptible to damage, rendering 
the vehicle inaccessible or damaged. 
Direction Menu With flow The vehicle is parked in the direction of 
traffic flow, i.e. the driver of a vehicle 
approaching it would see the left-hand side 
or rear lights (New Zealand Government 
2004b) (clause 6.12). 
Against flow The vehicle is parked facing oncoming 
traffic, i.e. the driver of a vehicle 
approaching it would see the right-hand 
side or front lights. 
Slant The vehicle is parked in an orientation that 
is not parallel or perpendicular to the flow 
of traffic. 
Perpendicular The vehicle is parked perpendicular to the 
flow of traffic. This is common practice on 
Voelas Road, opposite the school, for 
instance, due to the steep gradient. 
Forward out The vehicle is parked such that it would 
need to drive forward to exit private 
property or garage in order to join the 
traffic. 
Reverse out The vehicle is parked such that it would 
need to reverse to exit private property or 
garage in order to join the traffic. 
Type Menu Car A car, with seats for between 2 and 7 
passengers, and not otherwise categorised, 
below. 
SUV A vehicle with higher ground clearance 
than a car but not capable of off-road 
travel. 
4x4 A vehicle with permanent or selectable 
four-wheel drive, with high ground 
clearance, capable of off-road travel.  
Ute A vehicle with a tray in lieu of an enclosed 
luggage space. The tray may have an 
optional cover. [Ute is derived from utility.] 
Van A vehicle used by contractors or as a small 
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Attribute Data type Data values Description 
bus with up to 9 passengers. 
Truck A vehicle used for haulage. 
Trailer A vehicle with no motor that couples to a 
pulling vehicle. Includes caravans in this 
census. 
RV A recreational vehicle: a motor-powered 
caravan. 
Machinery Machinery used for road construction, etc. 
Other This category consists of motorcycles, 
mopeds, bicycles. It also includes road 
obstructions, such as skips. 
 
 
Figure E-1 : A Trimble Juno SB handheld, running Trimble TerraSync software 
After returning from the field, the data was transferred to a computer running Trimble GPS 
Pathfinder Office software, where it was post-processed against the McQueen’s Valley base 
station, operated by Land Information New Zealand (LINZ).  
Data was collected over a period of a few weeks for each day/time combination. Data from 
the various collection campaigns were merged together to provide a data set for Sunday 
late afternoons, Monday early afternoons, and Wednesday late evenings.  
The resulting, cleaned data was then exported as an Esri ShapeFile to ArcGIS, where it was 
mapped.  
A further bonus of using a GNSS receiver is that elevation data can be collected. Also, a 
travel log of all points between the vehicles was recorded, meaning the complete public 
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right of way road network of the study area has been mapped in three dimensions. This 
census did not include private rights of way.
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F. Temporary accommodation – tenancy 
 
Figure F-1 : Tenancy of temporary housing at Linwood Park (Robertson 2012) 
 
Figure F-2 : Tenancy of campervans sited at Canterbury Agriculture Park (Robertson 2012) 
Occupancy (week number 2011) 2012
Flat Number Bedrooms 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54
2 3
6 3
7 2
9 2
12 2
14 3
15 2
16 2
17 3
18 3
19 3
22 3
23 4
24 3
25 3
26 3
27 2
28 2
31 2
34 2
35 2
51 4
Initial tenancy
Second tenancy
Occupancy (week number 2011)
Campervan Berths 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
1 2
2 2
3 4
4 4
5 6
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G. Christchurch Suburbs and City Sectors 
Suburbs are unofficial unit areas commonly used to describe a locality and are not 
commonly gazetted. They can be found on various maps as names to describe a general 
area. Even though suburbs are used for physical post service delivery, they do not have any 
official meaning. As such, suburbs have not official extents and their boundaries are not 
officially recognised, and can change depending on use and who is using them.  
The smallest official unit area is that of the Statistics New Zealand mesh block. All official 
unit areas are built using mesh blocks: census blocks, wards, territorial units, etc. The 
boundaries of New Zealand Post postcode areas are the exception and are based on 
physical boundaries and do not follow either mesh block or suburb ‘boundaries’. 
This study lists 81 localities and treats them as suburbs. 
These suburbs have then been aggregated for this analysis to create City Sectors. For this 
study, the main population centres of the study area have been left separate and 
identifiable. 
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Figure G-1 : Christchurch city sectors 
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H. Housing stock 
 
Figure H-1 : Year of construction of buildings in the study area 
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Figure H-2 : Wall construction of buildings in the study area 
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Figure H-3 : Roof construction of buildings in the study area 
204 
I. Study area red/yellow/green sticker map, with demolitions 
 
Figure I-1 : Building placard placement – September 2010 
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Figure I-2 : Building placard placement – February 2011 
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Figure I-3 : Building placard placement – June 2011 
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J. New Zealand Modified Mercalli Scale 
The following table is taken from (Dowrick 1996). 
Table J-1 : New Zealand Modified Mercalli Scale 
Level Description 
MM I People 
Not felt except by a very few people under exceptionally favourable conditions. 
MM II People 
Felt by persons at rest, on upper floors or favourably placed. 
MM III People 
Felt indoors; hanging objects may swing, vibration similar to passing of light trucks, duration may be estimated, may not be 
recognised as an earthquake. 
MM IV People 
Generally noticed indoors but not outside. Light sleepers may be awakened. Vibration maybe likened to the passing of heavy 
traffic, or to the jolt of a heavy object falling or striking the building. 
Fittings 
Doors and windows rattle. Glassware and crockery rattle. Liquids in open vessels may be slightly disturbed. Standing 
motorcars may rock. 
Structures 
Walls and frames of buildings, and partitions and suspended ceilings in commercial buildings, may be heard to creak.  
MM V People 
Generally felt outside, and by almost everyone indoors. Most sleepers awakened. A few people alarmed. 
Fittings 
Small, unstable objects are displaced or upset. Some glassware and crockery may be broken. Hanging pictures knock against 
the wall. Open doors may swing. Cupboard doors secured by magnetic catches may open. Pendulum clocks stop, start, or 
change rate. 
Structures 
Some windows Type I cracked. A few earthenware toilet fixtures cracked. 
MM VI People 
Felt by all. People and animals alarmed. Many run outside. Difficulty experienced in walking steadily. 
Fittings 
Objects fall from shelves. Pictures fall from walls. Some furniture moved on smooth floors, some unsecured free-standing 
fireplaces moved. Glassware and crockery broken. Very unstable furniture overturned. Small church and school bells ring. 
Appliances move on bench or table tops. Filing cabinets or “easy glide” drawers may open (or shut).  
Structures 
Slight damage to buildings Type I. Some stucco or cement plaster falls. Windows Type I broken. Damage to a few weak 
chimneys, some may fall. 
Environment 
Trees and bushes shake, or are heard to rustle. Loose material may be dislodge from sloping ground, e.g. existing slides, talus 
slopes, shingle slopes. 
MM VII People 
General alarm. Difficulty experienced in standing. Noticed by motorcar drivers who may stop. 
Fittings 
Large bells ring. Furniture moves on smooth floors, may move on carpeted floors. Substantial damage to fragile contents of 
buildings. 
Structures 
Unreinforced stone and brick walls cracked. Building Type I cracked with some minor masonry falls. A few instances of 
damage to Buildings Type II. Unbraced parapets, unbraced brick girdles, and architectural ornaments fall. Roofing tiles, 
especially ridge tiles may be dislodged. Many unreinforced domestic chimneys damaged, often falling from roof-line. Water 
tanks Type I burst. A few instances of damage to brick veneers and plaster or cement-based linings. Unrestrained water 
cylinders (water tanks Type II) may move and leak. Some windows Type II cracked. Suspended ceilings fall.  
Environment 
Water made turbid by stirred-up mud. Small slides such as falls of sand or gravel banks, and small rock-falls from steep slopes 
and cuttings. Instances of settlement of unconsolidated or wet, weak soils. Some fine cracks appear in sloping ground. A few 
instances of liquefaction (i.e. small water and sand ejections). 
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Level Description 
MM VIII People 
Alarm may approach panic. Steering of motorcars greatly affected. 
Structures 
Buildings Type I heavily damaged, some collapse. Buildings Type II damaged, some with partial collapse. Buildings Type III 
damaged in some cases. A few instances of damage to Structure Type IV. Monuments and pre-1976 elevated tanks and 
factory stacks twisted or brought down. Some pre-1965 infill masonry panels damaged. A few post-1980 brick veneers 
damaged. Decayed timber piles of houses damaged. Houses not secured to foundations may move. Most unreinforced 
domestic chimneys damaged, some below roof-line, many brought down. 
Environment 
Cracks appear on steep slopes and in wet ground. Small to moderate slides in roadside cuttings and unsupported 
excavations. Small water and sand ejections and localised lateral spreading adjacent to streams, canals, lakes, etc.  
MM IX Structures 
Many Buildings Type I destroyed. Buildings Type II heavily damaged, some collapse. Buildings Type III damaged, some with 
partial collapse. Structures Type IV damaged in some cases, some with flexible frames seriously damaged. Damage or 
permanent distortion to some Structures Type V. Houses not secured to foundations shifted off. Brick veneers fall and 
expose frames. 
Environment 
Cracking of ground conspicuous. Landsliding general on steep slopes. Liquefaction effects intensified and more widespread, 
with large lateral spreading and flow sliding adjacent to streams, canals, lakes, etc. 
MM X Structures 
Most Buildings Type I destroyed. Many Buildings Type II destroyed. Buildings Type III heavily damaged, some 
collapse. Structures Type IV damaged, some with partial collapse. Structures Type V moderately damaged, but few partial 
collapses. A few instances of damage to Structures Type VI. Some well-built timber buildings moderately damaged (excluding 
damage from falling chimneys). 
Environment 
Landsliding very widespread in susceptible terrain, with very large rock masses displaced on steep slopes. Landslide dams 
may be formed. Liquefaction effects widespread and severe. 
MM XI Structures 
Most Buildings Type II destroyed. Many Buildings Type III destroyed. Structures Type IV heavily damaged, some 
collapse. Structures Type V damaged, some with partial collapse. Structures Type VI suffer minor damage, a few moderately 
damaged. 
MM XII Structures 
Most Buildings Type III destroyed. Structures Type IV heavily damaged, some collapse. Structures Type V damaged, some 
with partial collapse. Structures Type VI suffer minor damage, a few moderately damaged. 
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Construction types 
Buildings Type I 
 
Buildings with low standard of workmanship, poor mortar, or constructed of weak materials like mud brick or 
rammed earth. Soft storey structures (e.g. shops) made of masonry, weak reinforced concrete or composite 
materials (e.g. some walls timber, some brick) not well tied together. Masonry buildings otherwise conforming 
to buildings Types I to III, but also having heavy unreinforced masonry towers. (Buildings constructed entirely 
of timber must be of extremely low quality to be Type I.) 
Buildings Type II 
 
Buildings of ordinary workmanship, with mortar of average quality. No extreme weakness, such as inadequate 
bonding of the corners, but neither designed nor reinforced to resist lateral forces. Such buildings not having 
heavy unreinforced masonry towers 
Buildings Type III 
 
Reinforced masonry or concrete buildings of good workmanship and with sound mortar, but not formally 
designed to resist earthquake forces. 
Structures Type IV 
 
Buildings and bridges designed and built to resist earthquakes to normal use standards, i.e. no special collapse 
or damage limiting measures taken (mid-1930s to c. 1970 for concrete and to c. 1980 for other materials). 
Structures Type V 
 
Buildings and bridges, designed and built to normal use standards, i.e. no special damage limiting measures 
taken, other than code requirements, dating from since c. 1970 for concrete and c. 1980 for other materials. 
Structures Type VI 
 
Structures, dating from c. 1980, with well-defined foundation behaviour, which have been specially designed 
for minimal damage, e.g. seismically isolated emergency facilities, some structures with dangerous or high 
contents, or new generation low damage structures. 
Windows 
Type I Large display windows, especially shop windows 
Type II Ordinary sash or casement windows 
Water tanks 
Type I External, stand mounted, corrugated iron tanks 
Type II Domestic hot-water cylinders unrestrained except by supply and delivery pipes. 
Other comments 
 "Some" or "a few" indicates that the threshold of a particular effect has just been reached at that intensity.  
 "Many run outside" (MM 6) is variable depending upon mass behaviour, or conditioning by occurrence or absence of previous 
earthquakes, i.e. may occur at MM 5 or not until MM 7. 
 "Fragile contents of buildings": fragile contents include weak, brittle, unstable, unrestrained objects in any kind of building. 
 "Well-built timber buildings" have: wall openings not too large; robust piles or reinforced concrete strip foundations; superstructure 
tied to foundation. 
 Buildings Type III to V at MM 10 and greater intensities are more likely to exhibit the damage levels indicated for low -rise buildings on 
firm or stiff ground and for high-rise buildings on soft ground. By inference lesser damage to low-rise buildings on soft ground and 
high-rise buildings on firm or stiff ground may indicate the same intensity. These effects are due to attenuation of short period 
vibrations and amplification of longer period vibrations in soft soils. 
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K. Source data 
Table K-1 : Data sources used in this thesis 
Data description Source  
Parcel boundaries Christchurch City Council (CCC)  
Red/Yellow/Green Sticker  Christchurch City Council  
QV Data Christchurch City Council  
Demolition data Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA)  
Rockfall threat data Port Hills Geotechnical Group (PHGG)/(CCC)  
Lyttelton tunnel closures New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA)  
Lyttelton-area road use data Christchurch City Council  
Road condition data Christchurch City Council  
Satellite imagery Google Earth  
Topo-Maps TopoOnline  
Coastline data Koordinates  
Meshblock Statistics New Zealand  
Deprivation Index Otago University, Ministry of Health  
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L. Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) 
Some geotechnical obtained for use in the rock fall and land slide hazard analysis was 
obtained from the Port Hills Geotechnical Group, a working group which is part of the 
Christchurch City Council, under a non-disclosure agreement between the CCC and 
University of Canterbury. That source data cannot be published, however it is possible to 
publish the data in an aggregate form that is not site specific. The NDA is attached, 
herewith, as a record. 
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